Individuals, society and the world: a defence of collective environmental duties. by Cripps, E.B.
2810413668
Dispatched to Examiner
<3l/a6] dt ..........

Individuals, Society & the World:
A Defence of Collective Environmental Duties
Elizabeth Blanche Cripps
University College London
1
UMI Number: U593618
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U593618
Published by ProQuest LLC 2013. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Declaration
I, Elizabeth Blanche Cripps, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my 
own. W here information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this
has been indicated in the thesis.
2
Abstract
This thesis defends a collective duty to establish a global-level institution to 
tackle climate change. This is motivated through collective responsibility for 
environmental harm, and collective self-interest.
Building on Larry May, it is contended that a number o f individuals can be 
collectively responsible, in a weak but morally significant sense, for the (even 
unintended) predictable result o f  the combination o f their individual acts. It is 
argued that this gives rise to a collective duty to remedy or end the harm, and 
correlative individual duties.
The dominant intentionalist model o f collectivities is rejected. Arguing 
against Margaret Gilbert, it is claimed that a collectivity is constituted by a set o f 
individuals mutually dependent through some common goal, purpose or all- 
things-considered interest, whether or not they acknowledge it themselves.
A capabilities model o f human flourishing is defended, according to which it 
is not in someone's all-things-considered interest to be deprived o f a central 
functional capability, on something like Martha Nussbaum 's list. To undermine a 
person's capability to enjoy a central functioning is to do morally significant 
harm.
It is argued that, especially for larger collectivities, it is often “better”, in 
terms o f achieving the common goals, purposes or interests, that certain 
decisions be made collectively, rather than left to the aggregation o f individual 
acts. This appeals to: inefficiency, ignorance, the individual-collective rationality 
distinction, partial conflict, and rational altruist arguments.
Collective (and correlative individual) duties to establish global 
environmental decision-making institutions are defended: prudentially, because 
most humans constitute a collectivity by virtue o f the threat o f climate change to 
fundamental interests, and morally, because most are collectively responsibility 
for harm.
Finally, institutional change is called for, so that certain (primarily 
environmental) decisions are made by a global decision-making body and handed 
down as restrictions on states and individuals. A number o f objections are 
addressed.
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Introduction
It s  excitin g  to  have a re a l c risis  on y o u r  hands, when y o u  have sp en t h a lf  y o u r  p o lit ic a l  
life d ea lin g  with hum drum  issues like the environm ent.
Margaret Thatcher, 1 9 8 2 1
[T ] he sc ien tific  evid en ce  o f  g lo b a l w arm ing  c a u se d  b y  g reen h o u se  g a s  em issions is now  
o v erw h e lm in g ... f i jh e r e  is noth ing m o re  serious, m ore urgent o r  m ore dem an din g  o f  
leadersh ip , here  o f  cou rse  but m ost im portan tly , in the g lo b a l  com m unity.
Tony Blair, 2 0 0 6 “
As a species, we face urgent global problem s.3 Many o f these result from human 
behaviour. The detrimental impact o f combined human activity and human 
numbers on the natural world is beyond dispute, although the precise levels, the 
feasibility o f  prevention and the danger o f  passing a “threshold" beyond which 
damage becomes exponentially worse and irreversible, remain open to scientific 
debate.4 These are problems which will affect us all but which have, and will 
continue to have, a particularly detrimental effect on some o f  us, especially those 
who are already disadvantaged in various w ay s/
Through this impact on the environment, although not only in this way, we 
can seriously influence the lives o f  ourselves and others on a worldwide scale. 
Thus, like it or not, we find ourselves in an inescapable web o f relations 
extending beyond the acknowledged “groups" within which each o f us sees 
herself as living her life: beyond such familiar categories as families, friendship 
groups, local communities, nation states and even federal groupings o f states. 
Our impact on the lives o f others extends, moreover, beyond the current 
generation.
' Margaret Thatcher, then British Prime M inister, on the Falklands War, to the Scottish  
C onservative Party C onference, 14 M ay 1982. (O x fo rd  D ic tio n a ry  o f  Q u ota tions, R evised Fourth 
Edition, 1996. Exact w ording sourced by the O D Q  from H ugo Young: O ne o f  Us (M acm illan, 
1989)).
' Tony Blair, then British Prime M inister, at the launch o f  the Stem  R eview  into clim ate change, 
30 O ctober 2006 . (Full speech available at w w w .n u m b er-10 .gov .u k )
Indeed, "we" do so  m ore generally -  as all the sp ec ies sharing this finite planet.
4 See, for exam ple, 1PCC 2007  and O restes 2004 . For a survey o f  sc ien tific  and philosophical 
argum ents, see  Gardiner 2004 , 555-600 . For his d iscussion  o f  threshold effects, see  2 0 04 , 56 2 -3 . 
See 1PCC 2 0 0 7 , 5 3 -4  for analysis o f  the risk o f  abrupt or irreversible change.
5 See IPCC 2 0 07 , 4 8 -5 3  and Shrader-Frechette 2 0 02 , 8-13
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These are practical points, but they raise pressing questions for moral and 
political philosophers -  those thinkers who concern themselves with how human 
beings ought to live, and how they ought to live together. The philosophical 
challenge is all the greater given that the nation state has so long been taken as 
the locus o f political responsibility, and moral philosophy has so long focused on 
the foreseeable impact o f our individual actions (or the action o f some clearly 
defined corporate body).
The kind o f  questions facing us are: W hat should we (prudentially and 
morally) do about climate change? W hat does fulfilment o f our duties require in 
terms o f  a global institutional restructure? W hat does this mean for each o f us, as 
an individual? Under what circumstances could environmental duties 
legitim ately be coercively imposed? To answer them, we need to go back to the 
moral philosophy and philosophy o f  social science on which political philosophy 
relies, to ask some still more basic questions. We need to reconsider the 
circumstances under which we constitute the kind o f group or collectivity with 
which political philosophy should be concerned, and those under which we can 
be criticised as doing m orally significant harm to others.
This thesis will not answer all the questions posed above, but it will make a 
start. It will defend a collective duty to establish a global environmental decision­
making body, and will do so in two ways: prudentially, by appeal to collective 
self-interest, and morally, through collective responsibility for environmental 
harm. It will also discuss correlative individual duties: to promote such an 
institution (assuming there is a chance o f  success) and (subject to various 
conditions) to comply with the restrictions it imposes. These are motivated both 
prudentially and morally. In the moral case, supplementary individual duties are 
also suggested.
I will argue that such a global institution, to be effective, would need powers 
o f  enforcement. However, that is not enough in itself to justify such coercive 
authority. A first step will be taken towards such a justification, initially by 
appeal to the prudential incentive to consent to mutual coercion, but 
supplem enting this with two central liberal ideas: the Harm Principle and the 
Principle o f  Fairness, the latter itself supplemented by appeal to some positive 
moral claims, or duties o f  humanity.
The thesis will be structured as follows. Chapter One will build on Larry M ay's 
work to defend a weak but important notion o f collective harm. The claim is that 
a number o f individuals can be collectively, morally responsible for the 
predictable result o f  the combination o f  their individual acts, even if they do not 
individually intend to contribute to harm, or even to some collective act. I will 
argue that this weak collective responsibility gives rise to a collective duty to 
remedy or end the harm (if  necessary by establishing collective decision-making 
structures), and also suggest some correlative individual duties.
Chapter Two will reject the dom inant intentionalist model o f collectivities, or 
social groups, engaging in particular with M argaret G ilbert's plural subject 
account. (The "intentionalist" claim, broadly put, is that group-wide 
acknowledged awareness o f mem bership is necessary for collectivityhood.) 
Instead, I will argue that a collectivity is constituted by a set o f individuals 
mutually dependent through some comm on or shared interest, purpose or goal, 
and that social groups, on which political philosophers and philosophers o f  social 
science have standardly focused, are only a subset o f  the w ider (and politically 
and explanatorily relevant) set o f collectivities.
The mutual dependence clause is understood broadly: as meaning that the 
individuals have at least one goal, purpose or interest that it only makes sense to 
consider as being pursued together, whether or not they acknowledge it 
themselves. I will also introduce the idea o f a morally salient potential 
collectivity, whose members would constitute a collectivity were they to espouse 
some particular goal, and who have a collective moral duty (because o f  collective 
responsibility for unacceptable harm) to espouse it.
Assumptions made in both these chapters will be filled out by Chapter Three. 
I will defend a capabilities model o f  human flourishing, according to which it is 
against som eone's interest (whether or not they acknowledge this) to be 
permanently deprived o f  a central capability to function, on something like 
Martha N ussbaum 's list. By the same token, to undermine a person's capability 
to enjoy one or more central functionings is to harm them in a morally significant 
way.
Chapter Four will explain how a collective moral duty (or collective rational 
incentive) can translate to a duty to set up a collective decision-making structure. 
It will do so by defending the claim  that, especially for larger collectivities, it can
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be better for certain decisions to be made at the collective level, rather than left to 
the aggregation o f  individual acts. “ Better" is understood strictly in terms o f  
achievement o f  the goals, purposes or interests around which a collectivity is 
constituted. I will appeal to: efficiency; individual refusal to acknowledge 
common interests; the individual-collective rationality distinction; partial 
conflict; and two rational altruist arguments.
Chapter Five will apply the theoretical framework established thus far to the 
environmental case. It will argue that most humans make up a collectivity by 
virtue o f a fundamental interest in environmental preservation, and that a slightly 
different group, also constituted by much o f humanity and including any 
individuals not in the first set, constitutes a morally salient potential collectivity 
through weak collective responsibility for environmental harm. By dismissing 
potential moral “excuses". I will argue that this harm is morally impermissible.
This, I will contend, gives us a collective duty to establish a global 
environmental decision-making institution. Individual duties to promote and 
comply with such an institution will also be defended, and a preliminary 
argument will be offered as to how coercive powers o f  enforcement, by such an 
institution, could be legitimated.
Finally, I will outline some institutional implications. Building on Chapter 
Five, I will specify a Decision-M aking Claim, according to which decisions 
should be made qua collectivity when they are directly related to achieving or 
satisfying the common purposes, interests or goals o f the collectivity, and need to 
be made collectively to achieve better those goals, purposes or interests. This will 
be used to defend the making o f environmental decisions by a global institution, 
and a corresponding weakening o f  state sovereignty. I will also engage with 
potential criticisms o f both this proposed institutional framework (particularly 
statist objections to the threat to state sovereignty) and the philosophical model 
on which it rests.
I am aware that my account will prompt criticisms from all sides, breaking, as it 
does, with many conventions in this overlap o f three philosophical fields: moral 
philosophy, political philosophy and the philosophy o f  social science. I am 
unapologetic. If we are required to stick to a framework which provides no 
resources for the political philosopher to address the results o f  our practical
10
connectedness and the combined impact o f our behaviour (which does not 
always follow institutional lines but, rather, may motivate institutional change) 
then we are doomed, as far as policy m aking is concerned, to practical and moral 
disaster.
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C h a p te r  O ne 
T he H arm  W e Do T ogether
As a result o f  (largely anthropogenic) climate change, future generations will 
inherit a world very different from that into which we were bom. Temperatures 
will be higher, weather patterns will be more extreme, an increasing proportion 
o f the currently habitable world will be under water, and the rest will be at 
greater risk o f floods, tropical cyclones, droughts or other natural disasters.1 The 
statistics are bleak even for the lifetimes o f those currently alive." Those in low- 
lying or otherwise vulnerable parts o f the world are already affected by changing 
weather patterns. Pollution and other environmental waste is having a dramatic 
negative impact on health in poor communities even in otherwise affluent states, 
as well as in developing countries.3
W hat should this mean to me, as an individual enjoying a lifestyle which may 
not be carbon-intensive compared to that o f many o f my fellow westerners, but is 
certainly so compared with much o f  the w orld 's population? Should I refrain 
from flying to the Costa Blanca for a w eekend's rock climbing? Should I refrain 
even from driving to Snowdonia? Should I use less paper, glass and plastic? 
Should I recycle what I do use? Should I petition the UK government (or the EU 
parliament) daily to change its climate change policy? Should I spend every 
conversation with friends or colleagues nagging them to use less energy? Should 
I, as well as or instead o f  all these, give m oney to environmental charities, or to
1 A verage temperatures are expected  to increase by 0.2°C  per decade for the next tw o decades. 
After that, estim ates suggest a 0.1°C increase per decade even i f  concentrations o f  greenhouse  
gases w ere m aintained at 2 0 0 0  levels. A verage temperatures in 2090-9  could be up to 6.4°C  
higher than in 1980-99, depending how  pessim istic  a forecast one takes on em ission  growth. Sea  
levels are predicted to rise by up to 0 .59m . (1PCC 2 0 07 , 4 5 -54) B eyond the 2 151 century, the 
IPCC warns: ‘A nthropogenic warm ing and sea level rise w ould continue for centuries due to the 
tim e sca les associated with clim ate processes and feedbacks, even i f  GHG concentrations w ere to 
be stabilised.* (4 6 ) Gardiner, drawing on U S N ational Research Council statistics and Robert 
G agosian: "Abrupt C lim ate Change: Should W e B e W orried?" (W oods H ole O ceanographic  
Institution, 2 003) warns that IPCC predictions may not be stark enough, as they could  
underestim ate ‘the potential for nonlinear threshold effects*. (2 0 0 4 . 562)
‘ IPCC 2007 , 5 0 -3 . In Africa, the report warns: ‘By 20 2 0 , betw een 75 and 25 0  m illion o f  people  
are projected to be exposed  to increased water stress due to clim ate change. By 2 0 2 0 , in som e  
countries, y ields from rain-fed agriculture could be reduced by up to 50% . Agricultural 
production, including access to food, in many African countries is projected to be severely  
com prom ised . T his w ould further adversely affect food security and exacerbate malnutrition.* 
(5 0 ) T he IPCC also  asserts w ith 'm edium  confiden ce' that the im pact o f  temperature changes has 
a lrea d y  been felt in ‘ som e aspects o f  human health*. (2 0 0 7 . 33)
* Shrader-Frechette 2 0 0 2 , 8-13
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charities helping the victims o f  environmental disasters? (If so, how much? Any 
spare cash after fulfilling my wants, or all bar what is needed to keep me above 
some sufficiency threshold?4)
I might query whether I should do any o f  these things, given that m y own 
actions are not directly responsible for any particular harm. My turning up the 
heating will not make any perceptible difference to the temperature o f  the planet, 
pollution levels in Mexico City, or the size o f  the rainforest. Nor will my turning 
it (bu  n, in itself, make any positive difference. So, if  I think only in terms o f the 
consequences o f my individual actions, I will not change my way o f life.
Nonetheless, it is as the result o f  the combined behaviour o f  millions o f 
people like me that such damage is being done to the planet, and so to human 
beings.'' Perhaps, simply on this basis, I should refrain from flying (or driving) at 
all, or from heating my house above the minimum? (I would then be appealing to 
the Kantian idea that I should not do anything that I cannot consistently will that 
everyone should do: if  everyone lived the high energy lifestyle o f the average 
Londoner, the result would be catastrophic.6)
However, m y sacrifice would be pointless unless others also changed their 
behaviour. If, by refraining from all CFC-generating activities, I did make some 
significant difference, I would (surely unfairly) be bearing the costs o f  others' 
profligacy.
This chapter will introduce a framework within which the questions posed 
above can appropriately and helpfully be considered. It will do this by filtering 
our individual duties in such cases through an expanded notion o f  moral 
responsibility for harm, according to which the prim ary responsibility (and so the 
primary correlative duty) is collective. For an individual, the relevant question is 
not simply. “ What should 7 d o ? '\  independently o f  how others could change their
1 Singer, for exam ple, w ould claim  that each o f  us has this strong duty, sim ply as a duty o f
humanity. (1 9 7 2 , 229-43)
> N ote that I base the argum ents o f  this thesis on the harm done to human beings present and
future. H ow ever, this should not be taken as a claim  that the flourishing o f  humans is the on ly  
thing that matters. M y post-doctoral research proposal includes the expansion o f  my m odel to
include the unacceptability o f  environm ental harm to non-hum an anim als, and 1 w ould not rule 
out a moral duty based on the intrinsic value o f  the natural world.
6 Singer 2 0 0 2 . 35. K ant's categorical im perative, in its first form ulation, requires each individual 
to 'act on ly  in a cco rd a n ce  w ith th a t m axim  through which y o u  can  a t the sam e tim e w ill that it 
beco m e a un iversa l la w ' . (K ant 1785. 31 . em phasis in original) Thanks to Andrew W illiam s for 
bringing this point to my attention.
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behaviour, but rather “ W hat should we do, and what duties do I acquire, through 
that collective duty?"
I will defend a notion o f weak collective responsibility, according to which a 
set o f individuals can be collectively responsible for harm caused by the 
predictable aggregation o f individual acts, and explore its implications for 
collective and individual duties. Chapters Five and Six will apply this to the 
current environmental scenario.
This chapter will be structured as follows. Section I will motivate my 
investigation o f collective responsibility by appeal to Samuel Scheffler, who 
highlights a “gap" in our standard moral thinking. I will then engage with May to 
defend an expanded understanding o f  collective responsibility (in a weaker sense 
than corporate responsibility). After outlining M ay's arguments, laying out my 
model o f weak collective responsibility and distinguishing it from his account o f  
shared responsibility, I will defend the notion o f weak collective responsibility 
by rejecting two potential objections. (Sections II, III and IV) Section V will 
consider the implications o f the model in terms o f collective (and correlative 
individual duties) and complete the defence o f  the account by rebutting a final 
objection.
I. A “gap” in conventional morality
Scheffler, appealing to the often unintended and unacknowledged global 
“processes” to which our individual actions contribute, draws attention to a 
possibility overlooked by standard moral thought: moral duties that bind a 
number o f individuals collectively , even though it would be inappropriate to 
blame them individually and they are not acting in combination through some 
social or institutional structure.7 It is evident, in practice, that such groups (in this 
very weak sense) can and do cause great, and morally regrettable, harms.
[D e v e lo p m e n ts  in the modern w o r ld ... ( including] . . .  remarkable advances in sc ien ce  and 
te ch n o lo g y ... continuing revolutions in travel, com m unications, and inform ation  
p ro cessin g ... increased econ om ic  and political interdependence am ong the countries o f
Scheffler 2001 , 32-47
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the world: and the enorm ous growth in world pop u lation ... have made it more d ifficu lt 
than ever to sustain the conception  o f  human social relations as consisting  primarily in 
sm all-sca le  interactions am ong sin g le  in d iv id u a ls ... [QJuality o f  life for people  in an\ one  
part o f  the world is, to a very large extent, a function o f  a network o f  institutional 
arrangem ents that supports a very different quality o f  life  for people in other parts o f  the 
w o rld ... |P |o litica l and econ om ic develop m en ts in one area o f  the g lobe often have rapid 
and dramatic e ffec ts  on people  in other a rea s ... M oreover ... human behaviour now has 
effects on the natural environm ent that are unprecedented in scale. T hese environm ental 
effects distribute th em selves in com plicated  w ays within and across national 
b o u n d a ries ...s
Scheffler suggests that we find such scenarios difficult to accommodate 
because we tend to think exclusively in terms o f  individual moral responsibility, 
within which realm the so-called comm on sense view has a strong intuitive hold 
on us. This view centres on two conceptions o f  normative responsibility: 'the 
doctrine that individuals have a special responsibility for what they themselves 
do, as opposed to what they fail to prevent', and the idea that 'one has distinctive 
responsibilities -  or "special obligations’' -  towards members o f  one 's  own 
family and others to whom one stands in certain significant sorts o f 
relationships'.9
Thus, he argues, it would be problematic on two grounds to try to 
accommodate the global situation whilst retaining an exclusive focus on 
individual moral responsibility. Firstly, practically, to address these global 
problems with only the vocabulary o f  individual responsibility would mean 
rejecting the common sense view -  one which has a deep hold on us. Secondly, 
more fundamentally, while these political and economic developments raise 
cases on which the narrow, comm on sense approach is ill-equipped to comment, 
they do not autom atically provide an alternative within the framework o f 
individual moral responsibility.10 ‘[I]t is not uncommon for an important 
outcome to be the product o f a large num ber o f  acts performed by many different
8 Ibid., 40
y Ibid., 36
10 U sing a parallel argum ent to those against consequentia lism , to attempt to account for such  
w ide ranging e ffects w ithin the fram ework w ould mean putting unreasonable dem ands on 
individuals. ‘After all. the individual agent qua  individual agent w ill typ ically  have only the m ost 
lim ited opportunities to in fluence these global dynam ics, and, indeed, cannot in general be 
assum ed to have any but the sketchiest and m ost speculative notions about the sp ecific  global 
im plications or his o f  her behaviour.' (S ch effler  2 0 0 1 . 4 3 )
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people, few if any o f  whom actually intend to produce the outcome in 
question .'11
Thus, according to Scheffler, acknowledging the moral salience o f a global 
perspective does not necessitate a re-think o f  the conception o f  individual
responsibility but rather *generate[s] doubts about the practice o f  treating the
1 °individual agent as the primary locus o f  [normative] responsibility'. “ This 
chapter will make the obvious next move, exploring the notion o f collective 
responsibility as the best way to fill this hole in our moral framework.
That is not to say that it will ignore the question o f individual duties (o f what /  
should do) altogether. The claim is, rather, that individual duties in such cases are 
most appropriately filtered through the question o f what harm  we, collectively, 
are responsible for, and our corresponding collective duty to do something about 
it. Individuals, on m y model, acquire duties, or responsibilities, to behave in 
certain ways. However, they acquire them as part o f  a group (in some weak 
sense) which is collectively responsible for some harm. M ost crucially, the 
individual is not required to think only in the restrictive terms o f whether she 
should perform some particular contributory act, but in terms o f how (if at all) 
she can change what is happening at the collective level.
II. M ay’s collective responsibility
This section will provide a b rief outline o f  M ay's model o f  collective 
responsibility. It will also summ arise his account o f shared  responsibility, which 
he uses to accommodate some o f  the cases where, I will argue, my weaker 
collective responsibility also applies. The following sections will build on his 
arguments to present and defend my own account.
According to May, if  there is collective responsibility for a harm, some group 
as a whole is responsible: it is not necessary that all or any members be 
individually so. Collective responsibility, he adds, concerns ‘the nondistributed
" Scheffler 2 0 0 1 ,4 3
12 Ibid., 44
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responsibility o f a group o f  people structured in such a way that action can occur 
that could not occur if the members were acting outside the g ro u p '.13
A relatively familiar alternative to individual responsibility is that o f corporate 
responsibility, which seems to fit naturally into this understanding o f 
“nondistributed" responsibility. Corporate responsibility assumes a formalised 
decision-making apparatus, because o f  which there is a sense in which the 
corporation can be said to have acted which is not reducible to the contributing 
acts o f individuals. The corporation can be held responsible as a unit (thus, the 
company Network Rail was fined £14m by the Office o f  Rail Regulation;14 the 
UK government is popularly blamed for taking part in George Bush's invasion o f  
Iraq in the face o f  inadequate evidence o f  weapons o f mass destruction) although 
that does not preclude assigning personal responsibility (for all or some part o f 
the harm) to certain individuals within the corporation (for example, Tony Blair).
However, May extends the idea o f collective responsibility to include more 
than the standard corporate case .15 Firstly, he attributes collective responsibility 
for harm to informal groups such as mobs, where there can be, he maintains, 
group action.16 He argues that, '[a lth o u g h  mobs do not have explicitly decision­
making structures', there is a sense in which all members contribute to some 
action, and there is ‘a kind o f  collective in ten tion '17 by virtue o f  mob solidarity.
Secondly, May defends the idea o f  collective responsibility for waction by a 
“putative group” -  that is, where no group existed but one could have been 
formed in time to prevent a harm  from taking place.18 His example is o f  a
'■ M ay 1992, 106
14 The fine w as im posed after a four-day overrun on engineering w orks on the main London- 
G lasgow  railway line. (See, for exam ple, The G u ard ian , 29 February 2 0 08)
3 M ay 1987 and 1992. Others have a lso  expanded the m odel o f  co llectiv e  responsib ility . David  
M iller, for exam ple, defends an account on w hich either "like-m indedness" or participation in 
and benefit from a "cooperative practice" is sufficient for co llective  responsib ility , in the sense o f  
responsibility to rem edy. (2 0 0 4 , 2 4 8 -5 7 ) H ow ever, he does not rule out a w ider m odel: "I don't 
want to claim  that it is a necessary condition  for ascribing co llective  responsib ility  to a set o f  
individuals that they should display like-m inded  group or cooperative practice features." (2 0 0 4 . 
249)
16 'I use the term "mob" to refer to social groups w hich have no decision -m aking  or 
organisational structures, but w hich, unlike random crow ds, have com e together for econ om ic  or 
political reasons.’ (M ay 1987. 73-4)
17 M ay 1 9 8 7 ,7 4
lx "C ollective i n a c t i o n according to M ay. refers to 'the failure to act o f  a co llection  o f  people
that did not ch oose  as a g ro u p  to rem ain inactive but that could have acted as a group', as 
opposed to "collectiv e om ission", w hich 'refers to the failure o f  a group that co llectiv e ly  ch o o ses  
not to act'. (1 9 9 2 . 107)
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number o f holiday makers on a beach, who fail to organise themselves in time to 
save a child from drowning.19 Collective responsibility in such cases hinges, he 
argues, on whether the individuals could have organised in time to prevent the 
harm.
A putative group o f  people en gages in the kind o f  inaction that warrants co llective  
responsibility if:
(a) the m em bers o f  the group fail to act to prevent a harm, the prevention o f  which w ould  
have required the coordinated actions o f  (so m e of) the m em bers o f  the group;
(b) it is p lausib le to think that the group could have develop ed  a sufficient structure in 
tim e to a llow  the group to act co llectiv e ly  to prevent the harm; and
(c) it is reasonable to think that the m em bers o f  the group should have acted to prevent the 
harm rather than doing anything e lse , such as preventing other harms which they also  
could have prevented."0
May argues that while the individual members o f  the putative group should not
->|
generally be blamed or feel guilt, ‘feelings o f  shame or taint'" are appropriate. " 
May also defends a model o f shared responsibility. This, unlike his 
understanding o f  collective responsibility, ‘concerns the aggregated 
responsibilities o f  individuals, all o f  whom contribute to a result and for that 
reason are personally  responsible, albeit often to different degrees, for a given 
harmful result'." However, shared and collective responsibility are not mutually 
exclusive. Rather, May argues that a num ber o f  individuals can share personal 
responsibility and still be collectively responsible in the nondistributive sense for 
bringing about some harm.24
May develops his notion o f shared responsibility by appeal to cases where the 
jo in t action o f  two or more people leads to harm. In jo int undertakings, he 
argues, ‘the causal contribution o f  each person often cannot easily be ascertained,
10 M ay 1992, 110 
-° Ibid., 116-7
21 Ibid., 109
22 Both the form alised corporate structure and the m ob w ould count as co llectiv ities on the m odel 
I draw up in Chapter T w o. A putative group w ould count as a potential co llectiv ity . H ow ever, I 
w ill not use this vocabulary until my m odel has been laid out.
M ay 1992, 107 [em phasis added]
"4 Ibid., 107. He uses the exam ple o f  the d ow ning  o f  an Iranian passenger plane by the U S  
military: •C ollective  responsibility w as attributed to the United States; but in addition, certain 
A m ericans, because o f  their participation, shared responsib ility for what occurred.' (1 0 7 )
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except to say that all parties played a necessary role in the harm, and that no one 
party played a sufficient role '.22 He goes on to treat joint action as synonymous 
with concerted action, which he defines around intentionality.
Concerted action req u ires... som e sort o f  tacit understanding or agreem ent am ong the 
parties. But such an understanding is not reached w hen there is "mere know ledge by eaeh 
party o f  what the other was doing". Rather, in addition, there must be one clearly  
recognised goal (or set o f  goals) toward w hich each sees their actions as d irected .'6
His example is o f  a number o f persons who, between them, stole some silver 
buttons. One battered down the door, another restrained the plaintiff, another 
took the buttons, and so on, all intentionally contributing to the overall result.27
Although he focuses on intentional cases, May indicates two further scenarios 
in which ‘shared rather than individual full responsibility seems appropriate’. 
The first is that in which a person acted (voluntarily, even intentionally) ‘with no 
knowledge or intent o f contributing to a harm [but nonetheless] did perform a 
necessary part in a harm '. The second is when ‘a person... did not directly cause 
a harm [but] nevertheless acted so as to increase the risk o f the occurrence o f 
harm*.28
The idea o f shared personal (individual) responsibility naturally gives rise to 
the question o f how much harm each individual is personally responsible for. 
May suggests three ways in which personal responsibility might be allocated in 
such cases. The first is division o f  responsibility: either according to different 
roles, which could be used to assign responsibility for proportionally extensive or 
limited “parts" o f  the harm, or by a straight division o f the harm among the 
individuals. The second possibility is that no individual takes responsibility. 
Thirdly, each takes full responsibility.29
However, the latter two are often inappropriate. Given, May argues, that the 
participation o f each individual is necessary for the harm, some responsibility is 
surely appropriate. But because no individual's actions, alone, would have been
M ay 1992, 39
26 Ibid., 41
Ibid., 40 . He borrows the exam ple from  W. Paige Keaton ed. P ro sser  a n d  K eeton  on the L aw  o f  
Torts (W e st  Publishing C om pany, 5 lh edition  1984), 322-3
28 May 1992, 39
;y Ibid., 42
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sufficient to cause the harm, full responsibility seems inappropriate.30 Thus he 
favours the first option and, within that, dividing responsibility according to the 
roles played by individuals in bringing about the harm .31
III. W eak collective responsibility
The previous section outlined M ay's expansion o f the idea o f collective 
responsibility beyond the narrow corporate model. However, I contend that even 
his account overlooks a further plausible understanding o f collective 
responsibility: a weak, but hugely significant, sense in which a num ber o f  
individuals can be responsible for the combined result o f  their individual actions. 
The next sections will explore this possibility, distinguish weak collective 
responsibility from M ay's shared responsibility, defend it against potential 
objections and discuss its implications in terms o f collective and correlative 
individual duties.
The claim to be defended is:
Weak Collective Responsibility Claim
A number o f individuals who do not yet constitute a collectivity (either 
formally, with an acknowledged decision structure or informally, with 
some vaguely defined common interest or goal, as with the mob) can be 
held morally collectively responsible for a harm which has been caused by 
the predictable aggregation o f  individual actions.
“Predictable” here has a double meaning: individuals are acting predictably, in 
that they are acting in pursuit o f  their goals, purposes or interests, and it is 
predictable (reasonably foreseeable) that those actions, in combination, would 
result in the harm.
■° Ibid., 39
1 'I prefer the uneven-d ivision  variation o f  this strategy.' (M ay 1992, 42 ) In co llective  /^action  
cases. M ay argues that each ind ividual's share o f  responsibility w ill depend on the role she could  
have played in bringing about a co llective  prevention o f  the harm (for exam ple, on her leadership  
sk ills i f  such sk ills w ould  be crucial in enabling the putative group to act as a group). (1 9 9 2 , 117)
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Consider the following situation, a variant o f M ay's collective inaction 
exam ple.32 A number o f  teenagers, all independently, decide to swim in a small 
lake. They dive in, swim around very flashily and, between them, cause so much 
turbulence that a child also (independently) swimming in the lake is drowned.
What is the appropriate moral judgem ent on these teenagers? None, 
individually, has harmed the child: the minor turbulence caused by one alone 
would not have done so. Certainly, there is no (collective or individual) intention 
to harm. Nonetheless, it is as a result o f  the combination o f their actions that the 
child drowns. Building on standard moral thinking, I suggest that whether we 
hold the teenagers responsible on a particular occasion is likely to depend on 
whether they could reasonably be expected to be aware o f the danger.
If they are all unaware o f  the child 's inability to swim well, o f  the likelihood 
that others besides themselves would be diving in, or o f quite how much 
turbulence lots o f teenagers jum ping about in the water would create, it m ight be 
considered a tragic accident. If, however, they do not stop their behaviour as 
soon as the risk becomes apparent, or behave in exactly the same way on another 
occasion, with another child, then it seems that they are collectively 
responsible.33
The argument, “ It w asn 't just me -  what 1 did w ouldn't have done any harm if 
there hadn 't been lots o f  others doing it as well” might have some appeal in 
saving the teenagers, qua individuals, from full responsibility. However, it seems 
plausible that it is sufficient to ascribe weak collective responsibility that the 
following is satisfied.
'' M ay's exam ple, recall, is o f  holiday m akers w ho m ight, depending on their capacity to 
organise in tim e, be held co llectiv e ly  responsib le for failure to save a drowning child. (1 992 ,
110-6) H ow ever, my m ore p ositive  sen se  o f  co llec tiv e  responsib ility  appears to be im plicit in his 
account: he describes such "putative groups" as 'm ost responsible for preventing harms that those  
groups have  (tone som eth in g  to b rin g  a b o u t, or about w hieh they have raised expectations'.
(1992 . 118; em phasis added) But what w ould it mean for such a putative group to have done  
som eth in g  to  b rin g  a b ou t a harm? There is no form alised or even informal structure such that the 
action bringing about the harm could  count as co llectiv e  in Max 's sense. The gap can be filled  by 
the notion o f  weak co llectiv e  responsib ility .
' Indeed, to anticipate the d iscussion  below , these conditions go  further than those already  
familiar, for the individual case, from the moral foundations o f  tort law. There, for exam ple,
Perrx su ggests that 'w hen  com m on kn ow led ge  o f  the relevant causal regularities w ould lead an  
a g en t o f  a v era g e  m en ta l c a p a c itie s  to be aware o f  a su ffic ien tly  high level o f  risk o f  harm to 
other persons, taking account o f  both the probability and seriousness o f  the outcom e, then the 
action should be treated for the purposes o f  reparation as faulty'. (1992 , 509 -1 0 ; em phasis added)
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Two-part sufficient condition fo r  weak collective responsibility.
• the individuals acted in ways which, in aggregate, caused harm, 
and which they were aware (or could reasonably be expected to 
have foreseen) would, in aggregate, cause harm (although each 
only intentionally performed his own act); and
• they were all aware (or could reasonably be expected to have 
foreseen) that there were enough others similarly placed (and so 
similarly motivated to act) for the combined actions to bring about 
the harm.
It is important to distinguish this model from M ay's shared responsibility. 
Clearly, some o f  the same cases will be accommodated by each. However, there 
are two important distinctions, which the rest o f this section will bring out.
Firstly, on M ay's model, each individual has a share o f  personal (individual) 
responsibility for the harm. My claim is that the group (in a weak sense) is 
collectively responsible. The implications are different. On M ay's account, 
presumably, individuals, qua individuals, have a duty not to do their “bit" o f  the 
harm (or to make reparation). W ith weak collective responsibility, there is a 
collective duty to end, or repair, the overall harm. Individual duties are acquired 
through that. (I will return to this in the next section.) The second distinction is 
that my model covers a wider range o f cases.
Both points can be made through more detailed consideration o f the ways in 
which a number o f individuals might be said to “contribute to” a harmful result 
without being part o f  a collectivity.
Firstly, a number o f individuals could each cause small harms. These sum 
together straightforwardly as a larger harm. Suppose, for example, the children in 
a village each steal an apple a day from a farm er's orchard. Each theft constitutes 
a small harm, and the sum o f  these small harms is a greater harm (the loss o f 
many apples). The attribution o f personal responsibility is unproblematic, and the 
shared responsibility o f all the individuals is simply the aggregation o f the
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personal responsibility each has for the harm he has done.34 Call such cases 
Aggregated Harms Cases.
Secondly, each individual could contribute to the overall harm, but without 
direct responsibility for any specific part o f it. This could happen in two ways. 
Firstly, what I will dub Concerted Joint Action Cases, which correspond to 
M ay's understanding o f  joint action, above. His example, recall, is o f thieves 
coordinating intentionally to steal buttons. The second possibility is that 
individuals contribute to a harm through actions which are not in themselves 
harmful (which may even be beneficial) and which are not intended to contribute 
to harm, or even to contribute to some common goal. Call such actions “harm 
ingredients" and such cases Aggregated Harm Ingredients Cases.3> The teenagers 
in the lake present one example. At a wider level, Joel Feinberg uses the example 
o f sulphur dioxide emissions which, in combination, render dangerous the 
percentage o f the gas in the air.36
As we saw in Section II, May defends his model explicitly for Concerted Joint 
Action Cases, leaving it unclear whether he intends also to accommodate 
Aggregated Harm Ingredients Cases. He does indicate that shared responsibility 
would be appropriate in cases where a person acted ‘with no knowledge or intent 
o f contributing to a harm [but nonetheless] did perform a necessary part in a 
harm '. However, it is arguable whether this is intended only to refer to a 
particular case o f Concerted Joint Action, where the common end is some other 
goal o f which harm is a (foreseen) side effect, or to capture the wider Aggregated 
Harm Ingredients Case, where there is no conscious pursuit o f  any shared end.
,4 N ote that there may be cases in w hich the overall harm is greater than the sum  o f  its parts - on 
top o f  being sm all harms in their own right, each individual action may (to anticipate the 
discussion  below ) be a harm ingredient contributing to som e greater harm. Suppose the apple- 
stealing children take so  many apples betw een them  that the farmer's cider business fails. In such  
cases there is personal responsibility for each individual harm, but it doesn 't capture the wider  
harm so well as weak co llectiv e  responsibility.
7 A lthough in A ggregated Harm Ingredients C ases the actions are likely to be sim ilar ones, it is 
at least possib le  that they could be different actions which com bine predictably but 
unintentionally to bring about som e harm. For exam ple, certain activities in a public place could  
(and could reasonably be expected  to) com bine to cause harm. Suppose one o f  the people- 
covered-in-paint-pretending-to-be-statues in C ovent Garden were to use flam m able paint and 
occupy a stand next to a flam e juggler. Subject to sim ilar criteria as for the teenagers in the lake 
case, the tw o could be co llectiv e ly  responsib le for harm to passers by (and the statue-actor 
him self) from an exp losion .
6 Feinberg 1987, 228  
■7 M ay 1992, 39
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Let us assume that the shared responsibility model is intended to cover at least 
some Aggregated Harm Ingredients Cases. However, upon examination, M ay's 
account is rather less appealing in such cases than in Concerted Joint Action 
Cases. Given that there is no intention to contribute to a collective act (never 
mind an intentionally harmful one), the idea that responsibility fo r harm can be 
assigned to individuals, qua individuals, is less than compelling.
Recall the three possibilities outlined by May for allocation o f personal 
responsibility: division o f  responsibility into personal responsibility for shares o f  
the harm, no responsibility to each, or responsibility for the full harm to each.38 
As we saw in Section II, M ay him self argues that neither no nor full 
responsibility seem appropriate.39 This leaves us with the first option, which is 
plausible in at least some Concerted Joint Action Cases, but less so in 
Aggregated Harm Ingredients Cases.40
How are individuals to be assigned " p '^ 65, ° f  the harm, according to the 
roles they played, when their actions, which were not in themselves harmful, did 
not constitute the performance o f  roles in some deliberate collective endeavour? 
Yet it seems equally arbitrary simply to take up the other option suggested by 
May, and divide up the (perhaps very significant) harm and say each o f n 
individuals was responsible for Mnih o f  it.
The point is precisely that the individual, qua individual, has not harmed. Nor 
has she intentionally contributed to a joint harm. Given this, it seems 
inappropriate to talk o f  each individual being assigned a share o f  direct personal 
responsibility, at all.4]
Consider the alternative: collective responsibility. On M ay’s account, recall, 
this is appropriate only if  the group is structured in such a way that the harmful 
action could not have occurred if  the individuals were acting outside it. Both 
Aggregated Harm Ingredients and Concerted Joint Action Cases have something 
in common with this. While, in these two scenarios, the action is not collective in
-8 Ibid., 42
■9 Ibid., 39
40 Recall M ay's appeal to Prosser and K eaton (M ay 1992, 41 )
41 T o use the d istinction to w hich M ay h im se lf  appeals in the case o f  co llectiv e  /^action, it w ould  
generally seem  inappropriate to blam e them , as individuals, for the harm. M oreover, what they 
should feel is not the guilt o f  one w ho has intentionally harmed, but rather sham e that a pattern o f  
actions o f  w hich they were w ittingly a part, has resulted in this harm. (1 9 9 2 , 38)
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the strong sense o f irreducibility to individual actions, the result (harm) could not 
have occurred were not those individuals situated, in relation to one another, in 
such a way that their pursuit o f  individual goals would have a certain predictable 
aggregative impact. It is only because o f the way the individuals are grouped , in 
this very weak sense, that harm is done. Thus, it makes sense to assign moral 
responsibility collectively, albeit in a similarly weak sense, rather than attempt to 
divvy up the harm into individual responsibility “shares".
I contend, then, that while at least some Concerted Joint Action Cases do 
plausibly involve shared personal responsibility, they can also be cases o f 
collective responsibility.4- (Indeed, in at least some such cases it seems that there 
may be a stronger sense o f collective responsibility -  the collective responsibility 
o f an informal but intentional group such as the mob, to which M ay has earlier 
attributed jo int action ,43) Moreover, weak collective responsibility is more 
appropriate than M ay's notion o f  shared responsibility in Aggregated Harm 
Ingredients Cases.
Turning to the second promised distinction, there are important cases 
apparently explicitly excluded by May but covered by weak collective 
responsibility. Upon examination, Aggregated Harm Ingredients Cases fall into 
two categories. One includes those meeting M ay 's criterion for joint action: each 
individual’s action is necessary (but not sufficient) to bring about the harm 44 The 
other includes those cases where the num ber o f  contributory actions is above the 
threshold to trigger the harm. Thus, although the combination o f actions brings 
about harm, each individual's contribution is not necessary for that harm. Call 
these Overdetermination Cases.
My model, leaving it open whether each individual's action is necessary, 
allows for Overdetermination Cases. This is crucial, given that it is frequently in 
such scenarios (for example, the aggregation o f individual decisions to drive cars 
rather than use public transport, or to fly abroad for a holiday, resulting in 
significant environmental damage) that *an important outcome [is] the product o f
4‘ The attribution o f  weak co llective  responsib ility  (rather than personal responsib ility) becom es  
still more com pelling  when the harm is not the com m on goal to w hich each individual 
consc iously  contributes, but an unintended side effect.
43 M ay 1987, 31-41
44 M ay 1992, 39
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a large number o f acts performed by many different people, few if any o f whom 
actually intend to produce [it] '.4>
IV. Intentionality and overdetermination
Having laid out the weak collective responsibility model, I will defend it by 
responding to two potential objections. The next section will expand on the 
m odel's implications in terms o f  collective and individual duties, and in so doing 
reject an additional objection.
The first objection appeals to the popular idea that moral responsibility 
requires intentionality. There is, it points out, no intention to harm in cases where 
harm results from the aggregation o f individual acts, and so there cannot be 
moral responsibility.
However, it is questionable to what extent responsibility should rest on 
intention. Even at the individual level, it is often sufficient for the ascription o f 
moral responsibility that an individual could reasonably have been expected to 
know that what she was doing would cause harm.46 W hile there is considerable 
intuitive appeal in the idea that, on a one o ff occasion, not knowing might be an 
excuse (“ I d idn 't know that pressing this switch would cause my neighbour's 
house to blow up”), this loses its force if  the individual continues to behave in the 
same way once the connection is made clear to her. ("Yes, 1 have read all the 
statistics on the effects o f  alcohol on ability to control a vehicle, and, yes, I was 
drink driving, but I d idn 't intend to run over that man, so I'm  not morally
^  Scheffler 2001 , 43  [em phasis added] N ote, how ever, that I have not rejected M ay's account 
altogether. Nor do 1 need to. It is both p lausible and probable that there w ill a lso  be shared 
personal responsib ility in (at least som e) cases o f  weak co llective  responsibility. Recall that M ay  
h im se lf expects overlap betw een shared responsibility and his stronger co llective  responsib ility. 
(1992 , 107) Indeed, while my account is prim arily forw ard-looking -  accu ra te ly  assign ing  
responsib ility with a v iew  to attributing duties so  as to bring about the m orally optim um  end to a 
harm -  often, in practice, w e need w ays o f  assign ing  responsib ility as fairly as possib ly  betw een  
in d iv idu a ls , in a backw ards-looking sense, so  as to hand out fines or punishm ents.
46 This might at first sight appear to run contrary to the so-called  doctrine o f  double effect (D D E ): 
■[ 1 )he thesis that it is som etim es perm issib le to bring about by oblique intention what one may 
not directly intend.' (F oot 1978b, 20 . T he relevant chapter is reproduced from The O xford  R eview  
5, 1967) H ow ever the DD E does not rule out the p ossib ility  that it is  on occasion  im perm issib le  
to bring about an effect even  obliquely. M oreover, it has been called into doubt by philosophers 
including Foot herself. (S ee  1978b, 19-31)
26
responsible/')47 The moral force, in such scenarios, derives from awareness o f 
the potential consequences; intention to do a harmful act is not required.
This is reflected in tort law, which, through the notion o f recklessness, 
incorporates the idea that individuals should be held responsible (at least to the 
extent o f a duty o f reparation) not only for what they intend to do but also for 
consequences they foresee as a side effect o f their action.48
The second objection goes as follows. I have made it clear that weak 
collective responsibility, unlike M ay's shared responsibility, accommodates 
Overdetermination Cases. But if  what an individual did made no difference, why 
should she be one o f  those held collectively responsible? The answer, I suggest, 
is, precisely because any one o f  the individuals was similarly unnecessary -  it 
would be arbitrary (and unfair) to identify the harming group as all acting in that 
way less one specific individual. (This idea receives further support from the 
notion o f morality as a collective project, borrowed from Liam M urphy and 
discussed in the next section.)
That said, some question remains as to what the appropriate cut o ff point is for 
inclusion as one o f  those collectively responsible in such cases. Otherwise, 
people could become collectively responsible for various harms merely by 
existing. This is counterintuitive. For example, everyone has some carbon 
footprint, but that does not necessarily render everyone including (say) a South 
American rainforest tribe collectively responsible for environmental harm. A 
plausible working suggestion would be that a person becomes one o f the group 
collectively responsible for harm once her contribution exceeds the amount such 
that, were everyone contributing only to that level, there would be no h a m v 0
4 O f course, there m ight be m itigating circum stances -  preventing w orse harm, for exam ple -  but 
I will save such d iscussions for Chapter Five.
48 In fact, in also  incorporating n eg ligence, tort law g o es further: it rests liability not what the 
relevant individual foresaw  at the tim e, but on what a reasonable person w ould have foreseen in 
the circum stances.
4> It is, o f  course, possib le  to im agine som e dire situation in the environm ental harm case -  
perhaps an overpopulated future -  in w hich this w as the case. In such a scenario, no doubt the 
cost o f  not harming (see  Chapter Five, S ection  V ) could be applied to as a w ay to render the harm 
m orally perm issible. But this is not the ca se  at present.
50 A s Singer points out, in terms o f  per capita em issions and even  stab ilising clim ate change, 
residents o f  the US, Japan and W estern nations are already several tim es above this level. (2 0 0 2 ,  
35) H ow ever, applying this condition is not a lw ays straightforward. In particular, problem atic  
scenarios arise in the environm ental case, because o f  population growth. The more people  there 
are, the low er the level o f  em issions w ill be at w hich one b ecom es part o f  a co lle c tiv e ly  harming  
group. But this a llow s for the p ossib ility  that Z, w ho has em itted at a constant, very low  level and
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Having thus defended the notion o f  weak collective responsibility, it remains 
to consider the correlative duties, both collective and individual. A further 
objection will be addressed within this discussion.
V. Collective and individual duties
What duties are implied by weak collective responsibility for harm? When an 
individual has harmed, there is generally a duty (assuming the harm is morally 
impermissible) not to (continue to) do the harmful act. (And, quite often, to make 
reparation for harm already caused.)
With weak collective responsibility, the primary corresponding duty is 
naturally a collective one: to do something about it together. In practice, this is 
likely to require collective decision making. Especially in larger groups, while 
the aggregation o f  individual decisions to cease acting so as to contribute to harm 
could sometimes end that harm, motivational problems render it implausible that 
this would in fact happen.51 Moreover, coordination problems will frequently 
render this an inefficient mechanism, sometimes an ineffective or even 
counterproductive o n e .52
In smaller groups, such collective decision making might be more informal. 
(In the lake case, the teenagers might decide among themselves to take turns to 
swim.53) However, larger harming groups are likely to require a more formal 
structure or institution before they can decide, in any meaningfully collective 
sense, how to end the harm. Thus, where there is not already such an institution 
in place (which is likely to be the case where there is weak, rather than the 
stronger corporate collective responsibility) the collective responsibility will
had no children, b ecom es one o f  those co llect ively  responsible when he wasn't before because A 
to Y have had several children each, increasing the population. I cannot respond to this fully here, 
but would certainly suggest that one 's  ow n  carbon footprint include a factor for the number o f  
children one has had.
1 Shue, in the context o f  duties to protect basic rights to subsistence, highlights the l ikelihood o f  
cases *in which individual restraint would  be too  much to ask'. (19 8 0 .  59)
This claim will be defended in detail in Chapter Four. In theory, i f  each individual acted,
independently, in a certain way, the harm would cease. However, in practice such uncoordinated
action is likely to be an inefficient (or even , in such circumstances as are discussed later in this 
section, a morally suboptimal) w ay o f  ending the harm.
5" That said, with a group o f  changing membership, enforceable restrictions are likely to be
necessary. (In practice, this is what happens in public sw im m ing pools.)
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most often give rise in the first instance to a collective duty to establish such an 
institution/4
A number of individual duties, depending on the circumstances, correspond to 
this collective duty. These, I suggest, fall into two categories: duties to play one's 
part in bringing about that collective end to the harm, and supplementary 
individual duties.
The former can, again, take two forms. Firstly, duties to fulfil the individual 
requirements o f  a collectively pursued solution to the harm. Recall that the 
collective duty, put most generally, is a duty to change the situation so that the 
harm is not caused (or reparation is made). Assuming that some way has been 
established o f  making collective decisions, conclusions regarding appropriate 
action would be handed down as restrictions on, or requirements for, action by 
individuals. In this way, assuming fairly-established decision-making structures 
and fairly-allocated duties, members o f  the harming group would acquire 
morally-grounded individual duties/''-''
Secondly, even in the absence o f  the necessary collective decision-making 
structure or institution (and so o f  clearly defined restrictions on individual 
behaviour), individuals, by being part o f  a harming group, acquire certain 
responsibilities which, I suggest, they can no longer evade simply by “opting 
out".
Reconsider the lake case, with two supplementary assumptions: this is an 
Overdetermination Case, so the removal o f  any one o f  the teenagers would not 
save the child, and the conditions for weak collective responsibility are met. Each 
teenager could reasonably be expected to foresee that the combination o f  his 
action with others would cause harm, and knows that there are others sufficiently 
motivated to act, for the harm to be the likely result. Now suppose that one o f  the 
teenagers docs foresee the harm he realises what is going on. What are his 
options?
1 Such a duty is not a new idea merely an often neglected one. Rawls posits, as part o f  the 
(natural) duty o f  justice, not only a responsibility to obey and support just institutions, but also a 
dutv 'to further just arrangements not yet established, at least when this can be done w ithout too
much cost to ourselves'.  (1971 .  99) Shue. in his account o f  subsistence rights as basic rights, 
advocates a general duty to design institutions 'that avoid the creation o f  strong incentiv es to 
\  iolate | the J dutv [to avoid depriv ing others o f  their subsistence rights]'. (1980 .  60)
"  These questions o f  fairness constitute a huge topic in themselves,  but one 1 will reserve for
future research.
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The teenager could simply remove himself from the harming set (in this case, 
climb out of  the lake) without saying anything. This seems inadequate. There is 
more at stake, morally, for each individual, than just his own contribution. 6 
Rather, it seems, he has a responsibility, as part o f  the harming set, to make an 
effort to promote an end to the collective harm. In this ease, he would most 
probably fulfil that duty by alerting the others and promoting a way of  avoiding 
the problem, such as a jumping rota. At a wider level, promotion is likely to have 
to take the form of political advocacy o f  certain collective decision-making 
institutions.
Thus, I suggest that individuals who belong to groups collectively morally 
responsible (even in the weak sense) for unacceptable harms have a duty actively 
to promote the establishment o f  such collective decision-making institutions as 
would be necessary to bring about an end to the harm.v
Arguing parallel to May, this duty could be said to fall more heavily on 
certain individuals who are in a position to be heard.^ Pre-empting Chapter Five 
to assume that the environmental damage case does count as unacceptable harm 
to future generations and the global poor, the relevant individuals would be those 
wielding global political influence. These would include: prominent political 
leaders, those with economic or financial clout (such as World Bank officials), 
those with authority in the most polluting industries (such as oil company 
management), and even (arguably) those with religious authority /4
Unlike Pogge in the global justice case (2002,  66), I do not think my becom ing the 
environmental equivalent o f  a hermit would constitute the satisfaction o f  all the duties correlated 
to collective  responsibility for environmental harm. Rather, 1 would have first to at least try for 
som e time (a month? a year?) to promote the establishment o f  institutions to address 
environmental damage collectively.
Pogge. in the rather different context o f  responsibilities o f  members o f  existing unjust 
institutions, posits a neg a tive  dutv on all human agents "not to co-operate in upholding [coercive  
institutions under which the access o f  som e members to the objects o f  basic human rights is 
insecure] unless they com pensate  for their co-operation by protecting its victims or by working  
for its reform'. (2002 .  67)  However, in both his case and mine, worries are raised about 
overdemandingness. How far does an indiv idual have to go in promoting a collective  end to the 
harm, before he can legitimately opt out? In this particular case, to anticipate the discussion  
below, i f  his attempts to change the behaviour o f  the rest were to fail (or even look likely to fail) 
then, rather than opt out, he should attempt to rescue the child by removing it from the water. 
More generally,  it seems that there are limits to the sacrifices one individual can be required to 
make.
May, recall, appeals to such considerations in attributing personal responsibility for harm in 
collective  inaction cases. (May 1992, 112-6 See Footnote 31)
The Pope is an obvious example,  although the Catholic Church's policy on contraception, in 
adding to the population problem, is in practice making matters worse.
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One final point before moving on to supplementary individual duties. This 
account draws a clear distinction between members, or ex-members, o f  harming 
groups, and bystanders, which in itself calls for some further explanation. Does 
not the bystander, in such a scenario as that o f  the teenagers in the lake, also have 
an obligation to try to prevent the harm? O f  course she does. However, hers are 
positive duties to help the child. The (ex-)member also has those duties, but as 
one o f  the harming group he has also acquired negatively derived duties, 
including the duty to promote, if at all practicable, a collective end to that harm, 
of which opting out has not absolved him.
This leaves the twofold issue o f  what I have called supplementary individual 
duties: duties that might be incurred alongside the promotion process, i f  it has at 
least a reasonable chance o f  success, and those incurred in the place of  promotion 
duties if there is, in practice, little chance that collective decision-making 
institutions will successfully be established.
In either case, one or both o f  two further duties need to be considered. Firstly, 
the duty to mimic (or even exceed) the duties which would be assigned by a 
collective decision-making body. However, at least in the first scenario 
(promotion o f  a hopefully achievable decision-making institution), the duty to 
promote the institution will almost invariably take priority. As noted above, and 
as will be argued in detail in Chapter Four, coordination and motivation 
problems make it frequently implausible, or even impossible, to achieve a 
common or collective aim through the aggregated behaviour o f  uncoordinated 
individuals.
Even supposing, however, either that they can be fulfilled simultaneously with 
promoting the collective institution, or that there is no realistic chance o f  
bringing about the institution, it can be problematic to assign these individual 
“mimicking” duties. What would such action amount to? Most probably, cutting 
down on or stopping one's own individual contributing action. That is, in the 
lake case, getting out o f  the water unless there are few enough others for it to be 
safe, or, in the environmental one, reducing one's own carbon footprint, not 
having more than two children, and so on.
Such examples bring out an important difference between Aggregated Harms 
Cases and Aggregated Harm Ingredients Cases. There seems to be a much 
stronger moral incentive to refrain from the individual act if the overall harm is
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an aggregation o f  small harms, and so the individual refraining could prevent one 
particular sub-harm (as with the animal rights campaigner who goes vegetarian, 
reasoning that she is at least saving one cow), than if the acts are not themselves 
harmful.
In these latter. Aggregated Harm Ingredients Cases, there is likely to be a 
threshold effect. A certain number o f  people need to change their behaviour 
before any benefit will be felt. (If I reduce my carbon emissions to the level that 
would be required o f  me by some hypothetical global climate change body, but 
no-one else does, this will make absolutely no difference to environmental 
damage.) But in that case, so long as it is improbable that anyone else will 
change their behaviour -  or that this one sacrifice will motivate more -  it 
becomes a symbolic act and. arguably, nothing more than moral "showing o f f ' .60
The second potential duty is that o f  attempting to mitigate the damage, oneself 
or in combination with a likeminded subset. For an individual teenager in the 
lake case, this could involve attempting to rescue the child. In the environmental 
case, it might take the form of  regeneration efforts, or of providing support to 
those who live in areas already affected by climate change. In practice, this may 
well run alongside the primary duty o f  campaigning for the relevant institutions 
to be set up. In the absence o f  any realistic hope o f  establishing institutions to 
prevent the collective harm, it might be the only option.
However, there is another possible scenario to be addressed, in which this last 
duty could overlap with the earlier duty to bring about an end to the collective 
harm, and which gives rise to the supplementary objection left open at the end of 
the last section.
The scenario concerns those Aggregated Harm Ingredients Cases which are 
not characterised by overdetermination: where each individual's contribution is 
necessary for the harm, an individual has the option o f  opting out and so ending 
(he eolleetive harm. This explains why it is more plausible in such cases than in 
Overdetermination Cases to assign at least some personal responsibility. Could it, 
further, resuscitate the question o f  whether the idea o f  weak collective
1,0 I hat said, it is worth noting that such a sacrifice, by enough people, could plausibly be helpful 
in promoting a collective  institution to organise a wider effort. On the flip side, it is very possible  
that those promoting such an institution without making such sacrifices themselves, could be 
dismissed by the public as hypocrites and so undermine their promotion attempts.
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responsibility is significantly distinct from the shared responsibility account 
offered by May? Does my model only add value in Overdetermination Cases?
I think not. The arguments o f  Section I l f  which distinguished between weak 
collective and shared responsibility for harm, still hold. Moreover, such solutions 
(the opting out o f  one individual to end the harm) are rarely optimal, because 
they are generally unfair. The relevant individual takes on the full burden, 
regardless of how much more others have contributed to the harm, and o f  the 
possibly greater harmful side effects of  ceasing her contributory act than those of  
others -  or of reducing them across the board.61
In parallel w ith Murphy's discussion o f  principles o f  beneficence, one might 
make this point by appealing to the idea o f  morality as a collective project. He 
cites the 'natural thought... that it is objectionable to expect agents to take up the 
slack caused by the non-compliance of  others. We should do our fair share, 
which can amount to a great sacrifice in certain circumstances; what we cannot 
be required to do is other people's share as well as our ow n . '62
However, there is a relevant difference between the cases of beneficence 
considered by Murphy and those addressed here, o f  collective harm. While his 
"natural thought" supports the idea that the best outcome in weak collective harm 
scenarios is a collective end to the harm, it would be too strong to say that no 
individual can. in such cases, ever "be required" (morally speaking) to take on 
the shares of  non-compliers.
Compare the following two cases. In the first, I am one o f  a number of  
bystanders on the scene o f  a minor car crash. This accident was the result o f  
natural causes. No-one is hurt, but the car has become stuck at the side o f  the 
road. If all the bystanders present helped, it would require only a few minutes o f  
our time to free the car. However, many don 't help. If I stayed to move it on my 
own, the time taken would be longer, and the cost to me greater (say, I would 
miss a significant business meeting). According to Murphy's plausible 
Compliance Condition, my duty according to a principle o f  beneficence should 
not extend beyond doing what would have been my share in full compliance. 63
61 Feinberg makes this point. (19X7, 227-32)
6: Murphy 1993, 278
63 'I A] principle ol beneficence should not increase its demands on agents as expected  
compliance with the principle by other agents decreases.' (Murphy 1993, 278)
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Consider now the alternative scenario in which I am one of  several individuals 
collectively responsible (in the weak sense) for this harm. (Suppose it can be safe 
to overtake on that road, but only if no-one else does, and we all overtook 
knowing this and that many other drivers were likely to think in the same way.) 
Now, if the other drivers leave without helping, while they have undoubtedly 
acted wrongly to the victim (and unfairly to me), it is no longer so plausible for 
me to say: "I've done my share o f  the clearing up. I'm going now." It is at least 
arguable that, having contributed to the harm, I should stay until it is cleared
64up.
My model can explain this intuition. It can both accommodate a duty to opt 
out o f  the harming set, if there is no alternative way of  ending the harm, and 
acknowledge that this is not generally the morally optimal solution. All 
individuals in the collectively harming group have a duty to endeavour to bring 
about a collective end to the harm. In the absence of cooperation from others, if 
an individual can bring about the collective solution single-handedly, i.e. by 
opting out. then, often, he should. ("Often" because the potential moral 
"excuses" to be addressed in a later section may come into play.) But he is only 
obliged to do so because o f  the failure o f  others to act as they should -  a line o f  
thought which lends further support to the idea (to be examined in Chapter Five), 
that certain collective decisions to end collective harm, can legitimately be 
enforced.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that moral philosophy needs to accommodate the 
concept o f  weak collective responsibility for the harm which results from the 
predictable aggregation o f  individual acts. I have argued, further, that this 
collective responsibility gives rise to a collective duty to (to put it most broadly) 
do something to resolve the situation. Correlated to this are individual duties: as
M This line o f  thought brings out. again, the difference between bystanders and ex-members, as 
discussed above. The reason, despite this distinction, that the demands on the two might 
sometimes, in practice, be very similar, is that som etim es positive claims o f  beneficence are so 
strong as to demand a significant sacrifice e \ e n  a bystander. Murphy h im se lf  allows that the 
Compliance Condition may not hold in cases o f  special obligation, in which he includes rescue  
cases. ( 1 9 9 3 .2 9 0 - 2 )
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part o f  the collective endeavour (promoting the establishment o f  collective 
decision-making structures, then abiding by their decisions) and, potentially, 
either alongside it or in its place if the lack o f  cooperation by others renders it 
impossible.
This has important implications. At the close o f  the next chapter, I will use the 
notion o f  collective responsibility for harm to identify what I will call morally 
salient potential collectivities -  groups o f  individuals who do not yet constitute a 
collectivity but ought, on moral grounds, to count (politically) as though they 
did. In Chapter Five, I will argue that there is weak collective responsibility for 
the harm done through damage to the environment, so we, or at least most of  us, 
in this generation, acquire certain corresponding duties. (In other words, we 
constitute just such a morally salient potential collectivity.)
Before closing, there are two final points to be made, to which I will also 
return. Firstly, I have assumed, throughout this chapter, that is, that it is 
philosophically possible to flesh out what we mean by doing harm, in a morally 
relevant sense, to other human beings. In Chapter Three, I will use a capabilities 
model o f  human flourishing to justify this assumption.6^
Secondly, even with a clear understanding o f  morally significant harm, it is 
not invariably considered morally impermissible, at the individual level, to do 
such harm to another person. There are various moral “excuses” to which we 
might appeal. These excuses have varying degrees o f  plausibility, but do require 
consideration. I will return to them, in Chapter Five, to contend not only that we 
are collectively responsible for environmental harm, but that this harm is morally 
impermissible.
1 will claim that undermining one o f  the eentral capabilities on something like N ussbaum 's list 
counts as morally significant harm. (Nussbaum  2000b, 78 -8 0 )  I do not claim, however, that an 
effect on ly  counts as harmful i f  it undermines one o f  these central capabilities.
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Chapter Two
Against the Intentionalist: Collectivities v. Social Groups'
Under what circumstances do a set o f  individuals constitute the kind of 
collectivity w ith which political philosophers should be concerned?
Historically, political philosophy has focused almost exclusively on the single 
society -  and. as Scheffler notes, tacitly assumed 'a one-to-one correspondence 
between individual societies and sovereign states'". This has at once been 
supported by and posed problems for the prominent intentionalist tradition in the 
philosophy of  social science. According to the intentionalists (broadly speaking), 
in order to constitute a collectivity or social group, a group of individuals must 
all consider themselves to be part of such a group.
There are two reasons to reassess the philosophy of social science behind the 
understanding o f  collectivities standardly accepted in political philosophy. On 
the one hand, there are practical incentives. Humans no longer live in neatly 
separated, self-sufficient units. International communication and travel have 
facilitated an ever-expanding network o f  economic and legal ties. Moreover, 
between us, we have an impact on the environment which affects us all. It is time 
to reconsider the question: within which sets o f  relations do we acquire special 
responsibilities as co-members o f  some collectivity?
On the other hand, as this chapter will argue, the dominant intentionalist 
model, Gilbert's plural subject account o f  collectivities, is inadequate to account 
for even the collectivity on which political philosophy does focus: the nation 
state. Gilbert, treating collectivities and social groups as the same, and defining 
them via acknowledgement o f  shared goals, ends up unable to accommodate 
eertain members o f  the nation-as-collectivity, such as babies and the mentally 
handicapped.
This chapter will engage in particular with three philosophers o f  soeial 
science. Like non-intentionalists Paul Sheehy and Keith Graham, I will argue 
that Gilbert's plural subject account specifies conditions which are unnecessary 
for collectivityhood. However, I will also contend, against all three thinkers, that
1 Much o f  the material for this chapter is drawn from my MPhil thesis (Cripps 2005).  However, 1 
will only refer specifically to this thesis when I am alerting the reader to arguments offered there 
which it is unnecessary , for the purposes o f  my wider project, to reproduce here.
Scheffler 2001, 32
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social groups are only a subset o f  the wider set o f  (politically and explanatorily 
interesting) collectivities. In so doing, I will argue that the kinds of  collectivities 
with which political philosophy should be concerned include much wider 
groupings than the nation state.
The structure is as follows. Section I will lay out the non-intentionalist model 
to be defended: a set o f  individuals constitute a collectivity if and only if they are 
mutually dependent through some common or shared interest, purpose or goal, 
on a certain broad understanding o f  common interest, purpose or goal.
Section II will summarise Gilbert's plural subject account. Section III will 
argue that her argument fails to accommodate certain key collectivities and, in 
the process o f  trying to do so, becomes circular. Sections IV to VII will show 
how the non-intentionalist model offered in Section I can accommodate these 
troublesome cases without circularity. In order to demonstrate this, I will 
elaborate on the distinction between social and collective properties, and between 
collectivities, o f  which social groups are a subset, and aggregates (Sections V 
and VI).
Having thus defended the non-intentionalist model as able to accommodate 
the collectivities already key in our social and political thought, I will defend its 
inclusion o f  more controversial cases. Section VIII will appeal to some 
controversial, largely non-intentional examples. Section IX will argue that all the 
collectivities on my account satisfy three conditions for collectivityhood laid out 
by Graham: the significance o f  the actions o f  the individual members cannot be 
adequately captured without referring to the collective body as part o f  which 
individuals are acting, what that collective body does is distinct from what its 
individual members do, and the survival o f  the collectivity is 'relatively 
indifferent to the persistenee o f  the partieular individuals which compose it at 
any particular m o m e n t 3
Section X will respond to two obvious objections: that the model is too 
demanding, and that it is too inclusive. Finally, Section XI will link this chapter 
with the previous one, introducing the idea o f  a morally salient potential 
collectivity, as also meriting the attention o f  political philosophers, and 
potentially grounding special obligations.
Graham 2(X)2, 6 8 -9  [emphasis in original]
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I. The non-intentionalist model
This chapter rejects the intentionalist claim that, in order for a set o f  individuals 
to constitute a collectivity, it is necessary and sufficient that each regards himself 
as part o f  a group constituted by him and the others. Instead, the following model 
will be defended.
A set of individuals constitutes a collectivity if and only if those 
individuals are mutually dependent through some common or shared 
purpose, goal, or all-things-considered (ATC) interest, whether or not 
they acknowledge it themselves.4
Alternatively, this can be expressed as:
A collectivity is constituted by a set o f  individuals o f  whom at least one 
collective property in the strong sense is true.
Where:
Property c is a collective property in the strong sense if and only if the 
applicability o f  c to a set o f  individuals entails that those individuals are 
mutually dependent through some common or shared goal, purpose or 
ATC interest.
The "mutual dependence" clause requires that the individuals have goals or 
purposes or ATC interests that it only makes sense to consider as being pursued 
together. This can be understood in two ways: they could have a genuinely 
shared goal, as with a group o f  friends setting out to climb Monte Rosa together; 
or they could have individual (selfish) goals, ATC interests or purposes which 
require co-operation by all for their achievement. Consider, for example, a group
A Chapter Three will explain the limited range o f  cases in which an individual can be said to have  
an ATC interest which she does not regard as a goal or purpose. The idea is that enjoyment o f  
certain central capabilities constitutes such a fundamental human interest, being necessary for a 
full\ nourishing life, that it is not in a person's ATC interest to g ive  up one o f  these capabilities,  
or expose it to serious risk.
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of strangers washed up on a desert island, none o f  whom care about each other's 
welfare, but who need to co-operate in order to build a shelter to survive. 
(Something not unlike the start o f  the television series, Lost.)
Note that this allows for both goals, purposes or interests which, by their 
nature, can only be pursued together (for example, the playing o f  a symphony by 
an orchestra), and goals, purposes or interests which in the circumstances can 
only (can only efficiently) be pursued together. An example of the latter would 
be the keeping clean of  a vast mansion.
Importantly, the group must include all and only those who are thus mutually 
dependent. It would be arbitrary to include some but not all o f  the friends on 
Monte Rosa, or all of the London Symphony Orchestra save one flautist.
Given such a broad account, there are many distinctions to be drawn. 
Collectivities can be new or pre-existing. They can be voluntary or involuntary. 
They can be small or large. They can be passive or active. They can be ad hoc 
(constituted by individuals who are mutually dependent only through a limited, 
short-term goal, purpose or interest) or lasting. They can also overlap categories, 
so that (for example) for some members a group is voluntary, and for others 
involuntary. Crucially, they can be intentional, partially intentional (as with the 
family or nation state) or, most controversially, entirely unintentional.
Some but not all o f  these collectivities are also social groups. Here, this thesis 
breaks with both Gilbert and her non-intentionalist critics, Sheehy and Graham. 
Since my primary aim is to expand the account o f  collectivities with which 
political philosophy should be concerned, a thorough examination o f  the notion 
of  the social will not be necessary. Instead, I refer the interested reader to my 
earlier treatment o f  this topic/ However, the following rough definitions, to 
which I will return in Section VI, can be used to clarify the distinction and 
accommodate certain key cases whilst avoiding circularity problems.
A set of individuals constitute a social group if and only if they constitute 
a collectivity and: either, it is because o f  at least one social property true 
of the individuals that they constitute a set o f  which a collective property 
is true, or it is an integral part o f  the common goal, interest or purpose
5 Cripps 2005
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through which the individuals are mutually dependent that at least one 
social property becomes or remains true o f  someone, some set of 
individuals, or something.
Where:
It is a necessary condition o f  a property's being a social property that it 
has a significance over and above the material or physical properties with 
which it coincides, and has this because of  the recognition by a certain 
group o f  individuals that it will have it.
Sharing a social property is neither necessary nor sufficient for collectivityhood. 
Rather:
A set o f  individuals constitute an aggregate if and only if some property is 
true o f  all those individuals, but they do not constitute a collectivity.
A set o f  individuals constitute a social aggregate if and only if some social 
property is true o f  all those individuals, but they do not constitute a 
collectivity.
The following examples will illustrate the range o f  this account. They can also 
be used to show: firstly, the non-intentionalist model's ability to accommodate 
the intuitive, small-scale collectivities to which intentionalist models such as 
Gilbert's are also well suited, secondly, its ability to account for those bigger 
groupings o f  individuals which intuitively (and politically) count as collectivities 
but with which (as we shall see) Gilbert's account struggles, and finally, some of 
the more controversial groupings which it also counts as collectivities.
An example o f  a new, small, voluntary, intentional collectivity is the 
metaphysics reading group formed by six MPhil students from UCL and 
Birkbeck, with the intention o f  reading and discussing metaphysics papers at 
meetings each week. A college drama society is a pre-existing but voluntary, 
intentional collectivity. Fathers for Justice is an active subset o f  the wider and 
otherwise passive collectivity o f  divorced fathers.
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A nation state such as Spain is a large, mostly involuntary, mostly intentional 
collectivity. A family consisting o f  parents and two children, one o f  whom is a 
rebellious teenager and the other o f  whom is a six month-old baby, is also a 
collectivity, albeit involuntary and unintentional for some of  the members.
The final set o f  four examples takes us into more controversial territory. 
Firstly, consider the owners o f  weekend homes set round a green in a 
Ciloucestershire village. By picking a commuter village, without any history of  
community feeling, we can assume that the owners do not consider themselves 
part of a group, rendering the collectivity non-intentional in a broad sense. Each 
wants the green to be pleasant, but only because this meets his or her individual 
requirements. However, they can only keep it so by co-operating. Each o f  them 
(say, by playing loud music or dropping litter) could undermine the pleasant 
atmosphere.
Secondly, on a variant o f  an example by Sheehy, four egoist prisoners break 
out, independently, from a jail surrounded by water.6 They get into a boat with 
four oars and row away. The boat's size is such that no one o f  them, alone, would 
be able to row it, although each prisoner, being delusional, believes himself to be 
possessed o f  such superhuman strength that he could do so. Each thinks only o f  
himself, ” 1", as escaping, but as a matter o f  fact the prisoners are dependent on 
one another for the achievement o f  each one 's  individual goal (escape). On my 
objective account, the prisoners constitute an ad hoc collectivity.
Thirdly, suppose four young men and women, members o f  deeply opposed 
gangs in their home city, find themselves cast up on an isolated island. As with 
the Lost example, co-operation to find food, build shelter, live peacefully and so 
on. is in each individual's interest. However, such is their loathing o f  each other, 
that they would vehemently deny any such idea, and in fact spend their time on 
the island attempting to kill each other. They constitute an involuntary, 
unintentional collectivity. (Call this the Rival Gangs Case.)
Lastly, and most controversially o f  all, Searle's example o f  a pack o f  hyenas. 
Says Graham:
A pack o f  hyenas can coordinate in very subtle ways in collectively  stalking and killing
a lion. Though it may be presumed that they have intentions in doing so, they do not
6 Sheehy 2001, 128-130 and 2002, 384-5 .
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have the linguistic apparatus necessary for being aware o f  the intentions they hav e, and 
so a fo rtio ri they are not aware o f  any such intentions being collectiv e ones.
I will return to these examples in later sections. Now, having laid out the model 
to be defended, 1 will now turn to the intentionalist account, rebuttal o f  which 
constitutes the negative component o f  that defence.
II. Gilbert's intentionalist model
The intentionalist claim, put broadly, can be expressed as follows:
Broad Intentionalist Thesis
In order for a set o f  individuals to constitute a collectivity or social group, 
it is necessary and sufficient that each regards himself as part o f  a group 
which is constituted by him and the others in the set.
This chapter will deny this claim, but will also reject the following more detailed 
version.8
According to Gilbert, social groups are plural subjects.g Plural subjects, in 
turn, are defined in terms o f  joint commitment.
A and B (a n d . . . )  (or those with feature 1) constitute a p lu ra l su b jec t {by definition) i f  and 
only i f  they are jointly committed to doing something as a body -  in a broad sense o f  
•do' .10
Gilbert lays down three conditions for the creation o f  joint commitment. Firstly, 
it must involve all parties (all future members o f  the plural subject). Secondly,
Graham 2002, 71 -2, citing John Searle: The C onstruction  o f  S o c ia l R ea lity  (The Tree Press,
1095)
This project engages with Gilbert's plural subject account, because it is so thorough and has 
been so influential. However, Gilbert acknow ledges her ow n debt to Georg Simmel (Gilbert 
1089. 205. citing Simmel (1908): "I low is society possible?" as reproduced in I) N Levine ed. 
G eorg  Sim m el: On Individuality  an d  S o c ie ty  F o rm s , University o f  Chicago Press, 1971), and 
other theorists have offered intentionalist arguments. See, for example, Tuomela 2002 for a 
detailed "vve"-based account o f  social groups.
’ 'In a nutshell, the proposal to be discussed is this: a social group is a plural subject.’ (Gilbert  
2006 ,  165). She lays out her account in rather more com plex detail in On S o c ia l F acts  (1989),  
and I have prev iously defended the narrow intentionalist thesis as a plausible reading o f  the 
account given there. (Cripps 2005 ,  15-20)
11 Gilbert 2006, 144-5
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each party must, through their behaviour, make an 'expression o f  readiness for 
joint commitment: each understands what a joint commitment is, and expresses 
all that is needed on his or her part to bring such a commitment into being, 
namely, readiness to be jointly com m itted '.11 Finally, there must be common 
knowledge among the parties that this is the case.
[l]t"some fact is com m on know ledge between A and B (or among members o f  population  
P. described by reference to som e com m on attribute), that fact is entirely out in the open  
between (or among) them, and, at som e le \e l .  all are aware that this is s o . 1'
Gilbert stresses that these expressions o f  joint readiness 'include but are not 
limited to what would count as everyday agreements '.13 Joint readiness may be 
also expressed in action. (Gilbert's example is a number o f  people running 
towards the victims o f  an accident.) Its expression may even emerge gradually 
(as when two workers form the habit o f  meeting after work for a chat every 
evening).14 Nor need the joint commitment be to some goal, narrowly defined. 
Rather, she notes, a set o f  individuals can constitute a plural subject by virtue o f  
'a single collective goal, belief, value or whatever'.1'"'
She expands her account to accommodate large populations, where two 
conditions must be satisfied.
First, all members o f  the population must have expressed their readiness to participate in 
the relev ant joint commitment with all other members o f  the population. Second, this must 
be population com m on kn o w led g e .16
The former requires: that members o f  the population have a conception o f  that 
population, that they are all ready to enter into the joint commitment with all the 
others in that population, and that they express that readiness to the others. This, 
Gilbert argues, need not conflict with the anonymity o f  such situations. To use 
her example, if the members o f  a crowd shout their agreement to storm a com-
M Ibid., 1 38 [her emphasis]
12 I b i d . ,  1 3 8 - 9
1 Ibid., 139. This, importantly, distinguishes the theory o f  political obligation defended in her 
latest work from actual contract theory.
M Ibid., 139-40
15 Ibid., 167
Ibid., 175
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dealer's residence 'it is... natural to suggest that the expressions o f  readiness 
relate to those who are in the crowd -  whoever exaetlv (hey are. In other words, 
each is ready to commit with whose who fit a certain description -  being part o f  
the erow d.']
Similarly, population common knowledge is 'common knowledge between 
people considered by those involved as members o f  a population individuated by 
a certain general description'. Thus, to offer a variant on her example, it might be 
out in the open that everyone living east o f  the mountain worships the Sun God, 
and everyone east o f  the mountain might be aware o f  that. 'Then -  by definition 
-  the existence o f  this situation is population common knowledge between those 
who live east o f  the mountain.'ls
This model can be summarised as the follow ing:
Narrow Intentionalist Thesis
a collectivity is a set or aggregate o f  individuals with (a) common 
purpose(s) or goal(s), all o f  whom are aware o f  that (those) goal(s) or 
purpose(s), aware that they are shared, aware of the awareness o f  other 
members o f  this, aware o f  each member's joint readiness to commit as a 
body to the joint goal(s) or purpose(s), aware of  each member's awareness 
of this (and so on).
Lest this should seem too narrow to accommodate Gilbert's insistence that a 
set of individuals 'can constitute a plural subject by having a single joint 
commitment -  hence a single collective goal, belief value or whatever' ,iq it is 
worth spelling out my understanding o f  "purpose". It includes commitment to 
beliefs or values. The idea is that shared eonunitment to such beliefs (or values) 
will have implications for the way one lives one's life: it will bring with it the 
intention to act in a certain way, in accordance with those beliefs or to maximise 
those values.
If a belief is held entirely in isolation, without any implications for the way 
the person holding it will act, then I suggest that those people holding it do not
r  Ibid., 176 
ls Ibid., 176
1 ’ Ibid., 167 [emphasis added]
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form a group in any helpful or interesting sense, and Gilbert cannot intend to 
include them. There are no social or political implications, for example, if a 
number o f  people believe that oak leaves are blue when no-one is looking at 
them, provided that that belief does not in any way change their pattern of life, 
even to the extent of trying to persuade others to agree (which would count as a 
purpose).
Having thus laid out Gilbert's narrow intentionalist view, the next stage is to 
criticise her account. It is, I suggest, lacking on three levels. Firstly, it is an error 
to treat social groups and collectivities as one and the same. Secondly, Gilbert's 
criteria, although sufficient to identify one kind o f  collectivity with which we, as 
political philosophers, should be concerned, are not necessary. Thirdly, her 
condition is unnecessary for the constitution o f  even a social group. The 
relationship between collectivities and social groups is more complex than that. 
As far as the wider project of this thesis is concerned, the relevant point is the 
second. I will, therefore, discuss the other two, which I have made at more length 
elsewhere, only insofar as is necessary to make my case with regard to that one.~°
III. Three objections to Gilbert
This section will criticise the Narrow Intentionalist Thesis as unnecessarily 
restrictive. It is immediately vulnerable to two objections (call them the 
Involuntary Members and the Unintentional Members Objections), both of which 
identify intuitively compelling cases that Gilbert's model fails to accommodate. 
Her later work allows her at least some scope to evade the former, but in 
attempting to avoid the latter, she falls foul o f  a third, the Circularity Objection.
The Involuntary Members Objection accuses Gilbert of implausibly excluding 
groups which are standardly considered (some of  the most important) 
collectivities, through her implicit incorporation of the idea o f  voluntariness.
The Narrow Intentionalist Thesis' jo in t readiness has distinct overtones o f  
voluntariness. Gilbert (1989) spells out: 'One might say that someone who 
expresses quasi-readiness to do A in C in effect volunteers his will for a pool o f  
wills to be set up so that in certain circumstances, that pool will be dedicated to a
"° Cripps 2005
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certain end . '21 Moreover, on her account, a set o f  individuals constitute a plural 
subject if and only if each of  them can appropriately use the English word “we” , 
in a 'full-blooded'"" sense, which also requires some kind o f  expression of 
willingness.
[The] a ppropr ia te  fu l l - b lo o d e d  use o f  "nv " in "S ha l l  u v  do  . I ? " requ ires that ea ch  o f  the  
p e o p le  re ferred  to has in effect e xp ressed  to the  o thers  his will ingness to sh a re  with the  
others in do ing  d .  in c ircu m sta n ces  o f  the type  at i s s u e r '
How, then, is such an account to accommodate cases where members are bom 
into a group, notably the nation state but also various tribes, or even families? 
There is no sense in which all the individuals considered to be members o f  a 
nation state have chosen willingly to join it.
Gilbert (2005) clarifies herself out o f  this particular problem, by specifying 
that expressions o f  readiness need not be entirely voluntary. She counts coerced 
agreements as genuine agreements (although, as with coerced promises, they are 
not necessarily agreements which, all things considered, one is morally obliged
->4
to uphold)." By the same token, even coerced expressions o f  joint readiness (for 
example, expressing readiness for the joint commitments o f  the political society 
into which one was bom, when the only alternative is deportation2^) are enough 
for membership o f  a plural subject, although without necessarily rendering the 
individual morally obliged to fulfil the obligations thereby incurred."
She defends this viewpoint by pointing out that, once there is an established 
practice o f  making agreements, 'agreements may be made in situations in which 
one party is, indeed, pressuring the other to enter the agreement'. The point is
->7
that the agreer is still willing to agree in what Gilbert calls 'the intention sense'." 
Unlike someone who signs a paper without realising what it says and so agrees 
without intending to do so. the person who signs with a gun against her head is 
knowingly agreeing, although she is not acting voluntarily."1 This seems to fit
:| Gilbert 1989, 198 
:: Ibid., 200  
Ibid., 179 
^  Gilbert 2006, 75-82 and 228-9  
Gilbert's example, which she d iscusses in the context o f  actual contract theory. (2006 .  76)
:t> Gilbert 2006, 235 
Ibid., 76
Gilbert's example (2006 .  76)
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our standard understanding o f  agreements. Explaining what happened later, the 
person is likely not to say: "1 didn't agree -  he put a gun to my head", but rather: 
"I agreed, but I had no choice -  there was a gun to my head."
In such circumstances, Gilbert argues, the agreer is in a sense obligated: she 
has, by the act of agreeing, committed herself to some joint endeavour. However, 
in another sense (*a sense standardly connoted by the qualifier “moral'” - ), she is 
not, because she was coerced.
This line o f  argument, if successful, could save Gilbert from the Voluntariness 
Objection. Nonetheless, there remains the related question o f  how exactly 
members of (say) nation states or families are supposed to have expressed their 
readiness to be jointly committed with the other members. Those who are bom 
into a state rarely have to make some declaration, on coming of  age, to 
participate in the joint endeavours o f  their country. Nor, in countries where 
voting is not mandatory, can they be said to be declaring their willingness to 
participate in the political process by doing so in this explicit way.
Gilbert allows for expressions of joint commitment which are not explicit, and 
which evolve over time. Thus, she would presumably count remaining in the 
country, paying taxes, obeying the laws and so on an expression o f  readiness, 
made to others in society, to do one's part. This still leaves some potentially 
problematic cases, however. Suppose someone is bom into a country but, on 
coming of age, refuses to obey its laws or pay its taxes. He ends by being taken 
forcibly to prison, where he never gives up trying to escape. At no point, coerced 
or otherwise, has he made any expression o f  readiness for joint commitment. 
Does this exclude him from membership o f  the nation state? It is not intuitively 
obvious that it does. (Later sections will make it clear how my model can 
accommodate such examples.)
Perhaps Gilbert would interpret his being in the country at all, benefiting from 
an infrastructure (at the very least, roads and water systems) built with public 
money, as an expression o f  readiness. This, however, seems to stretch the notion 
of expression of readiness almost to emptiness. Moreover, there are individuals, 
whom we intuitively count as members o f  some central collectivities, who not 
only do not, but cannot express joint readiness in any intentional sense at all.
Gilbert 2006. 81
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This line o f  argument can be taken further still: to challenge not only the need 
for "expressed joint readiness" but also for "awareness". This is the 
Unintentional Members Objection. Against the Narrow Intentionalist Thesis, we 
can point to individuals intuitively regarded as members of some central 
collectivities, who cannot be (or are not) aware of  the common purpose or goal. 
Against the Broad Intentionalist Thesis, which requires that all members regard 
themselves as part o f  a group, we might point out that such individuals do not 
consider themselves as being so.
Consider the following special case individuals, familiar from the second set 
o f  examples identified in Section I. The cases are formulated in terms o f  the 
family, but the arguments could also apply at a wider level, to tribes or nations.
The first is the baby. Babies, intuitively, are members of families. Families, 
intuitively (and on my account), are collectivities. Gilbert wants them to count as 
such.30 However, babies are not aware o f  being part o f  a collectivity. They are 
not aware o f  the common purposes o f  a family (that is, all the various things a 
family does together). Nor would we want to deny them their status: the rest o f  
the family, after all, considers them to be members and they are tied to the other 
members through the interests w hich they have in common.
One possibility is to amend the Narrow Intentionalist Thesis to require that 
individuals, if they are not currently aware o f  the goals and their being shared, 
will at least become so. However, this (itself a significant amendment o f  the 
thesis) would not accommodate the next problematic case: the severely mentally 
handicapped person. The exclusion of  the mentally handicapped child from a 
family is as repulsive a result as the exclusion o f  the infant. The natural response 
would be to say that all individuals within the set who can be aware of the 
goals/purposes (aware that they are shared, etc) will be so aware, but that there 
may be some who are not so able. This, which would involve going further still 
from the core idea of  the intentionalist account, would nonetheless leave 
untouched the third problematic case: the teenage rebel.''
The rebel is not a baby, nor is he mentally handicapped. He would deny being 
part o f  the family and resent any demands made on him by the family. 
Nonetheless, it seems on most intuitive readings that he is still part o f  the family,
Gilbert 1989, 234
1 Thanks to David-Hillel  Ruben for the example.
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and his parents still think he is. To include such cases, the Narrow Intentionalist 
Thesis would have to be amended yet again, to allow for members o f  a 
collectivity who could be aware o f  the common goal, purpose or interest (aware 
that it is a common goal, purpose or interest) but who deny this.
The above discussion has taken us further and further from the Narrow 
Intentionalist Thesis. Full membership o f  families (or tribes or nations) by any of  
these three individuals is incompatible with the view that '[ t]he core type o f  
group membership is at some level intentional -  it is not acquired unwittingly, 
such as by inheritance simply; social groups [collectivities] involve a substantial 
kind o f  unitv [and] core group members will perceive that such unity exists'. ~ 
Gilbert (1989) insists that her account can be extended to include (at least 
some o f  these) 'complex cases'. While maintaining that plural subjecthood is 
'central to collectivity existence as intuitively conceived', she does not want to 
exclude the baby from the tribe or family. She also wishes to allow individuals to 
become members o f  clubs (as. indeed, they do) 'knowing little about [the club's] 
aims and ideology'. 3 Thus, she introduces the notion of  entry rules.
Plural subjects proper can develop along a \ariety  o f  lines. For instance, a plural subject 
may adopt a name; it may develop a sense o f  specialness and a desire for exclusivity:
'W e don't want anvone e lse  in on this, unless w e  all reall\ like her'. Or it may have a 
sense o f  need for new' members. For such reasons the existing members may establish  
rules that determine who may becom e a member. The possibility o f  such entry rules 
allows for com plex cases. The rules can in principle be so capacious as to allow those  
lacking the ability to be members o f  the initial plural subject to be considered members  
none the less. Thus infants can be thought o f  as 'members o f  the tribe', though they 
have no conception o f  the tribe as a whole. Similarly, an adult may know nothing o f  the 
tribe but still be a member according to the group's ru les . '1
Unfortunately, Gilbert leaves us unclear what limits there are on these entry 
rules. As it stands, this paragraph seems to say that anyone can become a part o f  
any collectivity, simply because those individuals who make up the plural subject 
at its core so decide. Suppose two o f  my young cousins decide to form an
: Gilbert 2006 ,  168 
'' Ibid., 233  
4 Ibid., 233
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Orlando Bloom fan club. They then feel a 'sense o f  need for new members' 5 and 
so set up entry rules such that all o f  their female first cousins count as members. 
My sister and I become members o f  a collectivity without knowing it, or wanting 
to be. (They could equally w'ell set up the rules so that everyone in the world was 
a member.)
This cannot be what Gilbert intends. Rather, she wants to allow cases such as 
the person who joins a club without really knowing much about what it does -  
that is, who espouses a goal without specific knowledge o f  what exactly that goal 
is. This point could be accommodated by suggesting that entry rules apply to 
those who want to be part o f  the collectivity. However, this fails to let in exactly 
that other set o f  cases with which we were originally concerned. The baby and 
the mentally handicapped person cannot (we assume) want to join the 
collectivity, because they have no idea what it is all about. The teenage rebel 
does not want to consider himself a member. We need some w ay of identifying 
those individuals who can be part o f  the group: those who, in each case, the 
supposed plural subject core is entitled to consider as members.
Later, Gilbert appeals to the idea o f  imputed membership, as a kind o f  stop 
gap until full, intentional membership can be assumed.
[Core members] may stipulate that others, for instance, their children, are to be regarded 
as members for som e or all practical purposes. These others then have imputed 
membership. They will not be core members or members proper unless they com e to 
participate in the joint commitment that constitutes the political society in question. '6
This could be plausible with regard to children, who can be expected to achieve 
core membership of their family groups and societies in time. However, it 
implies rather repugnantly that mentally handicapped individuals can never have 
more than imputed membership o f  their families or states, and would similarly 
exclude cases such as that of the teenage rebel.
Moreover, Gilbert's attempts to amend her account leave her vulnerable to the 
Circularity Objection.' According to her paradigm case, for a set o f  individuals 
to constitute a collectivity, they must all be in the appropriate ' 'we" mental state.
35 Ibid., 233  
'6 Gilbert 2006, 239  
Sheehy also accuses her o f  circularity (2002 ,  386-9)
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This allows her to define social groups in terms o f  the thoughts and beliefs o f  
member individuals. However, by introducing notions such as an entry rule or 
imputed membership, she is adding a social concept to the conditions on the 
existence of a collectivity (or, according to her own account, a social group).
Gilbert says disappointingly little about what entry rules would be, but they 
would presumably permit an individual to become part o f  a social group, without 
awareness o f  shared purposes, because some kind o f  criteria have been agreed to 
by those already in the group, according to which they count as members. This, 
certainly, is the idea behind imputed membership. Thus the concept o f  an entry 
rule is not, as she appears to suppose, innocent o f  anything social, but requires its 
own analysis in terms o f  collective ideas, and so cannot be thrown in at this 
stage/'8
IV. Accommodating tough cases
Having thus attacked the Gilbertian model, where do we stand? The Broad 
Intentionalist Thesis has been rejected. At least some members o f  those groups 
which we standardly regard as central collectivities do not see themselves as 
such. Moreover, having chipped away at the Narrow Intentionalist Thesis, we are 
left with the idea o f  a number o f  individuals who have a shared or common goal 
or purpose (or, as with the teenager example, an interest in common), but who 
have not each necessarily entered readily into this shared end, and not all of  
whom can (or do) even acknowledge it.
In other words, we have come to something very close to the definition given 
in Section I:
A set o f  individuals constitutes a collectivity if and only if those 
individuals are mutually dependent through some common or shared 
purpose, goal, or ATC interest, whether or not they acknowledge it 
themselves.
s A s Section V w ill highlight, such "counting” o f  something as significant in a sense over and 
above its material properties is central to the realm o f  the so c ia l.
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As we have seen, this accommodates all three o f  the problematic inclusions 
above. The baby is mutually dependent with his parents (and siblings) for the 
achievement o f  the goals o f  family life (broadly, living peacefully and happily 
together). O f course, the baby himself does not have goals -  he is unable to 
formulate them. However, the dependence is "mutual" because, although the 
conscious, practical effort in pursuit o f  these goals will be made by the others, it 
is not only part of their shared aims that the baby be included, and be happy, 
healthy, not screaming all the time, etc., but this healthy family atmosphere is in 
his interest. A similar argument can be offered for the mentally handicapped 
family member.
We can also assume, plausibly, that there are various ways in which the 
teenage rebel is tied to the family. Perhaps he still inhabits the same house as his 
parents and siblings, perhaps his parents want to spend time with him and they 
all, including him, benefit from a stable family atmosphere. It seems that there 
are common interests in play: fundamental interests in a stable, healthy family 
life, which can only be met together. (I will come back to this question of
. "Winterests.)
The non-intentionalist model can also accommodate a nation such as Spain, 
its collectivityhood hinging not on acknowledgement o f  shared purposes but 
simply on mutual dependence. This is a key aspect o f  the defence o f  this model. 
However, it requires further explanation. It is not entirely straightforward to 
identify the common interest, goal or purpose through which everyone in that 
state, including rebel individuals parallel to the teenager, is mutually dependent.
A first suggestion would be that the common goals or purposes o f  the Spanish 
are the many things they want to achieve as a nation, from winning the World 
Cup to defending themselves (if necessary) against attack. However, various 
individuals within Spain will not (for example) support Spain in the football. 
Perhaps their parents were Argentinean and they support Argentina instead.
This is not in itself a difficulty, so long as there are some common goals, 
purposes or interests at the national level: there are intuitively many different 
collectivities within the nation, including cultural subgroups. However, some
'9 Note, however, that there are circumstances in which the teenager could conceivably cease  to 
be part o f  the collectivity, although he would still be part o f  the biological family: for example i f  
he deliberately, physically separated h im se lf  from his family, m oving city and setting up an 
entirely independent existence
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individuals will not even regard themselves as committed to the most general 
goals, such as that o f  defending Spain against enemy attack. Consider extremist 
Basque separatists who do not regard themselves as part of Spain at all, and 
actively work against the national government.
Even in these cases, I argue, there is a common interest in the relevant sense. 
Those who live and work under a government are mutually dependent through 
the myriad o f  institutions in the country. Their long-term interests in keeping 
safe, healthy and educated (of generally getting through life in a worthwhile 
way) can, under the circumstances, only be pursued together. To use an analogy, 
consider the Tragedy of the Commons, familiar from game theory.40 There may 
not be any fellow feeling between the owners o f  the animals, but they are in a 
situation such that it is in all of their long-term interest not to destroy the land, 
and they can only achieve this by co-operating and agreeing to limit the total 
number grazing on it.
Even if the terrorist subgroup denies this, it is in everyone's (including the 
terrorists') ATC interest to find a peaceful solution. (The underlying claim -  that 
genuine opportunities for security and health are o f  such fundamental importance 
to a nourishing human life that it cannot be in an individual's ATC interest to put 
them at serious risk -  will be defended in the next chapter.) O f  course, it is 
possible that the solution would ultimately be a separation into two nations, and 
two collectivities, one of which was no longer a subgroup o f  the other. However, 
that does not change the current mutual dependence o f  the individuals.
This has defended the non-intentionalist model against two of  the objections 
levelled more successfully against Gilbert's intentionalist view. To show that the 
model can also avoid the third, it is necessary to go into more detail on the 
relationship (and the distinction) between the social and the collective.
V. Defending the distinction 1: social properties, groups and aggregates
There is no space here, nor is it necessary, to elucidate all the many rival 
accounts o f  what exactly is at stake when we speak o f  social properties.41 It is
40 See Chapter Four, Section IV for further discussion.
41 I discussed social properties in more detail in my MPhil thesis (Cripps 2005 ,  36-41).  See  
Ruben for one carefully thought-out example (1985, 1 10-7)
53
enough to draw on illustrative examples to offer a draft o f  a necessary criterion 
so general as to be uncontroversial.
The following are clear cut examples o f  social properties being true of 
something, or someone. Gordon Brown is the British Prime Minister. Italy is a 
member of the European Union. A certain piece o f  plastic and paper in my bag is 
my UCL student card. As these illustrate, an uncontroversial necessary criterion 
for a property's being social is that given in Section I: the property has a 
significance over and above the material or physical properties with which it 
coincides, and has this because o f  the recognition by a certain group o f  
individuals that it will have it. (I am trying to capture the idea of a general 
understanding that doing such-and-such a thing will count as doing x.)
Using this intuitive idea, we can bring out the threefold distinction, 
highlighted in Section I, between: collectivities (sets o f  individuals o f  which at 
least one collective property in the strong sense is true), social groups (roughly, 
collectivities whose collectivityhood hinges on the applicability of some social 
property, but I will return to this in Section VI), and social aggregates (sets o f  
individuals who share a social property but do not constitute a collectivity). On 
this account, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for collectivityhood that some 
social property be true o f  some set o f  individuals.
This gives rise to an obvious objection: that I have unnecessarily complicated 
matters, both in distinguishing between collectivities and (their subset) social 
groups, and in defining social groups other than through shared social properties. 
In response, beginning with the latter, I will attempt to rebut the suggestion that it 
is sufficient to establish social grouphood (and so collectivityhood42) that a set o f  
individuals share some social property.
Why should sharing a social property be any different to sharing some 
physical property (for example, having blue eyes), unless having that property 
ties the individuals in some further way? (As with, for example, being black, or 
being a woman: those who share such properties acquire shared interests, 
including an interest in not being discriminated against.)
Take, for example, all those people who happen to be entitled to a Spanish 
passport (a social property). Many o f  these (in particular those living in Spain) do
4~ It would he an intuitively repugnant account o f  collectivities which actually exclu ded  som e  
'.ocial groups.
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constitute an intuitively important collectivity. But it is probable that there are 
some individuals, scattered across the world, who are entitled to a Spanish 
passport (for example by virtue o f  a parent who emigrated as a child) but 
consider themselves, and indeed are, in no way specially attached to Spain. They 
are unconcerned about its performance in the World Cup, and upset by terrorist 
attacks on Madrid no more than they would be by such attacks anywhere else.
This wider set o f  individuals is not tied in a way which is either politically 
relevant or which should excite the interest o f  social scientists looking to explain 
the results o f  human interaction. There is no reason why such a set should 
constitute a collectivity, any more than those with blue eyes.
The non-intentionalist account can accommodate this intuitively important 
point. As the previous section indicated, many of  those entitled to a Spanish 
passport (because they are part o f  the Spanish nation state) are tied through 
shared goals and interests. However, those individuals whose parentage entitles 
them to a Spanish passport but genuinely have no special interest in Spain, are 
not so tied. Thus, the wider set constitutes only a social aggregate.
VI. Defending the distinction 2: collective v. social properties
A shared social property is insufficient for collectivityhood. As we have seen, 
Gilbert offers a more structured account o f  a collectivity, taken (by her) as the 
same thing as a social group, which incorporates the element of acknowledged 
significance central to the social. However, as we have also seen, she is unable to 
account for certain key members of  social groups without falling foul of  the 
Circularity Objection. Instead, my model appeals to the idea o f  the collective, 
independent o f  any preconceived views about the social. This point can be made 
by starting, as she does, with the idea o f  individuals doing something together, 
but understanding it more broadly.
There seem to be three ways in which a number of  individuals might bring 
about some result between them. The first is pure coincidence -  a combination of 
individual acts which, by chance, take place at the same time and so have some 
particular effect. An example would be if five individuals, going about their 
separate lives, happened to step on the five trigger points required for a bomb to
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go off, at exactly the same time. Such cases, being one-off and unpredictable, can 
be ignored for the purposes of this project.
The second is predictable combined effect', the combined outcome of  
individuals acting independently in pursuit o f  individual goals. Suppose a 
primary school is surrounded by houses which are being refitted. All the owners 
have decided independently to embark on the projects. The noise o f  construction 
from one house would not be a problem, but the combination is so loud as to 
render teaching extremely difficult. Such cases, I contend, are politically 
interesting under certain circumstances: where the combined outcome is harmful, 
in a morally significant way, to some other individual or individuals. I will 
explain this idea at the end o f  this chapter.
The third possibility is collective achievement o f  a common end. It is around 
such cases that the politically interesting understanding of  a collectivity revolves. 
It is here that we have a prudential case for special obligations between members. 
Moreover, Gilbert concentrates on this third case. However, careful attention 
reveals two sub-cases, corresponding to two understandings o f  "common end”, 
the second of  which Gilbert (w ith her focus on the social) overlooks.
The first case involves a genuinely shared goal: it is the goal of  the 
individuals to do something together, as a set. (Recall the example from Section I 
o f  the friends climbing Monte Rosa.) In the second case, action has to be taken 
by a number o f  individuals, as a group, in order for any individual's individual 
goal to be achieved, even if  each individual is indifferent as to whether the others 
achieve their goals. The Lost case is an example; another is the classic Prisoner's 
Dilemma, where it is in everyone's interest to find a workable means o f  co­
operating to reach the second best outcome for each, rather than leave each 
individual to make a selfish decision, which results in a worse outcome for all.43
In both cases, it is possible to identify a set o f  individuals who are mutually 
dependent for the satisfaction o f  their purposes and goals. This is the reasoning 
behind the definition offered in Section I: a collective property in the strong 
sense is true o f  them (that is, they constitute a collectivity). (Note that I use “ in 
the strong sense” to distinguish these from predictable combined effect cases, 
where a weaker collective property, corresponding to the weak collective harm
4 See Chapter Four, Section IV for further discussion o f  the Prisoner's Dilemma
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discussed in Chapter One -  would be applicable. I will come back to this in 
Section XI.) This is clearly distinct from the idea of a social property sketched 
above. However, it leaves us able to account for social groups as a subset of 
collectivities, as outlined in Section I.
A collective property is true o f  a set o f  individuals whenever they are 
mutually dependent in the relevant way. Their being so may be a result o f  
entirely material factors (as with the Commuter Village or Escaping Prisoners) or 
it may be a result o f  social factors (as with the friends on Monte Rosa: there is an 
additional recognised significance to their reaching the top, together).
Social groups are those sets o f  individuals who constitute a collectivity on the 
back o f  social properties. This could happen in two ways: it could be because of 
some social property or social properties true o f  the individuals that they 
constitute a set o f  which a collective property is true (as with the Spanish, as will 
be discussed below), or it could be an integral part o f  the common goal that at 
least one social property becomes or remains true o f  someone, some set o f  
individuals, or something. (Consider, for example, the supporters o f  a second 
division football team, whose shared goal includes various social properties -  
winning the FA cup, getting promoted and so on -  becoming true o f  that team.)
This leaves us with an account on which the attribution of  a social property is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for collectivityhood. Section V showed why it is 
not sufficient. The defence o f  it as unnecessary is twofold. Firstly, we have seen 
from Gilbert that, in defining collectivities as social groups (i.e. including this 
element o f  recognised  significance in the necessary criteria for collectivityhood), 
one runs the risk o f  circularity. This account, as I will spell out below, avoids this 
problem whilst still accommodating such central collectivities as nation states.
However, in avoiding this problem we have reached a model o f  politically 
(and social scientifically) interesting collectivities which is much broader than 
many would intuitively accept. Sections VIII, IX and X will defend this result.
VII. Avoiding circularity
My non-intentionalist account, in separating the collective from the social, is able 
to accommodate the Spanish nation state as both a collectivity and a social group 
without falling foul o f  the Circularity Objection.
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Gilbert tries to define the social in terms o f  the thoughts and beliefs o f  
individuals (“we" thoughts). However, as we saw in Section III, she introduces 
the notion of an entry rule, which is a social property, and thus runs the risk o f  
cireulanty. For me, there is no such problem, because my more objective 
definition is o f  a collectivity, which is not a social concept. This distinction 
allows me to claim that a collective property may hold true because o f  social 
factors, but that does not make it any less a collectivity. Rather, it also makes it a 
social group.44
How is this done? As Section IV showed, the inhabitants of the Spanish 
nation state count as a collectivity because they are bound together (at the very 
least) by their fundamental interest in a peaceful, secure existence. Because the 
mutual dependence arises as a result o f  historical social arrangements, the 
Spanish are not only a collectivity but a social group. But, regardless of  the status 
of "being Spanish" as a social property, a person bom in Spain finds herself, as a 
matter o f  fact, in relations of mutual dependence through common interests with 
all those with whom she actually shares her nation state. That is, she is a member 
of that collectivity. Thus, the account avoids circularity.
VIII. Controversial collectivities
In order to avoid excluding certain individuals from collectivities, I have defined 
collectivityhood according to actual rather than universally acknowledged mutual 
dependence. Avoiding circularity, it has been argued that collectivityhood does 
not rest on the attribution o f social properties. I have also appealed to the basic 
idea o f  doing or achieving something together, to identify cases in which 
individuals might be mutually dependent with regard to goals, purposes or 
interests, in a way independent o f  the definition o f  the "social". This section will 
address the more controversial implications of the non-intentionalist model, by 
returning to the non-intentional collectivities identified in Section I. I will then 
further defend the claims of even such controversial collectivities to the attention 
o f  political philosophers and social scientists.
44 Using Graham's example o f  the Unintentional Clique. 1 have argued elsewhere that it is 
possible to have not only a collectivity but even a social group which is characterised by 
unintentionality on the part o i'a ll  o f  its members. Howev er, for the purposes o f  my project here 
this stronger claim is unnecessary. (Cripps 2005 ,  74, and Graham 2002 ,  72-3)
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Two of  the controversial examples follow naturally from the second o f  the 
two senses of collective achievement o f  a common goaf laid out in Section VI. 
That is, where action has to be taken by a number o f  individuals, as a group, in 
order for any individual's individual goal to be achieved, even if each individual 
is indifferent as to whether the others achieve their goals.
Firstly, the house-owners in the Commuter Village do not consider 
themselves as part o f  a group, although they can only keep the green tidy (which 
each wants, on purely selfish grounds) if all contribute to this end. This is a 
borderline case. While it is involuntary, and non-intentional in the broad sense, it 
is at least arguable that there is intentionality to the extent that the individuals, if 
they use their intelligence, will know that they are mutually dependent.
Secondly, recall the Escaping Prisoners, rowing a boat none would be able to 
move alone. In Sheehy's original example, which does not specify that the 
prisoners are delusional, it does seem that each individual, while he is not 
voluntarily espousing the situation and does not think of himself as a member of a 
group, must at least be aware o f  the situation. This would render the collectivity 
intentional in the same sense as in the Commuter Village. However, in my 
adapted example, each of the prisoners believes himself to be possessed o f  
superhuman strength, such that he could propel the boat across the water himself. 
On my objective account, the prisoners still constitute an ad hoc unintentional 
collectivity. As a matter o f  fact, they are mutually dependent: escape, for each, 
can only be achieved through the action of  all.
In the Rival Gangs Case, each individual would vehemently refuse to co ­
operate and deny any kind o f  collectivityhood with the others. However, the 
discussion o f  the baby, the mentally handicapped family member and the teenage 
rebel has already demonstrated the need to expand the criteria for 
collectivityhood to include mutually dependence through certain key individual 
interests even if they are not acknowledged as goals by the individuals 
themselves. (The next chapter will fill this out by defending a capabilities-based 
model o f  human flourishing.) The individuals in this case are mutually dependent 
in exactly this way: co-operation is the only way to preserve each one's 
fundamental interest in staying alive.
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This leaves us with the most controversial example: Searle's pack o f  hyenas 
hunting a lion.46 Here, there is mutual dependence without the capacity to 
acknowledge a genuinely shared goal. I would argue that the hyenas constitute a 
collectivity. However, the key arguments o f  this thesis will not in any way rest 
on the inclusion of such cases, so there is no need to defend this claim in detail. It 
was mentioned to raise the (to me, interesting and advantageous) possibility of 
expanding my model to accommodate non-human animal cases.
IX. Meeting G raham ’s conditions
This section will complete the defence o f  the non-intentionalist model, by appeal 
to work by Graham. Graham and Sheehy are both non-intentionalists. However, 
unlike me. they do not question Gilbert's assumption that social groups and 
collectivities are essentially the same thing. Moreover, rather than offer a rival 
model o f  the circumstances under which a set o f  individuals constitute a 
collectivity (as with my appeal to mutual dependence), they attack the 
intentionalists by appeal to certain explanatory or descriptive criteria which a 
collectivity should meet, and which are satisfied by some non-intentional 
collectivities.
Sheehy claims that groups are individuated by their ineliminability from ‘our 
best explanations in the social domain'.46 He asserts this “ineliminability" for 
groups including his escaping prisoners. I have argued elsewhere that, 
understood as a claim about irreducible causal impact, or explanatory autonomy, 
this is flawed: social groups have an irreducible causal impact, in that causal 
explanations which cite the social properties o f  social groups are not reducible to 
explanations in terms o f  only the individual properties o f  individuals. However, 
those collectivities which are not social groups, do not have this kind o f  
autonomy.47 I omit these arguments here, as it is not necessary, for the purposes 
o f  this thesis, to engage in detail with the explanatory or causal status of  the 
social.
4 Graham 2002 ,  71-2. citing Searle 1995
46 Sheehy 2001 ,  117
4 Cripps 2005, 36-58
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Graham does not require explanatory autonomy. Rather, he argues, a number 
of individual human beings form a collectivity (or social group) if and only if 
they satisfy certain criteria:
i) that they  act in \ca\ s w hose s ig n ific a n ce  can  he a d eq u a te ly  ca p tu red  o n ly  by  an  
inelin iinahle  re ference  to so m e  co rp o ra te  b ody  as p a r t o f w hich  th ey  are  
acting , w here
ii) w hat that co rp o ra te  b o d y  d oes is d is tin c t f ro m  a n y th in g  w hich th ey  as 
in d iv id u a ls do, an d
Hi) w here the co rp o ra te  b o d y  is a p e rs is tin g  o n e  w hose su rv iv a l is re la tive ly
in d ifferen t to the  p e rs is te n ce  o f  the p a r tic u la r  in d iv id u a ls  w hich co m p o se  it a t 
any  p a r ticu la r  m o m en t.4S
I will argue that all the collectivities on my non-intentionalist account, 
including those which are not social groups, will satisfy these conditions. This 
requires a certain reading o f  the conditions, which may not be entirely in line 
with Graham's own intention. However, the point to be made is: other than by 
starting with the assumption that only social groups should be allowed to qualify 
for collectivityhood, there is no reason to interpret the conditions in such a way 
as to exclude other collectivities.
(Note, moreover, that I would eschew the word “corporate", with its 
implications of corporate action -  a rather stronger notion than collective action -  
and would replace it with “collective". This is an important move beyond 
Graham and one which I will defend in my treatment o f  condition (ii).)
Because he has rejected intentionalism, Graham would deny that the 
“significance" to which he refers in condition (i) must be in terms o f  how the 
individual thinks of himself as acting (that is, as part o f  a group). However, this 
leaves us puzzled as to what exactly is involved. What Graham means seems to 
be something like the significance of  the individual in his example o f  a mob.49 
Clearly, the combination of all the actions o f  all the individuals in those 
particular circumstances has a certain effect, and it is this effect to which we 
refer in accounting for the "significance" o f  the individual actions. However, left 
as that, any individual action which, however coincidentally, contributed to an
4s Graham 2002,  68-9  
^  Ibid., 72.
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overall effect, could be said to have ‘'significance". (Recall the three levels of  
doing something together, in Section VI.)
At the other extreme, Graham might require the kind of significance 
incorporated in the rough draft o f  a necessary condition for a social property -  
being understood by some group of  people to “count as" something e ls e /1 
However, this seems unlikely: Graham himself acknowledges that there is an 
additional significance to individual acts, even in coordinated action cases, which 
they could not have outside that con tex t/1 This essentially social reading is not 
the only possible understanding o f  "significance", and to understand it in this 
way would simply be to assume that all collectivities are also social groups. 
Moreover, given that he regards collectivities and social groups as one and the 
same, he could be accused of circularity.
I suggest that the significance lies in the fact that the individual acts 
(intentionally or otherwise) contribute to a wider effect which results from 
certain relations in which the individuals stand. That is, relations such that the 
individuals are mutually dependent for the achievement o f  certain of  their 
purposes, interests or goals: those ends, "common" in either o f  the two senses 
identified in Section I, can only be achieved, for all the individuals, by the set as 
a whole.
It still remains to specify what is meant by “ ineliminable”, which will be done 
by engaging with arguments by Graham Macdonald and Philip Pettit. In line with 
Graham himself, my contention is that the reference is "ineliminable" in the 
sense brought out by the notion o f  expressive or descriptive (rather than 
explanatory) autonomy. To simplify a definition given by Macdonald and Pettit, 
being able to refer to expressively autonomous collectivities ‘enables us to give 
expression to truths that we cannot formulate [without such terms]'. ~
M) Sections I and VI
M ' [S |u ppose  I am a member o f  the tow n 's  garrison and leave it in circumstances where others do  
so too. so that the town's defence collapses in a wav which would not be possible i f  1 alone had 
left. Or I act with a number o f  others to lift som e heav y object which I could not possibly lift on  
my o w n . . .  In these cases. 1 act as an individual in coordination with a number o f  other 
indiv iduals and the significance o f  what I do is thereby transformed.' (Graham 2002. 67)
52 Macdonald & Pettit 1981, 115. More precisely, ‘one sort o f  entity X exists over and beyond  
another sort Y i f  and only i f . . .  the addition o f  terms by means o f  which we refer to X-type things 
enables us to give  expression to truths that we cannot formulate in a language with terms for 
referring to Y-type items'.
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Drawing on Macdonald and Pettit's case for the expressive autonomy of  
institutions, it is possible to argue that even the most controversial collectivities 
on my account are expressively autonomous. Macdonald and Pettit argue that, 
for many of  the sentences formulable in a language with concepts for referring to 
institutions and individuals,
there seem to be no accessible  counterparts in the truncated language which is deprived o f  
the means oi referring to institutions.. .  The sentences from the richer language contain 
expressions with which no expressions from the more austere one can be more  
appropriately al igned ."
Consider the difficulty of  finding individualistic counterparts to group predicates 
such as "has members" or "regroups".
However, there is a possible objection, from what Macdonald and Pettit dub 
the ‘expressive individualist '/4 That is, 'that since groups are composed o f  
people, anything that involves a group involves the people who are its members, 
and... any predicate therefore which attaches to the group must do so only 
insofar as a corresponding predicate attaches to its members.
Macdonald and Pettit respond by drawing a distinction between two possible 
claims glossed together in the objection, one o f  which is accurate, the other of  
which does not follow. The first idea is that the composition o f  groups is such 
that any group predicate is supervenient on individualistic predicates (by which 
they mean, put most roughly, that group properties cannot change without some 
change in individual properties). The second is that there will be a specific 
individualist counterpart available for any given group term. This is not 
guaranteed by supervenience, which is, rather, consistent with a group predicate 
applying ‘in circumstances characterised by any of an open-ended list o f  
individualistic predicates, or predicates compounds, so that we are not in a 
position ever to identify a disjunction of such terms which applies just when the 
group predicate does so'. 6 (This is a version o f  the multiple realisations 
argument.)
Macdonald & Pettit 1981, 118 
Ibid., 119 
" Ibid., 119
P See Macdonald & Pettit 1981. 119.
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We use group terms without considering which particular individualistic 
predicates apply in each case, nor would it necessarily help us to do so. As 
Macdonald and Pettit point out. '[tjhere seem to be an indefinite number o f  
individualistically describable ways in which group predicates may be 
realised'/ For example, our ability to say o f  a group that it “gains members" 
does not depend on whether we can link the terms to individualistic 
characterisations of people, even if we can show which characterisations, in a 
particular case, were behind the application of the group predicate.
Given, then, that appeal to a group predicate 'enables us to detect a kind o f  
phenomenon that escapes our conceptual grasp if we are restricted to the 
narrower range o f  concepts' ,>s Macdonald and Pettit grant expressive autonomy 
to institutions. Similarly, all the collectivities identified by the model defended in 
this chapter have expressive autonomy because there will always be multiple 
combinations o f  individual action which could produce the collective result. 
Consider, for example, the numerous different combinations of  individual acts by 
crew members which bring about the sailing of a ship.
To make the two points (ineliminability and significance) together, recall the 
four controversial collectivities. In the Commuter Village, many combinations of 
individual action could lead to the green being kept tidy and pleasant. Some 
individuals might pick up litter while others simply refrain from spreading it, or 
vice versa; one person might turn his music down when he has a barbecue, 
another change out of his spiked boots to play football on the green, or vice 
versa. Moreover, while it is true that each individual refrains from making noise, 
etc, because he wants to keep the green pleasant fo r  himself it is nonetheless the 
case that, because of the relations in which the individuals find themselves (of 
mutual dependence through a goal which can only be pursued together) their acts 
only lead to the satisfying o f  these goals (keeping the green clean) in 
combination. This brings out the significance o f  their behaviour.
The same can be said o f  the hyenas. Indefinite numbers o f  different 
combinations o f  individual actions can lead to the group result. One particular 
hyena might grab the lion and three others form a line so as to stop it from 
escaping, or some other way around, or some completely different combination
Macdonald & Pettit 1981, 120 
?s Ibid., 120
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of actions. In all cases, the behaviour o f  each individual hyena does not achieve 
the goal (death of the lion) except as one of a number of  coordinating acts. In this 
sense, its significance is only captured by ineliminable reference to the 
collectivity.
The other two cases are more problematic, but still meet the condition. With 
Sheehy's prisoners, the significance o f  each individual's action (row ing) cannot 
be bought out without considering the fact that that action, in combination with 
the actions o f  the other escaping prisoners, will enable them to escape. But is 
reference to the group ineliminable in the relevant sense? At first sight, it might 
seem that because each individual is doing one thing (rowing) that contributes to 
the overall result, the multiple realisations argument does not apply. But this is 
not the case. Even given that all are rowing, there are numerous different 
combinations o f  precise individual actions which could yield the overall result. 
For example, all might row with force r, or two might row with force r-s and the 
other two with force a  +.v , and so on.
This leaves the Rival Gangs Case. Again, there is a significance to an 
individual's action -  a significance fo r him -  which can only be brought out by 
consideration o f  context. In fighting the others, he is contributing to a situation in 
which his own interests are undermined, because, in this small-scale state of 
nature, co-operation is required for survival. Moreover, the outcome (whether 
disaster or co-operation) could come about in innumerable ways, whether a 
bashes y over the head, and r  retaliates, or y attacks x and r  runs away and hides, 
or some other combination, the outcome at the collective level is the same: 
failure to co-operate resulting in disaster.
Now consider Graham's other two conditions. A slightly amended (ii) (what that 
collective body does is distinct from anything which they as individuals do) will 
hold for the model of collectivities defended in this chapter. However, this does 
reinforce the distinction between my understanding o f  the conditions and 
Graham's. As he notes, the difference (between what the collectivity does and 
what the individual does) can be contingent rather than necessary. However, his 
examples all involve social properties. He points out that in some cases (for 
example, when it comes to electing a president) it is impossible for an individual 
to do what a collectivity does, while in others it is only in a certain context that
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the individual cannot do what the collectivity does. For example, only a jury can 
find a person guilty in certain criminal trials, but there are some civil trials in 
which the judge alone can do so.
With collective properties, on my account, it is enough that the individual 
cannot physically do what the collectivity does. For example, a crew working 
collectively sails a large ship across the water; the orchestra working collectively 
plays a symphony.
Graham appears to exclude such combinations by drawing a distinction 
between such cases of coordinated human action, and what he calls collective 
action, which involves a corporate entity/* However, his attitude is puzzling. As 
already noted, given that he himself acknowledges the significance of 
coordinated action,60 it seems he must regard his elaboration of the further 
conditions -  (iii) and in particular (ii) -  as at least contributing to his defence of  
the distinction between coordination and collective action. But, again, 
presumably because he has started from the idea o f  social groups and 
collectivities as synonyms, he seems simply to assume that the only relevant 
cases to consider are those involving social properties. This rather begs the 
question.
Such a limitation is, I contend, unnecessarily restrictive given Graham's own 
ambitious starting point. His project, broadly put, is to explore the notion of how 
we should behave, that is, to discuss normative rather than explanatory reasons, 
and how this is influenced by the interlinkedness o f  our lives. As he puts it, he is 
concerned with ‘how the reasons we have for acting are affected by the simple 
thought that we are soeial creatures. Whenever we act, either singly or in 
collaboration, we act together.'61 However, when he formalises his starting point 
into ‘two truths', there is no mention o f  the “social".
These “truths" are; firstly, that ‘everything a person does carries causal 
implications for the lives o f  other human beings', and, secondly, that ‘some o f  
the things a person does gain their significance from being part of some 
collective action, carried out by a number o f  human beings'.6- By taking the 
social, almost before he starts, to delineate the interesting or relevant realm
59 Graham 2002 ,  67
60 Ibid., 67. See also Footnote 51 
Graham 2002 ,  1
b: Ibid., 1
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within which we act collectively, he is excluding some of  the cases covered by 
those "truths”, and so restricting the realm (and so the moral or political 
implications) o f  his enquiry.
Recall, again, the controversial examples. In each, there is a clear (if 
sometimes contingent) distinction between what the collectivity does and what 
the individual does. The hyenas, not any individual hyena, kill the lion. The 
prisoners, as a collectivity, escape: none could do so alone. The gang members, 
between them, destroy their chances o f  survival. The Commuter Village, as a 
collectivity, keeps the green tidy.
Finally, consider a slightly amended condition (iii): survival o f  the collective 
body is relatively indifferent to the persistence o f  the particular individuals which 
compose it at any particular moment. This requires some clarification. There are 
two possibilities as to what Graham means. He could mean that the collectivity 
must be indifferent to the persistence of all the individuals in it at any one time. 
But, while some collectivities appear to meet this condition (boat race crew, 
university), there are also some obvious counterexamples (a group o f  friends, a 
couple). O f course, even with the former cases where, over time, all the members 
can change and the group remain, it is far from clear that it would be the same 
group persisting over time if all the members left at once and were replaced by 
new members. However, these are Theseus' ship type problems, as 
acknowledged by Graham himself, common to metaphysics, and not unique to 
collectivities.63
The other option is that he requires at least some members to be able to leave 
and be replaced. In this case, the condition is more widely satisfied. Recalling 
some of the examples above, one home owner in the Commuter Village could 
sell his house to a newcomer, without the collectivity ceasing to exist, there 
could be one gang member more or less on the island without the mutual 
dependence which renders them a collectivity ceasing to bind those who were 
there, and indiv idual hyenas could drop out of, or join, the hunt.
However, there still seems to be a problem. Graham notes that ‘[pjerhaps the 
smallest [collectivity might be constituted] by just a couple'.64 But it looks as
Graham 2002, 70. For a discussion o f  such cases in metaphysics,  see, for example, Wiggins,  
1M-71 
04 Ibid., 76
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though the removal of one person from a couple does effectively put an end to 
that collectivity. Similarly, would the collectivity o f  a group of three friends 
continue if one of them left? In the first case, we can immediately rebut the 
objection by pointing out that one person alone cannot be a collectivity. 
Moreover, in general it seems at least possible that few-person groups could 
sustain some changeover. A family is still a family when an extra child is bom, 
or one parent dies. In the friends case, it is harder to sustain this argument. 
However, it is at least plausible that a small friendship group would persist if one 
member left and was replaced (compare a three-member pop band such as the 
Sugarbabes with its turnover of members).
We can accommodate this by allowing for borderline cases. Note, 
importantly, that these are borderline only in the same way as we can cite 
borderline cases with regard to artefacts. How many legs does one remove from a 
chair before it ceases to be a chair?
Thus clarified, condition (iii) is satisfied. Moreover, it brings out an 
important distinction between ad hoc and lasting groups. Some collectivities on 
my account -  those such as Sheehy's prisoners that I have already dubbed ad hoc 
-  will not satisfy (iii). However, lasting collectivities will. It is these that are of 
particular interest to practical philosophers, policy makers and social scientists.
X. Two objections to the non-intentionalist model
The previous section defended even the more controversial collectivities 
accommodated by the non-intentionalist model, as satisfying the criteria for 
collectivityhood laid out by Graham. This completed the defence o f  the model, 
and its expansion of the understanding of  a collectivity beyond that o f  a social 
group. However, there are two obvious, if conflicting, objections to be tackled: 
that the conditions for collectivityhood laid out here are too weak, and that they 
are too strong.
Let us begin with the latter. This contends that it is unnecessary to require 
mutual dependence of  all individuals on all individuals within a collectivity. 
Take the example of  the nation state. Surely, the objector points out, everyone in 
the state can get along very well without everyone paying taxes, so long as 
enough people do so to support the health, security and education institutions?
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The response to this is twofold. Firstly, I have already acknowledged the 
possibility o f  collectivities of  which only a subset is active. For example, women 
and the suffragettes. In such cases, there is some goal which, if achieved at all, 
would be achieved for all. This could be because it is a genuinely shared goal 
(each woman genuinely espouses the goal that all women should have the vote), 
or simply because of the nature of  the good (votes for women means votes for 
you if you are a woman, and it is in each woman's interest to have a vote). The 
mutual dependence clause is met because each individual's achieving her goal 
(or interest) depends on all the others also having theirs achieved or satisfied, but 
much or all o f  the positive effort may be put in by only the active subset.
However, secondly, the situation is different when we are considering goals 
or interests which do not by their nature, but in the circumstances do, need to be 
achieved by all for all. In this case, membership of the collectivity is contingent 
both on individuals having the interest (or goal or purpose) and on co-operation 
being required for its achievement. The nation state example seems to fall into 
this category.
On further examination o f  the example, it becomes possible to reject the 
objection, which narrows down unnecessarily the ways in which an individual 
could co-operate. Omissions, as well as actions, can count. Thus, while not 
everyone has to pay taxes for a peaceful, secure environment to be provided for 
all, this common interest does require everyone to refrain from committing 
terrorist attacks, running around yelling abuse at people on the street, or putting 
poison in the drinking water, and so on.66
This leaves us with the claim that the non-intentionalist model is too weak. 
The objection claims that the model counts as a collectivity any set o f  individuals
I will come hack to this distinction as part o f  Chapter Five's deriv ation o f  indiv idual duties.
66 Clearly, this implies that not all our so-called political duties can be grounded (directly)  
prudentially in this way. This is unsurprising. There are various points to note. Firstly, 
prudentially grounded special responsibilities to one another (i.e. prudentially grounded duties to 
co-operate in achieving the end which bind a collectivity together) do not com e automatically  
with a mandate for coercive imposition. Such a mandate could be added by moral considerations,  
either in order to prevent harm to others, as with morally salient potential collectivities (see  next 
section) or through a variant o f  the principle o f  fairness which legitimates coercing individuals 
into co-operating with a collective entity i f  that is required to satisfy their own fundamental 
interests, or i f  the costs o f  their noncooperation to other members w'ere too high. (See  Chapter 
Five, Sections 111, IV and VIII) Legitimate coercion might further require a condition not only  
about how decis ions were made (democratically, say, but with basic rights protected for all) but 
also about how duties were allocated, for example requiring that all rather than just som e  
contribute through the tax system. Howev er, this is beyond the scope o f  this project.
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who would benefit, in terms o f  some interest or goal they have, from co­
operating with one another. But this means that, because (say) you and I would 
both benefit from being fitter, and going running together each morning would 
help us to do so, we count as a collectivity. This is counterintuitive.
This objection misrepresents the model. There is a distinction between 
potential mutual advantage and mutual dependence. According to the 
understanding o f  mutual dependence incorporated in the non-intentionalist 
account, a set o f  individuals constitute a collectivity only in the following three 
situations.
Firstly, most uncontroversially, a set o f  individuals constitute a collectivity if 
they have an acknowledged shared goal in the simplest sense of wanting to 
achieve particular end together: as with the friends whose aim it is to reach the 
top o f  Monte Rosa (and get down again safely) as a group.
Secondly, they constitute a collectivity even without this strong sense o f  an 
acknowledged shared goal, if co-operation is required for the achievement of 
each individual's acknowledged goals or purposes. Thus, suppose several 
individuals have got themselves, independently, half way up Monte Rosa. They 
are faced with bad weather and each wants to get down. However, they need to 
rope together and use all the equipment they have between them to do so. Then, 
they constitute a collectivity even if none cares about getting down together. This 
can be distinguished from the case in which each could get down perfectly well 
alone but it might be pleasanter (or faster) to combine forces. Then, there would 
be potential for mutual advantage but, unless all choose to adopt the new shared 
goal (getting down together), they would not constitute a collectivity.
Finally, even where there is no such mutual dependence for the achievement 
of  acknowledged individual goals, a set o f  individuals can constitute a 
eollectivity if co-operation is required for the satisfaction o f  each individual's 
ATC interest. This is not the same as hinging collectivityhood on each individual 
having an interest in something that would require co-operation for its 
satisfaction. Thus, to use Robert Nozick's example, the fact that I could be said 
to have an interest in a public address system for my street, which would require
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co-operation with other residents for its achievement, is not enough to render 
them and me a collectivity.6
Rather, the idea is that there are some things (for example, life, health, bodily 
integrity) which are of fundamental importance in any human life. Nozick can 
plausibly argue that, while he might have an interest in the public address 
system, it is not in his ATC interest because there are other goals he considers 
more important, or other, more fundamental, interests which outweigh it. 
However, it would not be in his ATC interest to be permanently deprived of one 
of these more central components o f  a flourishing life, whatever he thinks. This 
claim will be filled out in the next chapter, when a capabilities model o f  human 
flourishing will be defended. For now, the point is simply that mutual 
dependence for the satisfaction o f  an interest which is not also espoused as a goal 
or purpose is not enough to ground collectivityhood, unless that interest is an 
individual's ATC interest in not being deprived o f  a central capability.
Returning to the example, suppose the climbers do not espouse the goal of  
getting down safely: some want to go on to the summit despite the changed 
conditions. They might still constitute a collectivity but only if: a) their lives are 
at serious risk if they don't descend immediately, and b) the situation is as 
described above, so that none has the equipment or expertise to get down alone, 
but all could do so together. If the risk o f  completing the ascent were only 
slightly increased, or if some could descend independently, they would not be 
mutually dependent in the required way.6s
This should clarify that the account is not too weak. Note also that it avoids a 
problem faced by Gilbert. Section III asked how Gilbert could place limits on her 
entry rules (or imputed membership) -  the mechanism to which she was obliged 
to appeal to include babies or the mentally handicapped in her collectivities. The 
risk would be that anyone could become a part of any collectivity, simply 
because those individuals who make up the plural subject at its core decreed this 
to be so. (Recall my example of  the Orlando Bloom fan club set up by two of  my 
young cousins.)
' Nozick 1974, 93-5. See also Chapter Five, Sections 111, IV and VIII 
A Although those thus capable might nonetheless have a positively grounded moral duty to 
co-operate in getting everyone down. (See  Chapter Five, Section IV)
71
This, as we have just seen, is not a problem for an account which draws the 
boundary according to actual mutual dependence through goals, purposes or 
ATC interests. To recall another example, parents and sibling can legitimately 
consider their baby (or adopted baby) part o f  the collectivity which also includes 
them. However, they cannot arbitrarily set entry rules such that the three o f  them 
plus (say) Cruz Beckham constitute a collectivity. Equally, my cousins cannot 
arbitrarily include my sister and me in their collectivity, by introducing entry 
rules. We do not share their goal, nor is actively admiring Orlando Bloom 
necessary to our flourishing as human beings.
The two girls are not entitled to claim that they constitute a collectivity even 
with all other Orlando fans in the world. Each fan has the aim of  adoring him in 
whatever ways she (or he) chooses, but that does not make them mutually 
dependent through a common goal. It is neither the case that all fans (as with 
these two) have as part o f  their goal that it be carried out with the others, nor that 
it is a goal which can only be carried out en masse. This is in contrast to the 
teenage rebel, whose family are entitled to consider him part of the collectivity 
even if he denies it. This is because he is tied to them, simply as a matter o f  fact, 
by his (and their) fundamental interests.
XI. Morally salient potential collectivities
Having completed the defence o f  the non-intentionalist model laid out in Section 
I, I have one addition to make to that model. I promised to return to the second 
sense o f  alleged collective action identified in Section VI. That is, the predictable 
combined effect of individuals acting independently in pursuit o f  individual 
goals. This suggests a way in which individuals could constitute at least a 
morally relevant set, without having any common goals or interests, in either o f  
the senses used in my definition.
I offered the example of the householders round the primary school. Now, I 
suggest that the set o f  individual homeowners in this situation has true o f  it a 
collective property in the weak sense and is, therefore, a potential collectivity. 
The individuals are in a situation such that, were they to adopt or acquire certain 
goals or interests, they would become a fully fledged collectivity. Were the
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owners to take on the goal of  eliminating the disruption, they would have to do 
so collectively.
Why should political philosophers care about such cases? Because there might 
be collective responsibility for harm, in the sense identified in Chapter One: 
harm resulting from the predictable aggregation of individual actions. Potential 
collectivities who are collectively responsible (in the weak but morally 
significant sense) for harm to some person or persons are, I suggest, morally 
salient potential collectivities. In such cases, I have argued that, assuming moral 
impermissibility, there is a collective duty to redress the harm. Put in the terms of  
this chapter, the potential collectivity should turn itself into an actual collectivity 
with the goal o f  ending (or at least mitigating) the collective harm. There is thus 
often a case for treating these particular potential collectivities, at a political 
level, as though they were actual collectivities. (I will return to this point in 
Chapter Five.)
Conclusion
I have argued that the common ground between political philosophy and 
philosophy o f  social science requires reworking, so as to start, in the former, with 
a broader model of a collectivity than that offered by the intentionalists. On this 
non-intentionalist model, a set o f  individuals constitute a collectivity if and only 
if those individuals are mutually dependent through some common or shared 
purpose, goal, or ATC interest, whether or not they acknowledge it themselves.
A set o f  individuals also constitutes a social group if its collectivityhood 
hinges on the attribution o f  social properties, that is, if it is because o f  some 
shared social property that the individuals are mutually dependent or if it is an 
integral part o f  the common goal, ATC interest or purpose of  the collectivity that 
social properties become or remain true of some person, persons, group or object. 
Social properties are properties which are taken (through the acknowledgement 
o f  a number of  people) to have a certain significance over and above the material 
and physical properties with which they coincide.
I have thus argued against Gilbert's model o f  a collectivity, taken to 
correspond to the Narrow Intentionalist Thesis, and taken the counterexamples to 
her account as the starting point for the development o f  a more objective, non-
73
intentionalist model, on which the set o f  social groups is a subset of that o f  
collectivities.
Before closing, it is helpful to bring out the difference between our two 
projects. Gilbert's primary focus, at least in her later work, is the obligations 
which we acquire as members of certain collectivities (in particular, political 
obligations acquired by members o f  states to one another). Given an exclusive 
focus on that side o f  our relationship with fellow citizens, it is at least prima facie 
understandable to consider only (or at least primarily) those with whom we are 
intentionally bound: that is, those who will fulfil similar obligations.
However, there are two sides to the membership o f  states, and the other one 
concerns those to whom we acquire responsibilities. Many of these will also 
participate in the political process. But what about those (children, the mentally 
handicapped, arguably -  although this goes beyond this particular project -  
sentient non-human animals) whose interests are as bound up with ours as each 
others' are, but who cannot actively participate in any collective decision 
making, or knowingly bear the burdens of membership o f  a state?
The intentionalists could, in excluding such individuals from full membership, 
intend them nonetheless to receive the protection of  the state. But such "half 
way" or "second class" membership, especially for mentally handicapped adults, 
is unsatisfactory, and open to dangerous interpretation in practice.
In fact, when we consider the actual situation, the dependence (as with the 
infant and the family) does to a great extent go both ways. Children, the mentally 
handicapped and even sentient animals are in a sense subject to the laws o f  the 
land, even if they do not knowingly comply with them: their behaviour is 
restricted in accordance with them. My model eliminates the contingent, add-on, 
element of their membership and allows for the possibility that, even if they 
cannot participate in collective decision making, they are at least represented in 
it: that their individuals interests are taken into account, perhaps through some 
specific individual or group who speaks on their behalf.
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Chapter Three 
In the Human Interest: Defending Capabilities
What is required for a human life to go well?
I am doubly required to answer this dauntingly fundamental question. Chapter 
One, defending an expanded understanding of collective responsibility for harm, 
tacitly assumed the availability o f  an account of  morally significant harm. To 
identify the key components of  a flourishing human life (a human life which can 
be said to be going well) is also to identify certain aspects, interference with 
which constitute harm to an individual.
Chapter Two defined a collectivity as constituted by a set o f  individuals 
mutually dependent through some common or shared goal, purpose, or all- 
things-considered (ATC) interest. I contend that political philosophy should be 
concerned with collectivities in this broad, non-intentionalist sense, rather than 
restrict its discussion of collectively-acquired duties to acknowledged social 
groups. The specification of mutual dependence not only through goals or 
purposes but also through ATC interests calls for an account of what can be said 
to be in a person's interest and how I can justify appeal to certain interests even if 
the individual does not acknowledge them as her goals or purposes.
More generally, this chapter can be understood as providing a basic moral 
grounding for my project, by responding to the question: what, if anything, has 
moral value? Such value might be assigned to the flourishing of communities and 
societies, over and above that of the individuals who make them up; to the well­
being o f  non-human animals, to certain religious ideals, to the natural world, or 
even to certain objects o f  aesthetic value, such as great works o f  art. These are 
more or less controversial.
However, I am taking as foundational only the uncontroversial claim that the 
flourishing of  an individual human life has moral value. That is not to say that I 
deny the moral value of all of the other ends suggested above. Indeed, I believe 
that at least the flourishing o f  non-human animals has value, and the arguments 
of this thesis could ultimately be extended to accommodate this. But by starting 
with only the more limited claim, I am starting from a truth which is (more or 
less) universally acknowledged, and so can only be strengthening my argument.
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That said, in order to make any progress from this unproblematic claim, it is 
necessary to answer a much more controversial question. That is, precisely the 
question which I am already required to address: what exactly is meant by "the 
flourishing o f  an individual human life"? This chapter draws on the idea of 
capabilities to function, in particular as elucidated by Nussbaum, to provide an 
answer.
However, there is a crucial objection to the capabilities approach, as 
identifying the elements o f  (or prerequisites for) a flourishing human life: that it 
must fall, unavoidably, into one o f  two camps: undiluted preference satisfaction, 
or unacceptable paternalism. Call this the Preferences-or-Patemalism Puzzle 
(PPP) and the two components o f  the complaint the Preferences Accusation and 
the Paternalism Accusation, respectively.
It is essential that I respond to this accusation. On the one hand, I have 
defended an extension o f  the notion o f  a collectivity to include sets of individuals 
bound together by ATC interests which are not necessarily their acknowledged 
goals. If the capabilities approach turns out to collapse into undiluted preference 
satisfaction, then I cannot use it, as an understanding of  human flourishing, to 
defend this distinction. On the other hand, given that I will later be drawing 
political conclusions, in terms o f  individual and collective duties, from such 
collectivityhood, it is essential to demonstrate that, in avoiding undiluted 
preference satisfaction, the model is not unacceptably paternalistic. There will 
thus be two stages to the defence against a charge o f  paternalism. One is to 
defend the capabilities account, as a model o f  human flourishing, which will be 
done here. The other is to defend my use o f  the account as providing a notion of  
our individual interest which can be used to ground certain collective and 
individual duties. The arguments o f  this chapter go some way towards this, but 
will be supplemented in Chapter Five.
Another significant objection has been made to the capabilities approach. 
Ronald Dworkin has argued that, taken as a metric for distributional equality, it 
collapses into either equality o f  welfare, or his own (or Rawls') equality o f  
resources.1 I will also address this, for two reasons. Firstly, because of  its 
potential implications at the wider level (that is, for the capabilities approach as
Dworkin 2000 ,  299-303
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identifying prerequisites for human flourishing). Secondly, because Dworkin's 
argument, if successful, could threaten any attempt to apply the capabilities 
model politically , and I need to show that it does not threaten mine. While I do 
not here defend equality o f  capabilities or even a capabilities-based account of 
distributive justice, I do rely on a version o f  the approach in grounding some 
special responsibilities, and I at least refuse to rule out the possibility that such 
responsibilities, in certain cases, could legitimately be coercively enforced.
The argument will be structured as follows. Section I will give some 
background to the capabilities approach, and lay out the version to be defended. 
This is something like Nussbaum's list o f  central human functional capabilities." 
Sections II and III will argue that Dworkin's attack turns out either to be 
unconvincing, or to rest on the PPP. I will then offer a solution to the PPP, 
beginning in Section IV by presenting an understanding o f  the capabilities 
approach from which it follows that it is not in someone's interest, because it 
undermines the possibility o f  a fully flourishing human life, to be permanently 
deprived o f  a capability. This draws a dividing line between the capabilities 
approach and a subjectivist welfare account.
Section V will defend the approach against the Paternalism Accusation by 
drawing a distinction between acceptable and unacceptable paternalism. I will 
argue that a "vague thick"3 account along the lines o f  Nussbaum's list is not 
unacceptably paternalistic. Finally, Section VI will tackle one outstanding 
objection.
I. Human flourishing: the capabilities approach
The capabilities approach, inspired by Aristotle, pioneered by Amartya Sen 
and spelled out by Nussbaum, has huge intuitive appeal. Its central claim, as 
Sen puts it, is:
that tor man\ evaluative purposes, the appropriate "space" is neither that o f  utilities (as 
claimed by welfarists), or that o f  primary goods (as demanded by Rawls), but that o f  the 
su bstan tive  freedoms -  the capabilit ies -  to choose  a life one has reason to value.4
: Nussbaum 2000b .  7 8 -8 0  
Nussbaum 1990, 217-28
4 Sen 1999, 74 [emphasis added]
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The approach is Aristotelian in that it draws on the notion of  human flourishing 
as more substantive than preference satisfaction. Modem moral philosophy has 
already drawn the idea of flourishing to provide a non-expressivist ground for 
judgements o f  moral character. The evaluation of human behaviour, as Philippa 
Foot puts it, is part o f  practical rationality, but abstract rationality alone is not 
enough. Rather, ‘the evaluation o f  human action depends also on essential 
features o f  specifically human life '/
Foot ties moral virtues (and defects) to 'what human beings are and what they 
do' by appeal to the same kind o f  “Aristotelian necessity" as is invoked in 
identifying as a “good’' lioness one who provides food for her cubs and teaches 
them to hunt.6 As part o f  this account o f  goodness in human behaviour, she 
defends a deep notion of happiness, tied to the idea o f  living a “good" or 
flourishing life. ‘To flourish,' she savs, ‘is here to instantiate the life form o f  that 
species'.7 We find deep happiness in ‘things that are basic in human life, such as 
home, and family, and work, and friendship '/
The capabilities approach is similarly concerned with what it means to live a 
flourishing life, but, unlike Foot, does not attempt to marry the ideas o f  a 
virtuous human and one who is living a “good" or flourishing life. Rather, the 
approach has standardly been concerned with evaluating human lives for the 
purposes of  guiding political action. Within the “equality o f  what?" debate, 
appeal to capabilities is intended to steer a middle way between an equality of 
welfare which mandates financing expensive tastes, and a Rawlsian or 
Dworkinian equality of resources, which is insufficiently sensitive to different 
abilities to translate resources into lives worth living.4 Recent work has 
developed the approach as a way of  identifying for policy purposes which people
5 Foot 2001, 14
6 Ibid., 15. See also Foot 1978b, 132-147
7 Foot 2001, 91
s Ibid.. 88. She adds: 'These are. in a way, ordinary things, even though, in a person such as 
Wittgenstein, the ch ie f  joy  o f  his life was in the quest for truth, and in other exceptional men and 
women it is in artistic creation or the exploration o f  strange lands.' (Ibid.. 88) This 
acknowledgement o f  different conceptions o f  the good or rational plans o f  life accommodates,  as 
Nussbaum's list does, the centrality o f  autonomy, or meaningful choice,  in a valuable human life.
4 See Rawls 1971, Sen 1980 and 1992, Dworkin 2000, 11-119. Note  that this section o f  Sovere ign  
Virtue (Chapters One and Two) is reprinted with only minor corrections from Dworkin. "What is 
Fquality? Part One: Equality o f  Welfare". P h ilosoph y & P ublic  A ffairs 10 (1981): 185-246 and 
"What is Equality? Part Two: Equality o f  Resources". P h ilosoph y & P u b lic  Affairs 10 (1981):  
283-385
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are "disadvantaged".10 and Sen has defended it as a tool for development 
economists and other decision-makers at the international level.11
For the purposes o f  this project, what matters is that the approach offers a way 
of  identifying what, broadly, is in a person's interest, over and above what they 
espouse as a goal. Individuals could, accordingly, be said to be tied to one 
another in politically relevant ways which they did not intend and might not 
acknowledge. The approach also lends substance to the notion of doing morally 
significant harm to some person or persons (the kind o f  harm, as I will discuss in 
Chapter Five, which policy-makers might legitimately interfere to prevent).
In all these cases, however, the question arises: on what is this evaluative tool 
based? The issue, according to Sen, 'is . . .  the capability to live really long 
(without being cut off in one's prime) and to have a good life while alive (rather 
than a life o f  misery and unfreedom) -  things that would be strongly valued and 
desired by nearly all o f  us.' A paragraph later, he stresses the importance of  
'having more freedom to lead the kind o f  lives we have reason to value' } 2 So are 
these things (these "freedoms" or capabilities) important because nearly all o f  us 
desire them, or is it our having reason to value them that does the normative 
work, in which case the question becomes one of how to fill out what we have 
reason to value?
Nussbaum goes further than Sen in that she lays out a provisional list of 
central human functional capabilities. I will adopt a model of the central 
capabilities based broadly on this list. Similar questions, arise, however, as to 
whether is she is taking a moral rather than a purely political view. I will take the 
approach as making a substantive claim about what is valuable in a flourishing 
human life, and one which can be defended in a certain way. This, I suggest, is 
compatible with at least one reading o f  Nussbaum, although my arguments need 
not rest upon its being so.
Nussbaum is ambiguous. Her article for Liberalism and the Good appears to 
make a substantive moral claim. She bases the list o f  capabilities on a sketch o f  
' The Constitutive Circumstances o f  the Human Being (or: the Shape o f  the
10 See for example, W o lf f  and De-Shalit 2007  
See especially Sen 1999
~ Sen 1999, 14 [emphasis added]
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Human Form o f Life)'13 and specifies allegiance to the Aristotelian social 
democracy camp. However, Women and Human Development assigns the 
capabilities a status similar to that o f  the Rawlsian political conception: as 'the 
object o f  an overlapping eonsensus among people who otherwise have very 
different comprehensive conceptions of  the good*.14
Her remarks elsewhere provide clarification. In "The Good As Discipline, the 
Good as Freedom", she affirms the list as 'something that people from many 
different traditions, with many different fuller conceptions o f  the good, can agree 
on as the necessary basis for pursuing their good life '1^  but also distinguishes 
between Rawls' "thin" theory and her own more comprehensive theory o f  the 
good.16 In "Aristotle, Politics, and Human Capabilities" she acknowledges 'a 
significant shift* towards political liberalism, and in her understanding o f  the 
political status o f  the capabilities. She remains wedded to a 'substantive-good 
approach'1 , but clarifies that hers is a basic-level ethical judgement on which 
there can be deep and broad consensus -  a "'provisional fixed poin t '"18 in a 
process o f  reflective equilibrium. She maintains her link with Aristotle by 
arguing that he was not 'deriving ethical norms from metaphysical biology '19 
either.
Thus, it seems plausible to take her capabilities, unlike Rawls' primary goods, 
as specifying what is involved in a flourishing human life (not just a political 
proxy for different individual views). However, her source for the information -  
her evidence as to what those capabilities actually are -  is neither metaphysical 
nor biological, but rather broad consensus at a deep level among actual human 
beings (backed by empirical research) despite differences in the detail of 
different conceptions of  the good.
This gives substance to Sen's claim that the capabilities (or freedoms) are 
what we have reason to value (we have reason to value them because they are 
the key ingredients o f  a flourishing human life) and renders it compatible with
13 Nussbaum 1990, 219
14 Nussbaum 2000b, 5. See Rawls 1993 for an extensive discussion o f  overlapping consensus and 
its role in political liberalism.
15 Nussbaum 1998, 318
16 1 will elaborate on this discussion in Section V.
1 Nussbaum 2000a, 117
' Ibid., 120
lv Ibid., 118
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his describing them as what most o f  us would want (they are, which is how we 
are able to identify them as the central elements of a nourishing life). Moreover, 
while on the face of it such a dissociation from '‘biology" appears to move away 
from Foot's species-based understanding of flourishing, Nussbaum's appeal to 
consensus at a deep level is not so very far from Foot's reasoning in the 
following elucidation o f  her notion o f  "deep" happiness.
We are tempted to think o f  deep happiness as explicable psychologically in a w ay  that 
m akes it p o ss ib le  to sep a ra te  it fro m  its objects. But why should this be possible? Why  
shouldn't the communality o f  meaning not depend here on a shared reaction among  
human beings to certain things that are very general in human life. Are not these reactions 
shared even by people o f  very different cultures; not, o f  course, exactly, but nevertheless  
with sufficient similarity for people o f  one age or culture to understand depth o f  happiness 
over a birth and depth o f  gr ie f  about the death o f  parent, child, or friend?"0
Having thus outlined the reasoning behind it, we turn to Nussbaum's list o f  
central human functional capabilities.
1. Life
Being able to live to end o f  normal human life, not die prematurely/before life 
reduced so not worth living.
2. Bodily health
Being able to have good health (including reproductive health), have adequate 
shelter/nourishment.
3. Bodily integrity
Being able to move freely from place to place, have bodily boundaries treated as 
sovereign, have opportunities for sexual satisfaction choice over reproduction.
4. Senses, imagination and thought.
Being able to use senses, imagine, think and reason in "truly human" wav.  
cultivated by adequate education, to experience and produce self-expressive works  
and events, to use mind in ways respected by freedom o f  expression (political and 
artistic), to search for meaning o f  life in one 's  own wav. to have pleasurable 
experiences/avoid non-necessary pain.
5. Emotions
Being able to have attachments to things/people outside ourselves, to love and 
grieve, feel longing, gratitude and justified anger, not to have emotional  
development blighted by fear/anxiety/abuse or neglect.
20 Foot 2001, 88
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6. Practical reason
Being able to form conception o f  good and engage in critical reflection about 
planning o f  one's  own life.
7. Affiliation
(A) Being able to live with toward others, to recognise  and show concern, interact 
socially, to imagine the situation o f  others and to feel compassion; capability for 
justice and friendship.
(B) Hav ing the social bases o f  self-respect and non-humiliation, being able to be treated 
as dignified being o f  equal worth to others, being able to work as human being, 
exercising practical reason enter into meaningful relationships o f  mutual 
recognition with other workers.
8. Other species
Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals/plants/world o f  
nature.
9. Play
Being able to laugh/play enjoy recreational activities.
10. Control over one 's  environment
(A) Political -  being able to participate effectively in political choices governing life, 
having right o f  political participation, free speech and association.
(B) Material -  being able to hold property (land and movable goods, in terms o f  real 
opportunity, having property rights on equal basis with others, right to seek 
employment on equal basis with others, freedom from unwarranted search and
;iseizure.
Except insofar as I will refer back to it in defending this kind of account 
against the charge o f  paternalism, it is not necessary to examine or defend this 
list in detail. Rather, it is enough to say: it is a prerequisite to flourishing that 
individuals have access to certain vaguely defined central functional capabilities. 
Indeed, the key interests on which I will rely, in later chapters, are less 
controversial than some included on Nussbaum's list.
Having laid out the capabilities account, we can now turn to the first stage of 
the argument.
21 Nussbaum 2000b, 78-80. [Text abbreviated] W o lf f  & De-Shalit propose the fo l low ing  
additions: 11. Doing good to others (Being able to care for others as part o f  expressing  
humanity. Being able to show gratitude); 12. Living in a law-abiding fashion (Being able to 
live within the law, not being forced to break the law, cheat or deceive other people or 
institutions); 13. Understanding the law (Having a general comprehension o f  the law, its 
demands and the opportunities it offers to individuals) (2007, 50-1. Text abbreviated.)
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II. The Dworkinian complaint 1: resources & preference satisfaction
Dworkin asks: i s  Sen's own positive eonception o f  equality -  equality of 
capabilities -  really different from equality of resources? If it is, is it really 
different from equality of welfare?'22 He answers in the negative. On one 
reading, he argues. Sen's account collapses into equality o f  welfare; on the only 
other reading (which he thinks Sen intends), it collapses into equality of  
resources.
There are three preliminary points to make. Firstly, I neither pretend nor need, 
for the purposes of this thesis, to provide a complete answer to the question o f  
whether equality o f  capabilities is an appropriate political goal. Even holding 
capabilities (rather than resources or welfare) to be the appropriate metric for 
distributive justice, it would be possible to defend, as does Nussbaum, a 
sufficiency or threshold-based model o f  distributive justice.-3
Secondly, Dworkin's complaint is concerned with redistribution but the 
capabilities approach, as I take it, is much broader than that. It is concerned with 
what is needed for a flourishing human life. There are, therefore, two issues to 
consider in examining Dworkin's argument. In terms of  the wider debate, to what 
does his criticism of  the capabilities approach amount? And does it succeed in 
the narrower context o f  the "equality o f  what" discussion? My concern is 
primarily with the former. However, these sections will also have implications 
for the latter.
Thirdly, Dworkin's case is made against Sen, who does not offer a list o f  
capabilities. However, he would presumably offer a similar criticism of  any 
attempt to use Nussbaum's list as a metric according to which politicians should 
seek to make people "equal".
Sen's viewpoint, as Dworkin quotes him, is:
A person's achievem ent.. .  can be seen as the vector o f  his or her "functionings",  
consisting o f  beings and doings,  [varying] from such elementary things as being  
adequately nourished, being in good health, avoiding inescapable morbidity and premature 
morality, etc., to more complex achievements such as being happy, having self-respect,  
taking part in the life o f  the community, and so on. The claim is that functionings are
Dworkin 2000, 301 
"' For example, Nussbaum 2000b, 75
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constitutive o f  a person's being, and an evaluation o f  well-being has to take the form o f  an 
assessment o f  these constituent elements.  C losely  related to the notion o f  functionings is 
that o f  the capability to function. It represents the various combinations o f  functionings  
(beings and doings) that the person can achieve.'4
There are, Dworkin thinks, two possible readings o f  this paragraph. One is 'as 
suggesting that people should be made as nearly equal as possible in their 
capacity to realise the ''complex'' achievements o f  happiness, self-respect, and a 
significant role in the life o f  the community'2' .  The second is that government 
'should strive to insure that any differences in the degree to which people are not 
equally capable o f  realising happiness and the other "complex" achievements 
should be attributable to differences in their choices and personality and the 
choices and personality o f  other people, not to differences in the personal and 
impersonal resources they command'.-6
I will begin with this second reading, which Dworkin takes to be closer to 
Sen's intention,27 and on which, he argues, equality of  capabilities collapses into 
equality o f  resources. I will contend that his claim, taken at the level o f  the wider 
debate, amounts to a version o f  the Preferences Accusation.
On Dworkin's model, "equality o f  resources" is achieved in two steps: 
external resources (wealth and income) are equalised; then deficiencies in 
internal resources (strength, health, talent, intellect, and so on) are compensated
for by adjusting the allocation o f  external resources according to what insurance
->8
would, hypothetically, be taken out against them.-' The motivating idea o f  
"equality o f  capabilities", by contrast, is to render people equally capable o f  
achieving certain key functionings.
There has already been considerable academic debate around the question o f  
the distinction (or lack thereof) between the two models. This has tended to focus 
on interpersonal variation in the ability to convert resources into capabilities to 
function, either because of natural differences, or because of  social or material
'4 Sen 1992, 39-40, quoted by Dworkin 2000,  301 
" Dworkin 2000, 301 
26 Ibid., 303  
r  Ibid., 302
2S Ibid., 65-119
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factors.21' I will not go over this ground, except to note that Dworkin's response 
would be to argue that his notion o f  internal resources allows him to 
accommodate internal differences between individuals, such as handicaps, but 
that this would leave still leave him open to the point that his “equality" o f  
resources is compatible with dramatic differences in actual capabilities.
Consider Andrew Williams' example of  capabilities discrepancies resulting 
from other people's choices. Ann and Bob, according to Williams, do not have 
equal capability “to combine parenthood and occupational success' because of 
the difference in the general willingness of men or women to take up the 
counterpart role in the family.30 Dworkin acknowledges similar counterintuitive 
implications in his hypothetical case o f  shipwreck survivors allocating resources 
on a desert island, but responds that ‘the contingent facts o f  raw material and the 
distribution o f  tastes are not grounds on which someone might challenge a 
distribution as unequal. They are rather background facts that determine what 
equality o f  resources, in these circumstances, is . '31 To treat them otherwise, he 
claims, would be to fall back into equality o f  welfare, which he sees himself as 
having effectively refuted.
However, such a response is convincing (insofar as it is) only so long as the 
two models, equality o f  welfare and equality of resources, are taken to be 
exclusive alternatives. It is undermined if a plausible metric for equality can be 
offered which can accommodate cases such as Williams', without collapsing into 
equality o f  welfare. That is, precisely what equality of capabilities would claim 
to do. This will be revisited in the next section.
The argument to be offered here takes a different line. It hinges on the role o f  
individual choice in determining with respect to which capabilities individuals 
should be rendered equal. Dworkin cites the reading of  equality of capabilities 
which he sees as collapsing into his model as calling for no objective ranking of 
‘‘functionings". Rather, he says:
It is enough to distribute impersonal resources equally, and find devices, like the 
hypothetical insurance market, to mitigate differences in personal resources so far as this
° See Sen 1992, Dworkin 2000,  as well  as, for example: Will iams 2002; Pogge 2004; Pierik & 
Robeyns 2007.
Williams 2002, 31 
;i Dworkin 2000, 69-70
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is possible. Then we can allow people, through their choices against that more nearly 
equal background, to make their own rankings o f  "functionings" important to them. "
However, in talking o f  "functionings” rather than "capabilities”. Dworkin 
neglects a key distinction within the capabilities approach. His idea is that his 
own resourcist model can satisfy the demands of the capabilities approach, in this 
reading, by providing individuals with resources such that they can pick and 
choose across the functionings important in living a full human life. But the 
capabilities approach treats not functionings, but capabilities, as the appropriate 
metric for distributive justice. Thus the key question in establishing a 
convergence must be whether the two accounts can agree on whether it is 
sufficient to provide individuals with resources such that they can "make their 
own rankings” o f  capabilities.
Recall that a central element in Dworkin's resourcist model is the use o f  
hypothetical insurance to calculate compensation (in external resource terms) for 
internal resource deficiencies. He explains:
If ...  everyone had at the appropriate age the same risk o f  developing physical or mental 
handicaps in the future... but the total number o f  handicaps remained what it is. how  m uch  
in surance  co verage  a g a inst these  h a n d ica p s  w o u ld  the avera g e  m em b er o f  the  com m u n ity  
p u rc h a se ? We might. . .  say that but for (uninsurable) brute luck that has altered these  
equal odds, the average person would have purchased insurance at that level, and 
compensate  those who do develop handicaps accordingly/ 3
However, basing calculations on the insurance the average person would take 
is only a practical compromise. Dworkin specifies in a footnote that, ideally, 
equality o f  resources would compensate for personal resource deficiencies 
according to the level of insurance the relevant individual would take out. 
Averaging, he says, ‘is a simplifying assumption only, made to provide a result 
in the absence o f  the detailed (and perhaps... indeterminate) information that 
would enable us to decide how much each handicapped person would have 
purchased in the hypothetical market. If we had such full information, so that we
;  Ibid., 303  
Ibid., 78 [emphasis added]
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could tailor compensation to what a particular individual in fact would have 
bought, the accuracy o f  the program would be improved.'34
Suppose, then, that we were in a world o f  such refined technology and 
information that distributions could be calculated, in line with this ideal version 
of  equality o f  resources, by appeal to the insurance that each individual, 
hypothetically, would have taken out against having the internal resource 
deficiency which he or she happens to have. Suppose, further, that an individual 
lacks some internal resource the absence o f  which prevents her from exercising a 
central capability. However, this individual does not have a preference for the 
relevant capability, and so would not have taken out insurance against lacking it.
The footnote from Dworkin quoted above makes it clear that this ideal world 
equality of  resources would not provide her with that capability. Indeed, to do so 
would appear to conflict with the core idea of equality of resources, structured as 
it is around the idea of  an envy test. A person would not be compensated using 
hypothetical insurance for the lack of a capability which she does not herself 
value, because she would not envy anyone else's bundle o f  resources simply 
because they were able to exercise that capability and she was not.
Is this enough for equality o f  capabilities? Only if the capabilities approach, 
too, would target equality only in those capabilities that the individuals 
themselves valued. (Or, to put it another way, if it would seek only to provide an 
overall allocation o f  capabilities which met the envy test.) Dworkin says that the 
idea, common to the two approaches, is to “allow people, through their choices 
against that more nearly equal background, to make their own rankings o f  
"functionings" important to them'.33 But to support his conclusion that equality
'4 Ibid., 478 (Footnote 5 to Chapter 2 o f  Sovereign Virtue) Note, however, that even i f  this "ideal" 
equality o f  resources did appeal to avera g e  insurance. Dworkin's claim o f  collapse would not 
hold. He would have a better chance o f  achieving a merger between the two approaches, but only  
because the capabilities approach could provide a rationale -  for appealing to average insurance -  
which would otherwise be lacking. With allocations determined in this way, most individuals  
would regard themselves as over or underinsured. Dworkin's model would thus involve the, as it 
stands, arbitrary allocation o f  a resource bundle, objective in the sense that it does not correspond 
to the individual's own valuations. There is no rationale, in ideal resourcist (envy test) terms, for 
doing this. However, by basing a resourcist system on a capabilities account o f  flourishing, it 
could be rationalised. Dworkin could point out, with som e validity, that the capabilities approach 
is hazy on what exactly equality o f  capabilities would involve, in terms o f  transfer calculations. 
He might, further, contend that an average hypothetical insurance model provides the best 
approximation. However, in this case, it would not be equality o f  capability that collapsed into 
equality o f  resources, but rather that the capability approach provided equality o f  resources with a 
theoretical backdrop o f  which it was much in need. (See also Footnote 50)
35 Dworkin 2000, 303
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o f capabilities collapses into equality o f resources, this claim would have to be 
phrased, more strongly, in terms o f rankings o f capabilities.
This would not hold for a version o f the capabilities approach (such as the one 
I will offer in Section IV), which holds that the appropriate metric for distributive 
justice is capability to achieve each o f the functionings on something like 
Nussbaum 's list, not just those whom each individual happens to value.
Note, moreover, that if it is enough to satisfy a capabilities-based model o f 
distributive justice that individuals are rendered equal in their capacity to pick 
and choose across central capabilities, the corresponding view at the wider level 
must be, not that individual human flourishing requires all the capabilities, but 
rather that it requires only such capabilities as the individual would choose to 
have. Thus, behind Dworkin's mvoz/rces-based account o f redistributive justice 
must be an implicit reliance (which he sees the capabilities approach as sharing) 
on preference or choice satisfaction as the underlying element o f a flourishing 
human life.36 This is the Preferences Accusation, and can thus be rebuffed by 
solving the PPP.
III. The Dworkinian complaint 2: welfare & paternalism
Dworkin's other reading o f Sen is ‘as suggesting that people should be made as 
nearly equal as possible in their capacity to realise the “complex" achievements 
o f happiness, self-respect, and a significant role in the life o f the com m unity'.37
On this understanding, Dworkin claims, equality o f capabilities collapses not 
only into equality o f welfare but into ‘a particularly chilling form '38 o f it. O f 
course, he explains, ‘it is good when people are happy, think well o f themselves, 
and are thought well o f by others. The idea that people should be equal in their 
capacities to achieve these desirable states o f affairs, however, is barely coherent 
and certainly bizarre -  why should that be good? -  and the idea that government 
should take steps to bring about that equality... is frightening.'39
6 This fits well with his saying "it is good  when people  are h a p p y ...' but sits less well with the 
end o f  this sentence: ‘ ...and  are thought well o f  by others.' (Dw orkin 2000 . 302) This last 
suggests a possib le determinant o f  the “goodness" o f  a human life w hich is not entirely dependent 
on the individual's ow n mental state.
7 Dworkin 2000. 301
'v Ibid., 301-2
* Ibid., 302
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To elaborate, Dworkin distinguishes between two aims. Firstly, the 
(legitimate) one o f redistributing resources the lack o f which renders it 
impossible to achieve such ends as happiness, self-respect, and a decent role in 
community life. Secondly, the (he thinks, illegitimate) one o f making people 
'equal in their overall capacity to achieve these goals, whatever ambitions, 
projects, tastes, dispositions, convictions, and attitudes they might have, which is 
the false goal o f equal welfare, or well-being'.40
This is ambiguous, as can be brought out by asking why it is necessarily a bad 
thing for equality o f capabilities to turn out to be a form o f equality o f welfare. 
Equality o f welfare, understood at its broadest as equality o f well-being, has 
considerable intuitive appeal. To reject equality o f capability on these grounds, 
Dworkin would have also to show that it amounted either to a version o f equality 
of welfare which falls under his own, expensive taste-related criticisms,41 or to 
one which is counterintuitive for some other reason.
It is unclear which o f these paths he is taking, but let us begin by considering 
the former. Several o f his remarks suggest this. He points out that '[pjeople vary 
in their capability for "happiness" for a thousand reasons, including their wealth, 
their personality, their ambitions, their sensitivity to the suffering o f others, and 
their attitudes towards M ilton's rival muses. M oliere's misanthrope lacks the 
capacity for happiness o f Voltaire's Pangloss.' He stresses that what makes it 
impossible for many to achieve 'happiness, self-respect, and a decent role in 
community life' is not only a lack o f external resources, but also, often, a lack o f
4 ~>
internal ones. “ This appears to echo his own earlier attack on equality o f 
welfare, measured subjectively.
Even within this line o f criticism, there is scope for interpretation. Dworkin 
could be assuming that the capabilities approach would pander to individuals' 
own perceptions o f their quality o f life, to the exclusion o f all more factual 
criteria, effectively collapsing into exactly the kind o f equality o f welfare which 
he has already, famously, attacked. Alternatively, he could be objecting to the 
inclusion o f any subjective criterion in the metric for equality.
40 Ibid., 302
41 Ibid., 44-64
4: Ibid., 302
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If the former, he misunderstands the capabilities approach. Expensive taste 
objections to equality o f welfare point to the intuitively repugnant possibility that 
(say) Tiny Tim could end up with fewer resources than Scrooge because, despite 
his handicaps and other physical and nutritional disadvantages, he is happier and 
has more self respect.43 However, appeal to such counterexamples relies on 
stressing Sen's mention o f “happiness" as a capability (one which Nussbaum 
does not include) at the expense o f others, including Sen's own “elementary" 
(more objective) functionings, such as good health and nutrition.44 Far from 
denying Tiny Tim compensation, the capabilities account is designed expressly 
to take account o f such objective criteria as his nutritional or medical needs.
Moreover, to accuse equality o f capabilities o f exclusive reliance on 
subjective criteria, Dworkin must, again, take the approach at the wider level (as 
an account o f what is important for human flourishing) to rest entirely on how 
satisfied individuals themselves are with their lives. This is the Preferences 
Accusation, which will be denied in the following section.
Given the inaccuracy o f such a reading o f the capabilities approach, a more 
generous interpretation o f Dworkin is W illiams' revised version. However, this, 
as we shall see, is no longer a straightforward accusation o f “collapse”. Williams 
suggests:
[T]he resourcist should not argue that i f  the capability v iew  departs from equality o f  
resources, it becom es equivalent to equality o f  welfare. Instead, he should a llow  that a 
capability v iew  can differentiate itse lf  from equality o f  resources by focusing on com plex  
capabilities yet also retain the nonderivative concern for elem entary capabilities which  
distinguishes it from welfare. He should nonetheless still insist that, to the extent that such 
a view  departs from equality o f  resources, it does so only by em bracing a concern with 
welfare which, even i f  not exclusive, renders it vulnerable to antiwelfarist objections.^
Williams states, not implausibly, that 'D w orkin 's reference to “collapse" is 
best understood in this sense'.46 But the accusation has changed: there is an 
important difference between the claim that equality o f capabilities must either 
be no different from equality o f welfare, or no different from equality o f
A' D w orkin's ow n exam ple (2000 . 59-62)
44 Sen 1999, 39^40
4' W illiam s 2002 , 27
46 Ibid., 28
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resources, and the claim that it must either be no different from equality o f 
resources, or contain a subjective element which renders it vulnerable to the 
same attacks as can be made on equality o f welfare.
In the latter case, the capability approach would remain distinct from either o f 
its two rivals, with the success o f the Dworkinian attack resting not 
straightforwardly on a reference back to his earlier expensive taste-based 
rejection o f equality o f welfare, but rather on the claim that his earlier (or other) 
arguments can justify rejecting any metric for distributional equality which 
incorporates any subjective welfarist element. An account is owed o f why this 
should be. Moreover, the following points suggest that Dworkin's own 
counterexamples cannot so easily be applied.
Firstly, the inclusion o f such criteria does not mean considering them 
exclusively. Tiny T im 's state o f mind might mean that he does not, as some 
others might, have a claim on the tax system for treatment for depression. 
However, his health problems and his lack o f adequate nutrition give him a claim 
to extra resources, or social facilities, to boost him in terms o f those capabilities. 
Indeed, one o f the motivating factors in developing the capabilities approach, as 
an alternative to a welfarist theory, is adaptation to poor lifestyle conditions or 
mistreatment. Expensive taste criticisms, the other side o f the same coin, are 
similarly defused by the inclusion o f objective criteria to balance out subjective 
claims.
The Dworkian objection might be reworked, pointing to the intuitive 
disappeal o f som eone's having any redistributive claim, even one ultimately 
balanced out, on the grounds o f voluntarily-acquired expensive tastes. Surely, we 
feel, Louis' consciously cultivated taste for plovers' eggs should not give him 
any claim to compensation.47
However, it is far from clear that the capabilities approach would be 
committed to compensating him. Much o f  the force o f Dworkin's expensive taste 
arguments can be removed by shifting the goal from equality o f actual welfare to 
equality o f opportunity for welfare. They are similarly defused by the distinction 
between functionings and capabilities. Such criticisms rest on the false idea that 
equality o f capabilities would seek to give people (say) equal self-respect rather
4 D w orkin's exam ple (2000 . 49-52)
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than what it would actually target: the capability  to achieve self respect, or, as 
Nussbaum puts it, 'the social bases o f self-respect and non-hum iliation'.4S
Moreover, Dworkin's attack rests heavily on Sen's reference to “happiness". 
This seems to operate at a different level to the other suggested functionings, and 
does not feature on Nussbaum 's list. Instead, more specifically, she includes the 
ability 'to have pleasurable experiences' within Senses. Imagination and 
Thought, and lists Play ('Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational 
activities') and Emotions as central capabilities.44
There is also an important distinction between central capabilities (broad- 
based capability ‘'categories'', such as “Life" or “Affiliation") and subcategory 
capabilities. Thus, for example, even if distributive claims were based on 
functioning shortfalls, it is unlikely that Louis would have any claim. Although 
his pleasure might be reduced by the fact that he cannot indulge his tastes as 
frequently, he has, we can assume, made other gains within the category o f 
Senses, Imagination and Thought. He has searched for his own meaning o f life in 
his own way (he has, as Dworkin himself sets up the example, cultivated this 
taste precisely because he sees it as making his life more worthwhile^0) and 
presumably thought, reasoned and imagined in the process.
Thus, on one (entirely) subjectivist reading o f the capabilities approach, 
Dworkin's argument relies again on the Preferences Accusation. On another 
(partially) subjectivist reading, he does not demonstrate collapse into equality o f 
welfare, or even into an account sufficiently welfarist to fail by appeal to the
,s Nussbaum 2000b, 79-80
49 Ibid., 80
M) A related line o f  attack focuses on another o f  Dw orkin's counterexam ples to welfarism : 
"bottom less pit" problem s which arise when an individual's physical condition is so  dire that they 
could never be made "equal" with regard to som e subjective criterion. (2000 , 60 -1 ) H owever, this 
applies not just to subjective criteria but also to more objective ones such as health. Som e  
individuals will have such bad handicaps that even given alm ost all o f  so c iety 's resources they 
would never be equal to others in a particular capability. This could be a stronger case than those  
considered above for a shift to a hypothetical insurance m odel, as the practical way round these  
problems. H owever, a) it w ill be clear from the previous and next sections that the hypothetical 
insurance calculations w ould have to operate within  each central capability, the m otivating idea 
still being to get as c lose  as possib le as equality in each o f  these, rather than to provide ability to 
choose and make trade-offs across them; b) this w ould not touch the approach at the broader 
level, as a m odel o f  human flourishing -  it w ould lim it the criticism  to the sphere o f  distributive  
justice; c) the presence o f  som e exceptional problem  cases does not seem  adequate grounds for 
giving up altogether on distribution according to capabilities, especially  when D w orkin 's  
alternative would permit significant discrepancies in capabilities in a wider range o f  cases than 
just these extrem e scenarios.
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same expensive taste-related counterarguments. We are left, then, with the 
alternative reading o f Dworkin highlighted at the start o f the section.
Rather than attacking the capabilities approach for making too much space for 
individual tastes and ambitions, he could be accusing it o f collapsing into a 
version o f equality o f welfare which is repugnant for exactly the opposite reason
-  that is, which does not leave enough room for individual taste.
There is. again, textual evidence for this. Although he ignores Sen 's more 
objective criteria (good health, nutrition, avoiding escapable morbidity and so 
on^1) and cites both “happiness'' and “self-respect” (another subjective criterion) 
as among the Senian ‘important goods' for human beings, he also acknowledges 
the more objective functioning o f “taking part in the life o f the community” . 
Being ‘thought well o f by others' is a measure o f quality o f life external to the 
individual. "
Thus, there is a plausible reading on which Dworkin is accusing the 
capabilities approach o f drawing up a set o f criteria for quality o f life and 
imposing this on individuals regardless o f  their individual ‘ambitions, projects, 
tastes, dispositions, convictions, and attitudes'/''3 In this case, his references to 
the “frighteningness” o f political interference, and the “chilling” form o f equality 
o f welfare make more sense. They draw on the idea that it should be up to the 
individuals whether, and to what extent, their quality o f life depends on such 
criteria as (say) involvement in the life o f the community.
This is an important objection. It is, moreover, one which applies at the 
broader level. But the PPP already takes it into account, as the Paternalism 
Accusation. Thus, again, defeating Dworkin on this score becomes one side o f 
solving the PPP.
IV. More than preference satisfaction
I am left with the twofold task o f solving the PPP. The Preferences Accusation, 
recall, claims to reduce the capabilities approach to a solely preference-based 
account o f human flourishing. The first point to press in refuting this is, as has
" Sen 1992, 39
-  Ibid., 302
53 Ibid., 302
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frequently been pointed out, the difference between functionings and capabilities. 
While space is left for individual freedom in choosing whether or not to exercise 
the functionings, that does not mean that an approach which identifies 
capabilities as prerequisites for human flourishing must collapse into preference 
satisfaction.
Rather, the question is whether scope is allowed for individuals to choose 
between the central capabilities, as expressed by something like the categories on 
Nussbaum 's list. I will simply bite the bullet. That is, I will take the capabilities 
approach as saying that the functional capabilities are all necessary elements o f a 
flourishing human life, regardless o f whether each individual thinks so. This is 
implies that it is not in an individual's ATC interest to give up, permanently, any 
one o f theirC4
There are three things, however, that I want to be careful not to say. Firstly, to 
reiterate, there is no suggestion that it is not up to the individual whether to 
exercise the relevant functioning. Consider examples such as the rich faster, the 
monk adopting an ascetic life style, or George Orwell down and out in Paris and 
London. ^
Nor, secondly, am I claiming that there should be no scope for an individual 
to put certain capabilities at risk in order to function more in others. This would 
be ridiculous: some degree o f risk is an unavoidable part o f life. Moreover, it is 
strongly intuitive that, when at least a certain level o f risk is balanced against an 
autonomously chosen goal (one which, perhaps, forms an important element o f 
her rational plan o f life 6), it must be up to the individual to say what is in her 
interest, all things consideredr1 To deny this would be to deny, for example, that 
it can contribute to flourishing to take part in many sports.
>4 As I will clarify in the final section , this claim  can be understood in tw o ways. H ow ever, for 
the moment it is sufficient to lay it out like this. It is worth re-stressing that this chapter aim s to 
lay out a version o f  the capabilities approach w hich can escape the PPP, not to defend such a 
version as exactly in line with either Sen or N ussbaum 's aeeounts. H ow ever, there is support for 
this reading in Nussbaum . For exam ple: 'The "capabilities approach", as 1 conceive it. c la im s that 
a life which lacks any one  o f  these [central functional] capabilities, no matter what e lse  it has, 
will fall short o f  being a good human life .' (1 9 9 8 , 320)
' These are W o lff & D e -S h a lif  s exam ples, with the rich faster borrowed from Sen (W o lff  & De- 
Shalit 2007, 64-5; Sen 1999, 75)
6 Recall N ussbaum 's Category 6: Practical Reason, which includes being able 'to engage in 
critical reflection about the planning o f  on e 's  life '. (N ussbaum  2000b . 79)
I will com e back in the next section to the question o f  autonom ous choice.
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However, there is an important difference between this and a deliberate 
decision irrevocably to give up a capability (or to expose oneself to a very high 
risk o f doing so). O f course, I cannot identify precisely at which point on the risk 
scale this kicks in. It is enough to say that, on this version o f the capabilities 
approach, it is contrary to a person's having a fully flourishing life for her to give 
up, or to almost certainly give up, voluntarily or otherwise, all future capability 
for one o f (something like) N ussbaum 's functionings. Moreover, there are clear 
grounds for concern if  an institutional framework enables individuals to exercise 
certain capabilities only by putting others in serious jeopardy. s
Thirdly, it is perfectly compatible with this that individuals might choose, 
rationally, to give up one o f these capabilities for some external end -  most 
plausibly the life or well-being o f some other person or people. To say that all 
these capabilities are necessary constituents o f a flourishing life is not to say 
anything about when a person might be justified in sacrificing (or might even be 
morally bound to sacrifice) some part o f their own flourishing.
The Preferences Accusation fails against this version o f the capabilities 
approach. The claim that it is a prerequisite for a fully flourishing life that an 
individual has all the central capabilities draws a clear distinction between this 
and any model which identifies a flourishing life with one in which the 
individual's own preferences are satisfied.
Correspondingly, Dworkin’s attempt to reduce equality o f capability, as a 
political goal, to equality o f resources, is mistaken. As Section II demonstrated, 
the alleged collapse depends on the assumption that equality o f capabilities 
would not require equality in each central capability, but only a “nearly equaloM 
background, in terms o f resources, against which each individual could choose 
such capabilities as she valued. Assuming that the aim of distributive justice is to 
provide all individuals with an effective opportunity to live a fully flourishing 
life, the version o f the capabilities approach just given would not be satisfied 
with this.
A final note, before addressing the Paternalism Accusation. I have defeated 
the Preferences Accusation as it stands. However, it might be reformulated as the
Consider Sen's exam ple o f  Kader M ia. who is ob liged  to risk his life in order to work. (1 9 9 9 , 
^ Dworkin 2000 , 303
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somewhat different claim: that the capabilities approach collapses into so-called 
ideal or rationed preference satisfaction. Call this the Ideal Preferences 
Accusation.
On an ideal preference satisfaction account, a flourishing life is characterised 
by the satisfaction o f preferences adjusted in certain ways, or the preferences a 
person would have in certain ideal conditions. For example, on Richard Brandt's 
account:
[A] person's desire, aversion, or pleasure [is] 'rational' i f  it would survive or be produced
by careful 'cogn itive' psychotherapy for that person. I shall call a desire 'irrational' i f  it
cannot surviv e com patibly with clear and repeated judgem ents about established facts.60
He points to four primary types o f "mistaken'' desires, aversions, or pleasures: 
dependence on false beliefs; artificial desire-arousal in cultural transmission; 
generalisation from untypical examples; and exaggerated valences produced by 
early deprivation.61 Cognitive psychotherapy is supposed to correct for these.
It should be clear that the capabilities approach, as laid out here, does not 
collapse into this kind of ideal preference satisfaction. There is no reason to 
assume that all individuals, taken from current circumstances, would prefer or 
ehoose the capabilities even after the kind o f cognitive psychotherapy advocated 
by Brandt.
Moreover, even if  the two did happen to coincide, for the alleged collapse into 
ideal preference satisfaction to take place, the capabilities would have to be mere 
means to ensure that preferences were rational, with the satisfaction o f rational or 
ideal preferences regarded as, ultimately, constituent of human flourishing. But 
even on a "practical reason ing"-based account o f the capabilities, such as the 
model favoured by Sabina Alkire, the line o f argument goes the other way.62 
Reason (like Nussbaum's deep and broad consensus63) is appealed to as the best 
way o f "getting at" the capabilities essential to flourishing. This is not the same
60 Brandt 1979, 113
61 See Brandt 1979, 115-26
6: Alkire. inspired by Finnis. defends appeal to reflection on the question "why do 1 (or others) do  
what 1 (or they) do?” to identify 'a d isc re te  heterogen eou s se t o f  m ost basic  a n d  sim ple  reason s  
for acting  which reflect the com plete  ran ge  o f  kinds o f  valuable human s ta tes  an d  actions  (the 
com plete range o f  functionings)'. (2 0 0 2 . 46 . referring to John Finnis: N atural Law  an d  N atura l 
Rights , Oxford University Press. 1980)
6 Nussbaum  2000a, 120
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as an approach which assigns ultimate importance to the satisfaction o f rational 
preferences, and gives the capabilities the instrumental role o f ensuring that 
preferences are formed rationally.
Anticipating later sections, however, an understanding o f ideal preferences 
can be envisaged such that the two accounts might well converge. Suppose ideal 
preferences were defined as those preferences that would be formed under 
something like the Razian conditions for autonomous choice.64 It is plausible that 
the capabilities would turn out to correspond to what (at least most) individuals 
would prefer in ideal conditions. However, this is not a problem for the 
capabilities account. Indeed, as the discussion o f Section I should have made 
clear, it is an advantage.^
Again, the direction o f the argument need not be the same. The account could 
agree that the only way, ultimately, o f getting at what is necessary to human 
flourishing is through such ideal preferences. But it would not thereby have to 
concede that what is ultimately valuable is the satisfaction o f ideal preferences, 
in itself. Even were a capabilities theorist to concede that, in the end, little turns 
on such a distinction, this hypothetical understanding o f ideal preferences goes a 
long way beyond undiluted preference satisfaction, or indeed Brandt-style 
accounts which take existing preferences and somehow “correct” them.
Thus, only on a very specific reading o f “ ideal” could enjoyment o f the 
capabilities plausibly correspond with ideal preference satisfaction. Such an 
model would be so far distinct from actual preference-based accounts as to 
continue to evade the Preferences Accusation. However, this does raise some 
specific questions regarding freedom to choose between capabilities within the 
circumstances o f autonomous choice. I will return to this in Section VI.
64 A bsence o f  coercion and manipulation; appropriate mental faculties; and adequate choices.
(Raz, 1986, 372-2). These will be discussed further in Section V.
6> Nussbaum . w hile rejecting preference or desire-based accounts o f  the good, stresses: 
nonetheless, it is quite important to political justification that there should be a good m easure o f  
convergence betw een a substantive-good approach and an in telligently designed inform ed-desire 
approach'. (2000a, 117-8)
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V. Paternalism: acceptable and unacceptable
Turning to the other side o f the PPP, the Paternalism Accusation says, broadly, 
that adult human beings are the best judge o f what is in their own interest, and it 
is unacceptable to impose on them any external conception o f the good.
One narrower version o f the criticism focuses on the unattractiveness o f the 
idea that philosophers consider themselves in a position to speak authoritatively 
on what is best for other people. It is intuitively unappealing that a theorist 
should, with something like the intellectual snobbery implicit in John Stuart 
M ill's ranking o f pleasures, pass judgem ent on what is good for the rest o f the 
hum anity.66
This is a forceful point. At first sight. Nussbaum 's account could, indeed, 
appear overweighed to the philosophical viewpoint, stemming as it does from 
ideas in Aristotle and Marx. However, as discussed in Section I, her later 
reformulation o f her position defends the list o f functional capabilities as derived 
through a procedure which is 'neither ahistorical nor a priori. It is the attempt to 
summarise the empirical findings o f a broad and ongoing cross-cultural inquiry. 
As such, it is open ended and humble: it can always be contested and rem ade.'67 
She draws extensively on work with women in developing countries, notably 
India.
Moreover, Jonathan W olff and Avner De-Shalit have since attempted to 
validate their slightly modified version o f the list 'by means o f a cross-check by 
more empirical forms o f enquiry: consultation with people from a wide variety o f 
walks o f life, analysis o f surveys, and the like'.68 This goes some way towards 
rebutting this narrower version o f the paternalism objection, although the range 
o f opinion canvassed by W olff and De-Shalit was relatively limited, and
66 Mill 1861, 136-42
67 Nussbaum  1998, 317
68 W o lff & D e-Shalit 2007, 43-4. See Footnote 22 for their additions. This evaluation process had 
four parts: (1) Reflection upon the list 'in a traditional w av' (43) through consideration o f  their 
own experience o f  the disadvantaged and discussion with other political philosophers and those  
in social policy, as well as consideration o f  existing em pirical studies. (2) Proposal o f  further 
categories. (3) Testing o f  the expanded list through a total o f  88 formal interview s with welfare  
services providers and disadvantaged individuals in Israel and in England. (4) A sking  
interview ees whether they felt that any categories were m issing. The response was general 
affirmation but with som e categories (notably (8), Other Species) considered less central, and one 
addition suggested: 'the fun ction ing  o f  bein g  ab le  to com m unicate, including bein g  ab le  to speak  
the lo ca l language, o r  being verba lly  in d ep en d en t'. (60)
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restricted to the UK and Israel. A more thorough endorsement would require 
research across more diverse cultures.
However, such consensus on this particular list does not refute the more 
general paternalist critique. As Nussbaum summarises it, the accusation is that
when we use a set o f  universal norms as benchm arks for the w orld's various societies, 
telling people what is good for them, w e show too little respect for people's freedom as 
agen ts... People are the best judge o f  what is good for them, and if  w e prevent people  
from acting on their own choices, w e treat them like children.69
One immediate response is to stress, again, as Nussbaum does, that her list is 
one o f capabilities,70 What matters is that each individual human being has the 
option o f functioning in each o f the categories. She thus steers clear o f any 
dangerous suggestion that individuals should be “ forced to be free".
However, the charge o f paternalism can still be pressed. Is it not paternalistic 
to judge a person's quality o f  life according to a set o f capabilities which she 
herself might not choose to prioritise, or to assign interests to her which she does 
not embrace as her goals? This section will argue that the capabilities approach is 
not unacceptably paternalistic.
Begin by considering what exactly it is that we object to about paternalism. 
The following might be taken as a first draft.
First Paternalism Assertion
It is unacceptably paternalistic to judge the success or otherwise o f another 
human being's life according to a thick conception o f the good that does not 
correspond to her own conception o f the good.
The term "thick" is used here in contrast to a Ravvlsian liberal "thin theory" o f 
the good.71 For Rawls, famously, the right is prior to the good. Individuals have 
their own comprehensive conception o f the good and rational plan o f life, and 
freedom to pursue these is central. However, parties behind his veil o f ignorance,
6) Nussbaum  2000b , 51
0 The relation between capabilities and functions is. she stresses, 'crucial to .. .  [addressing] 
concerns about paternalism and p lu ralism ... W here adult c itizens are concerned, capability , not 
function ing , is the a p p ro p ria te  p o lit ic a l goa l.' (N ussbaum  2000b , 86-7 [her em phasis])
1 Nussbaum  1990, 210.
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ignorant o f their own comprehensive views, agree on the primary goods (rights, 
liberties, opportunities, income and wealth, the social bases o f self respect'2) as a 
proxy or "thin” conception o f  the good. They then choose principles on the 
assumption that more primary goods is better than less. A thick theory o f the 
good takes a more comprehensive stance on what is needed for a flourishing 
human life.
As it stands, the Paternalism Assertion can be questioned. Indeed, its force 
depends on two factors: the preciseness o f the conception o f the good imposed; 
and the conditions under which the individual's own conception o f  the good is 
held or adopted.
Consider the latter first. The thin liberal objection to something like 
Nussbaum 's list is that it overrides individual choice. This rests on the idea that 
what matters most for humans is the ability to decide how to live their own lives. 
Thus only goals and interests acknowledged by the individuals themselves 
should be allowed to "count” in determining whether they are fully flourishing, 
or what is in their interest. Because the capabilities approach doesn't limit itself 
in this way, the suggestion is, it is unacceptably paternalistic.
However, the capabilities theorist has a reply to this which not only serves as 
a response to the Paternalism Accusation, but also indicates the flaws in the kind 
of preference satisfaction account o f human flourishing which Dworkin, as well 
as Rawls, appears to assume to be a good thing.
The force o f the thin liberal objection -  the supposed intuitive wuicceptability 
of a capabilities model -  hinges on a misconception o f what is required for 
individuals to be able to decide, in some genuine sense, how to live their lives. 
Meaningful choice requires more than negative freedom to choose against 
whatever background of living conditions, family, educational opportunities, and 
so on, a person happens to have.
Nussbaum offers examples o f women in India with established entrenched 
"preferences” that reflect the ill-treatment to which they have become 
accustomed.73 Even in a supposedly advanced W estern society, a young adult 
who has spent his childhood watching TV in a small flat might “choose’' to stay 
in and watch Big Brother every evening rather than go out to the theatre, play a
' Rawls 1971, 54  
* Nussbaum  2000b, 114
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sport, or attend a night school to get the chance to go to university. A woman 
who has been beaten by her father in her childhood, might "choose" a similarly 
abusive husband, and then "choose" not to leave him. But this is not the kind o f 
"free" choice on which we should be placing so much value.
It is important to stress once again that the capabilities theorist does not 
attempt, Mill-style, to classify certain activities as more valuable than others. 4 
The claim is simply that assigning absolute priority to an individual's chosen 
conception o f the good or plan or life loses its appeal if that conception has been 
imposed on her by the circumstances in which she lives, if she has never had the 
opportunity to reflect on it, to express freely her own thoughts, and to discuss and 
develop her own views within a wider informational context.
It would be better for the young man (his life could be said to be going better) 
if he were deciding against a background o f a childhood with the opportunity to 
explore various different ways o f spending his time, and the basic education 
required to be able to appreciate them. Similarly, the w om an's quality o f life 
would be higher if she could (various other assumptions being made) get up the 
courage to leave her husband, or not have married him in the first place. It might 
well, thus, be in her interest to do so even if she persuades herself that it is not. 
We explain this intuition by appealing to the idea that she is rendered unable, by 
circumstances, to value herself as she ought, exercise autonomy, and escape from 
the situation.
With such examples in mind, the hypothetical objector's claim, that what 
"matters most" to individuals is being able to choose how to live their own lives, 
is more plausible understood as a claim about autonomy, not about negative 
freedom. The appeal lies in what Raz identifies as ' [t]he ruling idea behind the 
idea o f personal autonom y... that people should make their own Iives'.7r> Given 
this, the capability approach has a twofold defence to the thin liberal objection. 
Firstly, as Nussbaum herself has stressed, it does not exclude considerations o f  a 
person's autonomously or genuinely chosen plan o f life or conception o f the 
good. Secondly, unlike a "thin’' preference-based account, it establishes the 
background criteria likely to ensure that an individual is deciding autonomously.
4 See Mill 1861, 137-42
5 Raz 1986, 369
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Begin with the first point. Far from under-weighting the individual's own 
choices, Nussbaum gives central importance to an individual's genuinely
76espoused conception o f the good and rational plan o f life. This comes out most 
strongly in capability (6), Practical Reason, which specifies ‘[b]eing able to form 
a conception o f the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning o f
77one's own life', and is part o f a more general emphasis on meaningful choice 
and human individuality as necessary components o f a flourishing life. 
Functional capabilities (3), Bodily Integrity, (4), which includes being able ‘to
78search for meaning o f life in one 's own w ay'. (7B) and (10), as well as (6), 
make this particularly clear.
This should come as no surprise. Recalling the quote from Sen which opened 
Section I, the fundamental aim o f the capabilities approach is to ensure that 
individuals have ‘the substantive freedoms -  the capabilities -  to choose a life 
[they have] reason to value '.79
To make the second point, we need a clearer specification o f what is meant by 
an autonomous, genuine, or meaningful choice. Such an account has been 
provided by Joseph Raz, according to whom an autonomous person's well-being 
‘consists in the successful pursuit o f  self-chosen goals and relationships'.80 He 
identifies three 'conditions o f autonom y', only one o f which is the absence o f 
‘coercion and manipulation by others' standardly associated with negative 
freedom. The others are: 'appropriate mental faculties... [including] minimum 
rationality, the ability to comprehend the means required to realise [one's] goals, 
the mental faculties necessary to plan actions etc.'; and ‘an adequate range o f 
choices'. Within this last, Raz stresses the need for ‘options with long term 
pervasive consequences as well as short term options o f little consequence, and a
'  • • *> SI • 8^fair spread in between'.' Variety, not just number, is essential.
Negative freedom, against whatever historical and background circumstances 
happen to hold, is no guarantee that these conditions will obtain. But there is
6 A point reinforced by the fact that com m unitarians have accused her o f  being too  
individualistic. (R obeyns responds to such accusations (2005, 107-9))
Nussbaum 2000b, 79  
'S Ibid., 79
’ Sen 1999, 74 [em phasis added]
Raz 1986, 370  
sl Ibid., 372-4  
Ibid.. 375-7
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reason to believe that the capabilities, on something like Nussbaum 's list, will do 
rather better. Not only does Bodily Integrity features as a central capability, but 
adequate education is stressed under Senses, Imagination and Thought, critical 
reflection is stressed under Practical Reason, and the very range o f capabilities 
and sub capabilities indicates a range o f long and short term choices in line with 
Raz's condition.s3
Having thus offered one strong line o f defence against the Paternalism 
Accusation, by identifying a way in which the First Paternalism Assertion fails to 
get at what is really unacceptable about paternalism, I will turn to the first o f the 
two factors to be considered. What sort o f conception o f the good is being 
"imposed” on individuals by the capabilities approach, in the sense that it is 
being used to judge how well or badly their lives are going? This is not what 
might be called a "thick, precise conception” o f  the human good, which lays out 
exactly which way of life should be adopted, and provides detailed rules (along 
the lines o f a religious code) for living by it.
Rather, Nussbaum's is a vague conception. She outlines functionings at a very 
general level, based on intuitive, uncontroversial and, importantly, open-ended 
ideas about what human flourishing requires -  ideas on which there can be broad
84consensus at a deep level. Value is assigned to the ability to: form and live by
*" This very defence opens up another line o f  questioning: is it possib le to have substantive  
freedom, or consistently to be m aking on e 's  choices autonom ously, without som e o f  the central 
capabilities? If so, why should the fu ll  list be taken as necessary for human flourishing, rather 
than just the Razian conditions? In response, note firstly and obviously  that i f  som eone is, for 
natural reasons, unable to enjoy a central capability (say, health), it rem ains important to seek to 
ensure that, so fa r  as is p o ss ib le , their choices are made autonom ously. Secondly, when it com es  
to certain key decisions, such as espousing a conception o f  the good, it is at least arguable that 
som eone who didn't enjoy all the central capabilities would have an inadequate range o f  options. 
It is to precisely this idea that Nussbaum  appeals in defending her m odel: "If one cares about 
people's powers to choose a conception o f  the good, then one must care about the rest o f  the form  
o f  life that supports those powers, including its material conditions.' (1998 , 324) H ow ever, 
Joshua Cohen argues that Sen cannot rest his appeal to capabilities on the im portance o f  
substantive freedom alone. Capabilities, Cohen says, are a wider concept, and he appeals to 
exam ples such as im provem ents in drinking water quality as im proving capability to function  
without making an individual more free . (1 9 9 5 , 278-80) M oreover, Nussbaum  uses the 
distinction between capabilities and functionings to separate her own view  from that o f  liberal 
perfectionists (o f  whom Raz is one), although she does concede that she is "in a sense  
perfectionist' (2000a, 129) about practical reason. Her focus on respect for choice  should, she 
specifies. be understood "not in terms o f  a com prehensive liberal ideal o f  autonom y but in terms 
o f  an idea o f  respect for the div ersity o f  persons and their com prehensiv e conceptions', (ibid.) 
She would thus deny that autonom ous choice  is the on ly  factor in a flourishing life. H ow ever, it is 
enough, to defeat the Paternalism A ccusation that the list o f  capabilities can be defended as being  
b e tter  able to allow individuals to m ake m eaningful, or genuinely '"free" choices, than thin liberal 
negative freedom alone.
Nussbaum 1990, 219; 1998, 318; 2000b , 77
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some conception o f the good; make and carry out a plan for one's own life; 
produce ‘self-expressive works and events o f one's own choice, religious, 
literary, musical, and so forth ';s> and engage in 'various forms o f social 
interaction'.86 Opportunities are what matters; no comprehensive conception is 
being imposed on anyone.
The above arguments reveal the First Paternalism Assertion as inadequate. To 
identify more plausibly what is unacceptable, it needs to be rewritten along the 
following lines.
Strong Paternalism Assertion
It is unacceptably paternalistic to judge the success or otherwise o f another 
human being's life according to a thick, precise conception o f the good which 
does not correspond to her own considered conception o f the good, formed 
within the conditions for autonomous choice.
This may be true but it fails, as we have seen, to get a grip on the capabilities 
approach. There may be elements o f paternalism in the approach (such elements, 
one might suggest, are unfortunate but necessary in a world rife with entrenched 
preferences and non-autonomous choice) but these do not render it unacceptably 
paternalistic. As Nussbaum herself puts it:
W e dislike paternalism, insofar as w e do, because there is som ething else  that w e like, 
namely each person's liberty o f  choice  in fundamental matters. It is full} consistent to 
reject som e forms o f  paternalism while supporting those that underwrite these central 
values, on an equal basis.87
The capabilities approach has been defended against the Paternalism 
Accusation. This completes the solution o f the PPP. However, there remains 
another potential objection, suggested by the earlier consideration o f ideal 
preference satisfaction, and by close attention to the Strong Paternalism 
Assertion.
85 Nussbaum  2000b, 79
86 Ibid., 79
8 Ibid., 53. Raz, in his perfectionist critique o f  liberal neutrality, makes a sim ilar point, drawing a 
distinction between com prehensive and narrow neutrality. (1986 , 123-4)
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VI. A final objection
According to the version o f the capabilities approach presented here, it is not in 
someone's interest (would be detrimental to their flourishing) to give up, 
permanently (or expose to very serious risk) one o f the functional capabilities on 
something like Nussbaum 's list. 1 have defended this as not unacceptably 
paternalistic. In so doing, I have pointed to the Razian conditions for autonomous 
or meaningful choice. Suppose, however, that an individual who had hitherto had 
all the capabilities, and so satisfied the Razian conditions, decided permanently 
to give one o f them up. (Not, moreover, as a sacrifice in pursuit o f some external 
goal, as discussed in Section IV.) W hat would the capabilities approach say?8S
Note, firstly, that such cases are likely to be rare. Giving up a capability is 
very different to giving up a functioning. Moreover, there is a difference between 
giving up a sub-category capability, on something like Nussbaum 's list (say, by 
being voluntarily sterilised), and giving up (say) one's entire capability for 
health, or affiliation. It is therefore worth reiterating that reference to 
“capabilities’' should, in this discussion, be taken as reference to the categories 
on something like N ussbaum 's list.
The question, then, is whether the capabilities approach must deny the 
following claim.
Permissibility Claim (a)
An adult human can have a fully flourishing life despite giving up a central 
capability, provided that she has enjoyed all the capabilities (and so been in 
the circumstances o f autonomous choice) up to the point.
88 This also brings us back to the point left open by the discussion o f  the Ideal Preferences 
Accusation at the c lose  o f  Section IV. If the capabilities did indeed correspond with ideal 
preferences, defined as the satisfaction o f  preferences made within the conditions o f  autonom ous 
choice, they could do so in tw o w ays. Is the satisfaction o f  each ind ividu a l's  ideal preferences, so  
defined, supposed to get at what is n ecessa n  for that individual's nourishing? Or is the idea that 
such ideal preferences, in gen era l, offer a guide to what is generally necessary for human 
flourishing? In the former case, there is less distinction betw een the capabilities approach and an 
ideal preference satisfaction account. In the latter, the distinction is m aintained, but arguably at 
the cost o f  im posing a v iew  external to each individual, in a way which is unacceptably  
paternalistic. This turns on our exact understanding o f  the Strong Paternalism Assertion, and so is 
addressed by the arguments o f  this section .
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Insofar as it relates to the use o f the capabilities approach in the rest o f this 
thesis, the claim could be rewritten as:
Permissibility Claim (b)
It can be in the ATC interest o f an adult human permanently to give up a 
central capability, provided that she has enjoyed all the capabilities (and so 
been in the circumstances o f autonomous choice) up to the point.'
My contention (perhaps a frustrating one for the reader) is that the 
capabilities approach could go either way without falling foul o f the PPP. There 
are two possible versions. The first (call it the Non-Permissive Version) would 
deny the Permissibility Claims. This need not render the approach unacceptably 
paternalistic, provided we take a certain reading o f the Strong Paternalism 
Assertion.
To clarify, the Strong Paternalism Assertion as it stands suggests that both o f 
its conditions (preciseness o f the imposed conception o f the good, and formation 
o f the individual's own conception o f the good under the circumstances o f 
autonomous choice) must be satisfied to avoid unacceptable paternalism. 
However, it could be rephrased, according to the outcome o f the question (which 
the arguments here have not settled) whether paternalism still counts as 
unacceptable if  only the second condition is met. That is, if  the conception o f the 
good imposed is vague, but is nonetheless at odds with what an individual has 
formed as her conception o f the good under the conditions o f autonomous 
choice.
As the Strong Paternalism Assertion stands, the Non-Permissive Version 
would not be unacceptably paternalistic because nothing has been said to 
threaten the defence, above, o f a Nussbaumian theory o f the good as a vague 
thick conception. If, however, the connection between the two conditions is
8) As already stressed, the understanding o f  the capabilities account offered here does not pretend 
to be an exact reading o f  N ussbaum 's ow n v iew . In any case, it is hard to conclude from her work 
what the approach should say in this scenario, given that she considers only the possib ility  o f  an 
adult's signing away a major capability, perm anently, 'apparently w ithout coercion ', in which  
case she thinks that '[freq u en tly , though certainly not alw ays, w e w ill judge that interference is 
justified to protect the capability'. (N ussbaum  2000b . 93 ) N ot only does she not address the 
question under the more stringent Razian conditions, but her focus here is on what p o litic a l  
action is justified, not on the more basic point o f  whether the person is acting against his or her 
interest or flourishing.
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understood as an “or" rather than an “and", the Non-Permissive Version could be 
harder to maintain. (Although, to reiterate, there is little evidence that such cases 
would arise. In the real world, when such choices are made, it is very rarely 
against such backgrounds.)
This need not trouble the capabilities approach, which could equally well 
adopt the Permissive Version. This stops short o f denying the Permissibility 
Claims, requiring for flourishing only that an individual have all the capabilities 
at least to a certain stage in adulthood, and that any permanent decision to give 
one o f them up be made with the Razian conditions satisfied.90 These two 
stringent requirements prevent it from sliding back into a preference satisfaction 
account. As discussed, what individuals would prefer, full stop, and what they 
would prefer under the stronger conditions o f having the capabilities (and, w ith 
them, the conditions o f autonomy) well into adulthood, are very different things.
Thus, for the moment, I will remain agnostic on the Permissibility Claims. 
However, in Chapter Five it may become necessary to take the distinction 
seriously, and I will return to it then.
Conclusion
This concludes my defence o f the capabilities approach, taken at its broadest 
level as an attempt to identify the prerequisites o f a flourishing human life. A 
solution to the PPP has been laid out, and a further objection has been met by 
offering two workable versions o f the capabilities approach. This paper has 
already shown how Dworkin's criticisms turn, at this wider level, into a version 
o f the PPP, and are dependent, even at the narrow level, on the Paternalism and 
Preferences Accusations.
I am thus able to fill out the account given in the previous chapter by stating 
that a person has such a fundamental interest in enjoying certain broadly-defined 
capabilities that it is not in her ATC interest to give up one o f these central
90 It is important that the capabilities them selves, and not on ly  the (arguably narrower) set o f  
Razian conditions, are maintained up to adulthood. This is because without having had the 
chance at a formative stage to develop the relevant internal capacities (w hich may, as N ussbaum  
notes, require not only the enjoym ent o f  the capability, but actually o f  the functioning, as a child  
(Nussbaum  2000b, 89-90)), the individual would often be unable to experience the capability at 
all. They would thus be incapable o f  evaluating, or appreciating it, and o f  making a genuine  
choice, in p ossession  o f  the relevan t in form ation , to g ive  it up.
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capabilities. On the other side o f the same moral coin, if a person has morally 
important interests, then she can be harmed in a morally relevant way through 
the undermining o f those interests. I have not attempted to defend all 
Nussbaum's central capability categories in detail because the broadly defined 
categories on which my later arguments will rest are relatively uncontroversial.
I have now completed my defence o f the non-intentionalist account o f 
collectivities and morally salient potential collectivities, and argued for an 
expansion o f the notion o f moral responsibility for harm, so that sets o f 
individuals can be collectively responsible for harm resulting predictably from 
the combination o f their individual acts. The next task is to fill out another 
suggestion made in Chapter One. There, I pointed to the likelihood that 
fulfilment o f collective duties to end harm would require collective action. 
Chapter Four will defend this claim, identifying six scenarios under which it is 
“better" (in the sense o f better achieving the common goals, purposes or interests 
o f the group) for a collectivity or morally salient collectivity to make certain 
decisions qua collectivity, and hand them down as restrictions on individual 
action, then leave pursuit o f common goals or interests to the aggregation o f 
individual decisions.
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Chapter Four 
Collectivities as Units o f Agency
This chapter will ask why at least some o f the actions or decisions o f a 
collectivity should be collective actions or decisions, rather than the result o f 
aggregated individual actions or decision making. The reason, I will argue, is that 
outcomes in such cases are better in terms o f the attainment or satisfaction o f the 
common goals or interests defining the collectivity.1
Chapter Two defended a model o f collectivities as constituted by sets o f 
individuals mutually dependent through purposes, goals or all-things-considered 
(ATC) interests that it only makes sense to consider as being pursued together, 
whether or not they acknowledge it themselves. There are two main reasons why 
decisions in such collectivities might be better made collectively. One is the 
inefficiency, or even counterproductivity, o f leaving the outcome to the 
aggregation o f individual acts. This will be discussed as the Inefficiency 
Argument. (Section II) The other is that individuals might not be motivated to 
act, qua individuals, in pursuit o f  the common goal, interest or purpose.
This could come about in either o f two ways: (i) there could be a clash 
between what an individual sees as in his own individual interest and what is in 
fact collectively rational, or (ii) there could be motivation problems even where 
individuals are genuinely committed to some shared goal.
Both (i) and (ii) could, again, come about in various ways. Individuals might 
perceive what is in their own short-term interest as distinct from what is in fact in 
the overall interest, either because those individuals are unaware (or deny) that 
they are mutually dependent with others for the achievement o f some interest or 
goal (the Ignorance Argument, Section III), or because there really is a clash 
between what is individually and what is collectively rational (Game Theoretic 
Arguments, Section IV).
In terms o f (ii), individuals might fail to be motivated to act in pursuit o f  even 
a genuinely shared goal because o f clashes o f interest within the collectivity over 
how best to achieve it. {Partial Conflict Arguments, Section V). Even without
1 In fact, the actions or decisions with which I am concerned are those (and only those) involved  
in pursuing the com m on interests or goals o f  the co llectiv ity , as I have defined them. This 
restriction is one I will defend in Chapter Six.
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such partial conflicts, it might not be rational for them to contribute, or be 
rational but in such a way that the decision-making process required to reach this 
conclusion places implausibly high demands on the individuals in terms o f 
assessing probabilities. Both these possibilities will be discussed under the 
Rational Altruist Arguments. (Sections VI to IX)
I will discuss these arguments in turn. However, there are two preliminary 
points to stress. One is that some o f the arguments have stronger implications 
than others. We need to distinguish between two closely connected questions: 
why it might be better for a group to make certain decisions collectively (and 
hand them down as patterns o f individual action), and whether this improvement 
will require not only collective decision making but also the power to enforce 
such collective decisions on individuals. Such powers might involve sanctions 
(formal or informal) for non-compliance, at various levels up to, ultimately, 
either the threat o f expulsion from the collectivity or coercive interference with 
an individual's property or freedom.
While some of the arguments (Game Theoretical and Ignorance Arguments) 
have implications for both o f the first two questions distinguished above, others 
(Partial Conflict and Inefficiency Arguments) are less clear cut on the issue of 
enforceability. Rational Altruist Arguments, far from implying that enforcement 
is necessary, indicate rather that individuals should be motivated, without 
coercion, to fulfil their role in a collectively-decided process to achieve the 
common goal to which they are all committed.
A further question, which this chapter will not attempt to settle, is that o f  what 
further conditions would have to be met before (if ever) such coercive 
enforcement could be said to be legitimate.
The second preliminary point concerns what is meant by “better” and 
"worse" in this context. The next section will clarify this, and eschew some of 
the more worrying implications o f such phraseology in any discussion o f group 
action.
I. Better for whom?
Why does this question o f collective versus aggregated individual action matter? 
This chapter will argue that the outcomes o f aggregated individual decision
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making will, at least on occasion, be worse than the outcome of decisions made 
collectively (with the collectivity as the unit o f agency) and handed down to 
individuals. But what do 1 mean by "worse" or "better"?
One possibility would be: better or worse for the collectivity, on the grounds 
o f an interest assigned to that collectivity by virtue o f its metaphysical status, 
over and above those o f the individuals within it. This is not the claim being 
defended here. This project has made only very limited metaphysical claims.
In previous work, and (briefly) in Chapter Two, I have taken a position on the 
irreducible existence o f collectivities to the extent that I have defended their 
expressive autonomy: the claim that they add terms to the language which enable 
us to express truths we could not have expressed with only the means o f referring 
to individuals.2 I have argued, further, that they meet the three criteria laid down 
by Graham for collectivityhood (which he takes, mistakenly, to be the same as 
social grouphood). That is: individuals act in ways whose significance can only 
be adequately captured by ineliminable reference to the collectivity itself, what 
the collectivity does is distinct from anything the individuals do, and its survival 
is relatively indifferent to the persistence o f the individuals composing it at any 
one time.
I do not (as, for example, Sheehy does3) take a stand on the materiality or 
otherwise o f collectivities. Moreover, I do not assign any independent interests or 
goals to the collectivity: any interests or goals which it can be said to have are 
derived directly from the goals, purposes or ATC interests o f individuals. The 
answer to the question, better for whom? is, better for all the individuals who 
make up the collectivity.4
To clarify this, consider first those collectivities whose members are bound by 
selfish individual goals or ATC interests requiring co-operation for their 
achievement, then those where there is genuine espousal by individual members 
o f some shared goal.
Regarding the former, it is helpful to borrow from W G Runciman and Sen. 
They use the theory o f non-zero-sum non-cooperative games, in particular the
: Cripps 2005, 5
' Sheehy maintains that social groups are 'com positional material particulars'. (Sheehy 2001.
1 2 1 )
Better, as will becom e clear, in terms o f  prom oting the interests, purposes or goals through 
which they constitute a collectiv ity . H ow ever, 1 am rem aining agnostic for now on whether such 
promotion is alw ays in the individuals' a ll things co n sid ered  interest.
I l l
Prisoner's Dilemma, to give a substantive sense to the notion o f a “general will” .
I will not lay out their argument, as I will be discussing the Prisoner's Dilemma 
in more detail later. The essential point is that, while each prisoner judges it 
(correctly) to be in his individual best interest to confess whatever the other does, 
both will be worse off if both act on this line o f reasoning. As Runciman and Sen 
put it:
This conflict between what seem s individually better and what seem s to produce the best 
overall result contains, in our v iew , the essence  o f  R ousseau's distinction betw een the 
"will o f  all” and the "general will". The "general w ill" o f  the prisoners, we can say. is to 
avoid confession, but each person's "particular w ill" is to co n fess.'
The overall result, if individuals are left to act independently, is worse in the 
straightforward sense o f being worse for all individuals, in terms o f the goals 
they hold as individuals, than if a decision could have been made (and stuck to) 
as a collectivity. (Runciman and Sen call for an ‘enforceable contract'6 between 
them.) What the general will wills is the common good.
The same holds (as Runciman and Sen add) for cases o f partial conflict: that 
is, where all parties are better off acting as a collectivity than not so acting, but 
different individuals will be better o ff again depending on exactly how the 
collectivity acts. The general will, Runciman and Sen argue, wills ‘the just 
resolution o f conflicting interests'8 in such cases. John Smyth disputes this, 
claiming (although without defending his claim) that ‘there is no reason to 
suppose that the general will does will the_///.s7 resolution o f conflicting interests. 
O f course, it may be said to will the resolution o f them. But the just resolution o f 
them is a different matter altogether.'4 However, it is enough for my current 
point that there is a non-empty set o f outcomes to be brought about by acting qua 
collectivity, each o f which is more desirable to all the individuals in the 
collectivity than the outcome o f all acting qua individual.
Now consider those collectivities where the common goal, purpose or interest 
is one that individuals genuinely espouse. Either their goal is to do some
Runciman & Sen 1965. 555-6
6 Ibid., 556
1 will return to such cases with the d iscussion  o f  the Battle o f  the Sexes in Section V.
' Runciman & Sen., 558
} Smyth 1972, 429. See Runciman & Sen 1974 for their response
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particular thing with that particular group and/or the common goal or interest is 
one an individual cannot have alone -  it only makes sense as part o f a 
collectivity. Nonetheless, the moral force o f the goal or interest derives from its 
contribution to individual lives. In such cases, the collectivity is constituted by 
individuals who have as a goal (or in whose ATC interest it is) to be part o f a set 
o f individuals with this shared aim.
For example, the goal might be that o f being one o f a set o f individuals 
constituting an orchestra: a set which, qua orchestra, can play beautiful music. 
This may be simply because the individual wants to do something which cannot 
be done except as part o f a group (she wants to take part in concerts performing 
classical works, and so to be part o f an orchestra -  any orchestra) or because she 
has the goal o f doing something with certain particular individuals. (Suppose 
four musician friends choose to form a string quartet: each, we can assume, has 
the goal o f producing the beautiful music with those other people, but it is still a 
goal the individual has.)
I hope this has clarified that when I speak o f an outcome being better for a 
collectivity, I mean better in terms o f promoting the common goals or interests o f  
the collectivity, which goals or interests derive from the goals, purposes or ATC  
interests o f  the individuals within it. For the rest o f this chapter, I will defend the 
claim that outcomes will be better in this sense if  at least some collective results 
are the outcome of decision making qua collectivity, rather than the aggregation 
o f decisions made qua individual.
II. Inefficiency arguments and the Discursive Dilemma
This section will examine what might be called ‘‘pure efficiency'' arguments for 
collective decision making, by making a general point about efficiency, then 
appealing to a particular case: the Discursive Dilemma. Here, we are setting 
aside any potential problems regarding individual commitment to, or 
acknowledgement of, shared goals or interests, and highlighting simply the 
potential for loss, in terms o f achievement o f shared goals or satisfaction o f 
common interests, if the individuals all act independently.
There are infinitely many scenarios, in collectivities big or small, where it is 
necessary to co-operate in deciding what to do, because decisions made
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individually and aggregated could undermine the progression of the collectivity 
towards its common goals, interests or purposes. On a trivial level, suppose you 
and I want to spend the evening together. (This makes us, at least in the short 
term, a collectivity.) Neither o f us has any strong feelings about what exactly we 
do, so long as we are together. However, we still need to come to some 
agreement: if we don't coordinate properly, and I turn up to the cinema while 
you go to the restaurant, then our shared aim o f doing something together is 
foiled.
Scenarios such as these explain the establishment o f many conventions. 
Examples are: driving on the left hand side o f the road, walking up or down the 
left hand side o f an escalator, using three tugs on the rope in rock climbing to 
indicate it is safe for one's partner to start climbing, flashing lights to warn 
oncoming traffic o f some obstacle on the road ahead o f them. It does not matter 
to the individuals exactly which side o f the road or escalator, what number o f 
tugs, etc. is chosen, but each collectivity has to establish some convention or the 
outcome will be sub-optimal for all.
Equally, consider Derek Parfit's example o f an act-utilitarian society: if  we 
are all 'pure do-gooders ' , motivated only by a straightforward act-utilitarianism, 
we might not actually maximise happiness.10 Much o f our happiness, he notes:
com es from having, and acting upon, certain strong desires. These include the desires that 
are involved in loving certain other people, the desire to work w ell, and many o f  the 
strong desires on which we act when we are not working. To becom e pure do-gooders, we  
would have to act against or even to suppress most o f  these desires. It is likely that this 
would enorm ously reduce the sum o f  happiness."
Again, the overall outcome would be sub-optimal unless the collectivity decided 
together how best to achieve the goal, and acted accordingly (as rule utilitarians).
Following these general points, a more specific efficiency argument can be 
offered. This derives from a problem in jurisprudence, the doctrinal paradox, and 
has been adapted and generalised by Pettit as the discursive dilemma.
The discursive dilemma arises because different action may be taken if a 
collectivity decides on the basis o f individual voting on premises (and the logical
10 Parfit 1984, 27 
" Ibid., 27
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conclusions to be drawn from these) than if it had decided on the basis o f 
individual voting on conclusions. Consider the following scenario. A group of 
environmental activists (a voluntary, intentional collectivity) are concerned with 
the threat a proposed new building would make to the survival o f a local flock o f 
rare birds. They are considering whether to campaign actively against it by 
mounting a protest in the Town Square.
1 ^  rAdapting Pettit's ‘conjunction case', “ suppose the group is composed o f 
three members, A, B and C, and they are deciding whether to campaign on the 
basis o f two issues:
(i) whether there is a serious risk to the survival o f the bird flock from
the new building;
(ii) whether the campaign has a high chance o f preventing it.
The idea is that, if and only if someone answers yes to both (i) and (ii), she votes 
in favour o f the campaign. Suppose that the matrix o f answers is as shown below.
Serious risk? High chance o f 
prevention?
Campaign?
A Y N N
B N Y N
C Y Y Y
This is not a unique case. It can arise, Pettit notes, whether the following hold:
a. there is a conclusion to he decided am ong a group o f  people by reference to a 
conjunction o f  independent or separable prem ises - the conclusion w ill be 
endorsed i f  relevant prem ises are endorsed, and otherw ise it w ill be rejected;
b. each member o f  the group forms a judgem ent on each o f  the prem ises and a 
corresponding judgem ent on the conclusion;
c. each o f  the prem ises is supported by a majority o f  m em bers but those majorities 
do not coincide with one another;
d. the intersection o f  those majorities will support the conclusion, and the others 
reject it, in view  o f  a; and
e. the intersection o f  the m ajorities is only a minority in the group as a w h o le .13
Pettit 2001, 272
1' Ibid., 274. There is. moreover, a parallel ‘disjunction case' which 1 w ill not discuss here.
(274-6)
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The dilemma arises because, if  a vote is taken on individual conclusions, the 
campaign will not go ahead. If, however, the members o f the group vote on the 
premises, then as a group, they answer yes to both (i) and (ii) and so, logically, 
should support the campaign.
On the face o f it, neither appeals. As Pettit sums up, 'going the conclusion- 
driven way means adopting a course that is inconsistent with the premises 
endorsed by the group and going the premise-driven way means adopting a 
course that a majority individually reject'.14 Pettit argues that the premise-driven 
approach is superior on the grounds that it enables individuals to question group 
or collective (often government) decisions by demanding to know the reasons 
behind them. As far as this chapter is concerned, the case can be made directly 
relevant by considering it as follows.
Suppose, rather than voting on whether to campaign, the individuals are 
simply turning up to a protest in the Town Square (or not) as they judge 
appropriate. Suppose, moreover, that the group has 90 members, each o f whom 
knows that the local authorities will not even register that there has been a protest 
(and so consider whether to act on its demands) unless there are at least 60 
protesters. O f the 90 environmentalists, 30 reason as A in the matrix, 30 as B and 
30 as C. The result o f this, effectively a conclusion-led decision, is that there are 
not enough protesters even to get noticed, even though 60 members o f the group 
believe that a protest would be effective at preventing the building, and 60 
believe that the building would seriously threaten the birds.
I suggest that this must be a sub-optimal outcome, in the sense o f failing to 
optimise pursuit o f the group's goals, if  we make the assumption:
K: the majority verdict on each premise will be the right one (or be most
likely to be right)
If K holds, the best way to achieve the common goal o f the group (for now 
assumed to be the relatively narrow one o f protecting local birds) is to assess 
individual views on the premises and draw the logical conclusion, collectively,
14 Ibid., 274
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rather than leave it to individuals to draw their own conclusions and vote with 
their feet.
K can be considered in relation to two general classes o f premise. The first is 
factual premises. This includes both premises in the example above (although 
they may, by their nature, have to be estimates). In this case, various 
circumstances improve the chances o f K holding. One is that the individuals are 
influenced by scientific work by unbiased experts (rather than, say, by tabloid 
headlines or what the local preacher says). If individuals have familiarised 
themselves with scientific work on the subject, accepted where there is consensus 
and sifted through the evidence to make an educated decision where there is not, 
then there are grounds for optimism that, so far as modem  science will get it 
right, then a majority vote will reflect this.
Secondly, there are cases where a judgem ent call on at least one o f the 
premises must be value-based (or at least relative to individuals). Suppose that 
there is no doubt o f the risk to the birds, but that (i) is replaced with:
(i') whether it is more important that the birds be preserved or that resources 
be devoted to replanting certain rare types o f tree.
Then it seems that there is no other way o f deciding the issue than debate 
followed by (if no consensus can be reached) a vote. O f course, if divergence is 
sufficient and on sufficiently “key’’ issues, then with many voluntary groups the 
solution will be for those favouring the priority o f path X to form a separate 
collectivity to those favouring path Y. However, in some cases, this is not an 
option (or is too drastic a response). Consider for example the group o f travellers 
committed to each other through sharing a car, and having to choose between 
two possible sights, only one o f which they have time to visit. Ideally, it seems, a 
consensus would be reached, but a decision has to be made, and if  debate fails, 
then it seems that a vote is the closest the collectivity can get to a “group” view .15
Opponents o f the claim above might try to identify cases where K holds but 
nonetheless the conclusion-driven approach yields a better outcome. However, 
intuitively and drawing on remarks by Pettit, such scenarios are likely to take two 
possible forms: the two premises are somehow inseparable (or one is so
13 That is not to say, o f  course, that there would not be other available ways o f  reaching a verdict, 
for exam ple appointing the car driver as a dictator.
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important as to outweigh the other), or the aim o f the decision process has been 
incorrectly clarified.16
Suppose, for example, either that: unless there is a reasonable chance o f 
success there is no point carrying out the protest whatever the seriousness o f the 
risk, or that the more serious the risk to the birds, the higher the chance o f 
success. In either case, each individual's considered judgem ent will be on the 
conclusion rather than independently on the premises. Alternatively, suppose that 
what matters to the group is not reaching the outcome most likely to be accurate. 
Rather, what is required is that the campaign only take place if  there is no room 
for doubt on either condition. In that case, a unanimous "yes" on each premise 
would be required.
In none o f these scenarios is there a genuine discursive dilemma: either the 
premises are not independent, or the process o f reaching a conclusion is not as 
laid out by Pettit.
Moreover, even where K does not hold, and so a premise-driven approach will 
not be optimal, this does not mean that a conclusion-driven one will be any 
better. There is no reason to assume that individual mistakes will cancel each 
other out unless the premises are in some way interdependent -  in which case 
there is not a genuine discursive dilemma.
Consider the activists, with respect to premises ( i’) and (ii). Given that (i1) is 
value-based, we can assume the unreliability o f the majority to be with regards to
(ii). The scenario might play out in various ways, but the following exemplify the 
main possibilities:
1. Members o f faction (A) are all experts on the statistics regarding 
previous environmental demonstrations and their success rate. 
Members o f (B) and (C) have no such knowledge.
2. None o f the members o f the collectivity have any information on the
success rate o f demonstrations, but there is an independent body with
considerable expertise, to which appeal could be made.
3. None o f the members o f the collectivity have any information on the
success rate o f demonstrations.
16 In relation to his exam ple o f  (not) granting a retrial. (Pettit 2001 , 286-7)
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In none o f these cases is appeal to the conclusion o f each individual any more 
likely to yield the optimal outcome in terms o f the goals o f the collectivity than 
appeal to the premises. Rather, while retaining appeal to the majority on premise 
(i'), it would be better in Scenario (1) for the collectivity to defer to the expertise 
of faction A on premise (ii), or in Scenario (2) to appeal to the independent body 
for advice. In Scenario (3), there seems to be no point in appealing to (ii) at all, 
as a factual premise. It could be rewritten as a more evaluative one -  is there any 
point taking a chance on the unknown probability o f being successful -  in which 
case K might well hold and a premise-driven approach would, again, be most 
likely to be optimal.
I have discussed this at more length elsewhere, but need no more detail here.1; 
The point to be extracted in support o f the Inefficiency Argument is that a 
situation has been identified in which the aggregation o f individual decisions or 
individual actions can fail to achieve an optimum outcome in terms o f the goals 
of the collectivity -  and that there is no reason to suppose, in those cases where 
an aggregation o f premises would not be the optimum way to make a collective 
decision, that an aggregation o f conclusions would do any better. Rather, some 
other way o f making a collective decision is called for.
There are two points to note before leaving this section. Firstly, whether 
enforceability is likely to be required will depend on how well individuals 
understand and accept the kind o f reasoning provided in this section. For
example, do they accept the need, ultimately, for a vote on value-based premises
18where a decision has to be made? Do they accept that their own factual views 
may be mistaken? Secondly, many o f the cases discussed in later sections (such 
as the Common Land Farmers or the Rational Altruists) can be supplemented 
with efficiency-based arguments.
17 Cripps (2006  conference paper): 'T h e  D iscursive Dilem m a and C ollective  D ecision  M aking"  
ls 1 am not advocating the im position o f  ideological view s at a state level. Chapter Six w ill make 
this clear. M uch o f  this applies at the level o f  the voluntary collectiv ity  where an individual 
could, ultim ately, opt out. W here this does apply in non-voluntary co llectiv ity , it is likely to be 
because som e decision  has to be made, for exam ple on whether to preserve som e piece o f  land as 
wilderness or build houses on it. (In at least som e such cases, although this goes beyond the scope  
o f  this project, 1 would suggest that the interested parties include non-humans, w ho ought to be 
represented in the decision process, even though they cannot express an opinion them selves.)
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III. Ignorance arguments
The next argument for collective decision making focuses on those individuals 
who do not or cannot acknowledge their membership o f a collectivity.
The account defended in Chapter Two expressly allowed for such cases. It 
required that the individuals be mutually dependent through their purposes, goals 
or ATC interests -  whether or not they acknowledge it themselves. I spelled out, 
moreover, that this includes both goals/purposes/interests which, by their nature, 
can only be pursued together, and goals/purposes/interests which in the 
circumstances can only be pursued together.
I made clear that I wanted to include both o f the following types o f cases: a 
set of individuals whose goal is to do something together (for example, the 
friends climbing Monte Rosa), and a set o f individuals with individual goals who 
do not care whether everyone else succeeds in achieving their goal, when the 
circumstances are such that they must all co-operate in order for each to achieve 
his own goal (as in the Lost example). This leaves open the possibility that 
individuals might either refuse to acknowledge an ATC interest; or acknowledge 
an interest, purpose or goal but deny that it required collective action.
With regard to the former. Chapter Three defended an understanding o f 
human flourishing according to which we all have certain fundamental interests 
(central capabilities). For example, all members o f a nation state are assumed to 
have such an interest in living in a safe, peaceful society, even if terrorists might 
reject those interests.19 Similar points will be made in the next chapter, regarding 
the curtailment o f climate change. The case can be made even less 
controversially by consideration o f those (such as the mentally handicapped, or 
infants) who cannot be aware o f their own interests.
The latter possibility (acknowledgement o f an interest but not o f its being a 
common interest) could arise in the Lost scenario. Each o f those washed up on 
the island might erroneously be convinced that he had the wherewithal to catch 
food, build shelter, etc. for himself, by himself.
In both scenarios, at least some individuals within the collectivity cannot be 
relied on to act in pursuit o f the common interest, purpose or goal. In such cases,
U See Chapter T w o, Sections IV and VII
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collective decisions, restricting the behaviour o f all (through rules or less formal 
conventions) are necessary for the furthering o f that end. Clearly, the need for 
enforceability goes alongside the need for such collective decision making: 
without acknowledgement by individuals that they are even part o f a collectivity, 
there is hardly likely to be voluntary compliance with collective decisions.
A sub-case o f this is those individuals who know, at some level, that they 
have a shared goal, purpose or ATC interest with certain others, but bury their 
heads in the sand. Consider the following example. A village, made up o f 
various farmers, has been built on land reclaimed from marshland. Considerable 
maintenance o f the land is required to prevent long-term risk o f flooding. 
Carelessness by any farmer in maintaining and protecting his plot is a serious 
risk to the long-term future o f the whole village. The farmers are rendered an 
involuntary collectivity by virtue o f their mutual dependence through the 
common interest: saving the land. However, the costs o f such maintenance in the 
short term are significant.
Consider the following decision matrix faced by each farmer.
Head-in-the-Sand Fanners
This farmer carries out 
maintenance
This farmer does not 
carry out maintenance
Other farmers carry 
out maintenance
A: Low profits for all 
farmers this season, but the 
land is saved.
B: Very low profits for 
other farmers this season, 
extremely high profits 
for this farmer this 
season. Land almost 
certainly unusable in the 
long term
Other farmers do not 
carry out 
maintenance
C: Very high profits for 
other farmers this season, 
extremely low profits for 
this farmer this season. 
Land almost certainly 
unusable in the long term.
D: High profits for all 
this season. Land almost 
certainly unusable in the 
long run.
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B is a worse outcome than A, because the land cannot be saved in the long term 
unless all farmers carry out maintenance. However, each farmer might well 
ignore this, especially (given that D is much better for him than C) if he has no 
guarantee that others will co-operate.
The farmers might understand but ignore the problem of the decline o f the 
land in order to boost immediate profits, hoping vaguely, since it is not 
impressed upon them on a daily basis, that the problem will go away. Or they 
might go further, and adopt unfounded factual beliefs. As David Papineau has 
argued, while individuals faced with potential conflict in their overall set o f 
desires and beliefs will need to adjust one or the other (assuming the evidence o f 
that clash to be forced regularly upon them), they could do this in two ways: by 
adjusting their desires, or by adopting beliefs that match their existing desires.20 
In this case, if they are constantly reminded o f the situation but really don 't want 
to make the effort to do the maintenance, they might, like smokers denying the 
link between smoking and lung cancer, deny the scientific evidence regarding the 
marshland.
It could be argued that the best solution in such cases is education and 
repeated spelling out o f the situation, so it is harder to ignore or deny. Clearly, 
this is an advantage whether or not decisions are made collectively. W hether they 
are expected to follow rules or conventions, or act voluntarily, as individuals, to 
bring about the best outcome, it is far more likely that a solution will be 
unproblematic and stable if  the individuals understand why they are acting in this 
way. But it seems implausible that education alone would always be enough. 
Humans, in general, are remarkably adept at burying their heads in the sand until 
it is too late.21 General attitudes to environmental risks are a case in point.
IV. Game theory arguments
Such cases bring us to the second case for collective decision making. The non- 
intentionalist model o f a collectivity allows for “common goals" which are 
individual goals requiring the co-operation o f the whole o f the set for their
20 Papineau 1978, 168
1 1 am putting aside the question o f  who is to direct co llective  action i f  a lt members o f  the 
collectiv ity  are genuinely ignorant o f  the situation. The point in the env ironmental case is that 
som e o f  us are now aware.
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achievement. However, this opens up the possibility o f collectivities whose 
members, even if  they acknowledge the situation, will be rationally motivated, 
qua individuals, to act in a way which yields an overall lower-than-optimum (or 
worst) outcome.
This can be illustrated with two Game Theory dilemmas: the Prisoner's 
Dilemma and Chicken. These, while identifying small, involuntary collectivities, 
are most useful in casting light on wider dilemmas which call for collective 
decision making.
Let us start with the Prisoner's Dilemma. Two prisoners, call them Jack and 
Jill, are to be questioned (separately) about a crime. If neither confess, then they 
will both be given two years in prison (second best outcome, S, for both). If  Jill 
confesses and Jack doesn't, she will be let o ff altogether (best outcome, B) but he 
will go down for ten years (worst outcome, W). The same applies in reverse. If 
both confess, they will both spend five years in prison (third best outcome, T, for 
both). The decision matrix faced by Jill and Jack is:
Prisoner's Dilemma
Jack Jack
D on't confess Confess
Jill Don't confess S,S W,B
Jill Confess B,W T,T
Whatever Jack does, Jill will be better off confessing (B is better than S and T is
O')
better than W). Confessing is a dominant strategy." This is a symmetric game, so 
the same applies to Jack. Thus, both will be rationally motivated to confess, and 
the resulting outcome will be (T,T). The paradox, as Henry Hamburger spells 
out, is:
1) Each player has a dominant strategy
2) If both players use the dominant strategy, the result is worse for both 
players than if both instead had used their dominated strategy.^3
* I am borrowing my term inology from Hamburger 1979. 
Hamburger 1979, 78
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Jill and Jack constitute a small, involuntary collectivity on my account. They 
have individual goals (minimising time in prison) which, under the 
circumstances, require co-operation to be achieved: by agreeing not to confess 
and sticking to that, they would achieve outcome (S,S) which is better for both 
than (T,T). The problem is that, so long as they are individuals acting qua 
individuals, and the pay-offs are as they are, they cannot trust each other. Even if 
they agree not to confess, each will be motivated to renege, and so boost his own 
pay-off. (In Game Theory terms, the cell (S,S) is not an equilibrium because
24either player could, acting independently, improve his or her outcome. )
The goal can be achieved by making the collectivity the unit o f agency, with 
the individuals in some way bound by the joint decision. Again, the need for 
enforceability is bound up with the need for collective decision making. In 
different collectivities, this can take different forms: conventions associated with 
social disapproval for those who break them, or rules and penalties. Jack and Jill 
might ensure that the rest o f their friends and associates know o f the deal, so that 
anyone who breaks it will be socially excluded. Or they might have buried their 
stolen loot in a safe with a combination half o f which is known to each, so 
anyone who breaks the "rule" and confesses will be penalised. The point is that 
the decision has to be made collectively, with individuals bound to that collective 
verdict, for the common goal (in this case the individual goals) to be achieved.
This artificial case has far-reaching implications, as can be seen using a 
related example: the Common Land Farmers. A number o f farmers all want to 
graze their cows on some village land, but if they all keep on adding cows, the 
land will quickly become unusable. They are mutually dependent through each of 
their long term interest in retaining use o f the land, rendering them a collectivity. 
However, there is a rational incentive for each farmer to free ride. Consider the 
following decision matrix.
:4 Ib id . ,  85
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Common Land Farmers
This farmer reduces cow 
numbers
This farmer does not 
reduce cow numbers
Other farmers reduce 
cow numbers
A: Somewhat low profits 
for all farmers this 
season, but the land is 
usable indefinitely.
B: Very low profits this 
season for other farmers, 
extremely high profits for 
this farmer this season; 
land usable indefinitely.
Other farmers don't 
reduce cow numbers
C: Very high profits for 
other farmers this season, 
extremely low profits for 
this farmer this season; 
land unusable beyond 
this season.
D: Somewhat high 
profits for all farmers this 
season; but the land is 
unusable beyond this 
season.
This is not a pure Prisoner's Dilemma: the case is not symmetric seen as one 
farmer versus many. However, the situation is the same in that this farmer (and 
so any individual farmer) has a dominant strategy: don 't reduce cow numbers. B 
is a better outcome for him and A, and D better than C. But if all farmers reason 
this way and don 't reduce cow numbers, the outcome will be D, which is worse 
for all than A. Collective, coordinated (enforceable) action is required for the 
achievement o f common ends.2>
This is a very real problem when considered in the light o f environmental 
issues, which require some small but significant action more or less across the 
board. (The next chapter will make the case for at least most o f humanity to 
constitute a collectivity on the grounds o f a common interest in environmental 
protection.) It is one, I would argue, which calls for collective action and 
collective decision making. Consideration o f the situation as analogous to a game 
theoretic problem makes this clear.26
Parfit suggests two ways out o f such situations: political solutions and 
psychological (including moral) solutions. Perhaps, as he outlines, individuals
N ote that even i f  farmers did all act independently to reduce cow  numbers, this m ight be 
inefficient compared with (say) a rota system .
*b The use o f  gam e theory to explain the problem s posed by environm ental degradation is nothing  
new. See Hardin 1968 and Gardiner 2002
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could be made: trustworthy (so that they could all promise not to free ride on the 
condition that the others do the same), reluctant to be free riders, Kantians (so 
that each does only what he could rationally will all to do, so none free-ride), or 
sufficiently altruistic not to free-ride. Alternatively, the situation could be 
changed so that the free-riding option was no longer available, or other options
■*> ~i
relatively more attractive."'
Past experience suggests the implausibility (especially with large groups) in 
relying on all individuals becoming morally motivated in one o f the four ways. 
This leaves us with the political solutions. For Parfit, these are roughly 
categorised as solutions which change the situation rather than the individual -  
either by making certain options inaccessible or by adjusting the payoffs so that 
the options which lead to the best overall outcome become the most attractive 
ones to individuals."L
This translates into a need for a collective decision to be handed down to 
individuals as enforceable rules, or conventions, more or less formally, 
depending on the collectivity. However, as Parfit also notes, it will be much 
easier (sometimes only be possible) to achieve stable political solutions if 
individuals have at least some awareness o f and are at least to some extent 
moved by the moral motivations.
The second case to consider is “Chicken". Two young men are driving towards a 
cliff edge. Whoever brakes first will “ lose" the game, but it would be a much 
worse outcome for neither to brake. The matrix is:
Chicken
Boy 2 Boy 2
Brake first Don't brake first
Boy 1 Brake first S,S T,B
Boy 1 Don't brake first B,T W,W
Unlike with the Prisoner's Dilemma, there is no dominant strategy for either 
player. If Boy 2 brakes first, Boy 1 will be better o ff not braking until just
Parfit 1984, 62-6  
Ibid., 63-4
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afterwards; if Boy 2 doesn't, then for Boy 1 not to would mean the worst 
outcome. On a maximin strategy (that is, make the worst possible outcome as 
good as possible), either boy would brake, meaning that the worst possible option 
would be that he braked and the other didn't. But each, assuming the other would 
reason this way, would have reason to make his own situation better off by not 
braking (the cell (S,S) is not an equilibrium). Both reasoning thus, however,
->9
would mean the worst outcome for both (W,W).~
On the non-intentionalist model, the boys form a (very unwilling, ad-hoc) 
collectivity. The only way, in practice, to avoid disaster, is for both to brake. 
However, this can only be achieved by each committing him self to act as a 
member o f the collectivity, abiding by a collective decision. O f course, in the 
original case this would be entirely contrary to the spirit o f the game and would 
never happen.30 But it is echoed in global politics.
Hamburger, writing in 1979, develops a model o f what he calls "Nuclear 
Chicken".31 There are two superpowers, US and SU. Each has the choice o f 
accommodation or aggression with nuclear weapons.
Assum e that i f  both sides choose accom m odation, then the status quo will con tin u e ... II' 
one side is a g g ressive... and the other accom m odates, then the accom m odating side would  
suffer strategic and perhaps trade and diplom atic losses (-2), w hile corresponding gains 
would accrue to the aggressor, though in lesser amount (+1) because the resulting increase  
in world tension might generally interfere with trade and diplom acy. If both sides choose  
confrontation (with no w illingness to accom m odate), then the result is taken to be a 
nuclear exchange, presumably by far the worst outcom e for each (-1 0). '
The matrix is thus:
US US
Accommodating Aggressive
SU Accommodating 0,0 -2,1
SU Aggressive 1,-2 -10,-10
29 For a full discussion o f  this case, see Hamburger 1979, 83-7
0 In 1955 film R ebel Without A C ause
- 1 Hamburger 1979, 20-21 
Ibid., 21
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Or:
US US
Accommodating Aggressive
SU Accommodating S,S T,B
SU Aggressive B,T W,W
Today, with various countries likely to have nuclear weapons, the model would 
be a wider one, but the point remains the same. No player has an incentive, qua 
rational individual and assuming the others to be rational, to be accommodating. 
But if all are aggressive, the result is nuclear war, and total disaster, not just for 
the respective players, but for the whole world.
As will be discussed in the next chapter, I would defend the claim that at least 
most o f humanity (including all o f my generation and below) is a collectivity. 
The governments o f the nuclear-weapon-owning countries would thus constitute 
an active sub-collectivity. As with the Prisoner's Dilemma cases, the rational 
thing to do, as a collectivity, is to make a collective decision to which all players 
(all members o f the collectivity) are bound.
V. Partial conflict arguments
The last two sections focused on clashes between what the individual perceives 
as in her own interest, and what is in fact in the collective interest (and so, 
ultimately, in hers). From now on, the assumption will be that individuals are 
genuinely committed to some shared goal or purpose. However, motivation can 
still arise.
Partial conflict may arise within the collectivity, which can only be settled by 
a collective decision. Consider the Battle o f the Sexes: a couple want to spend 
the evening together. However, she wants to stay in; he wants to go out. Each 
would rather do what the other wants, than separate. The decision-matrix is:
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Battle o f  the Sexes
Her Her
Stay in Go out
Him Stay in S,B W,W
Him Go out T,T B,S
One will have to make a sacrifice (do what the other wants), or the outcome will 
be worse for both. The matrix can be redrawn in these terms, as another Game 
Theory case, Hero.
Hero (Battle o f  the Sexes)
Her Her
Don't sacrifice Sacrifice
Him D on't sacrifice T,T B,S
Him Sacrifice S,B W,W
Coordination is essential, as Hamburger notes, because it is essential that one 
yield but both do not.33 On occasion, deciding separately, they might happen on 
(S,B) or (B,S) outcomes, but for this to happen reliably requires the decision to 
be made as a pair, for the pair. Moreover, each player, knowing that the other 
will be better off yielding, if  he or she does not, will be motivated not to yield. 
This, however, would mean a second-worst outcome o f each doing as he or she 
chose, but separately.
Again, there is a motivation to free ride. This becomes clearer in wider cases. 
Suppose several children are playing catch, and the ball lands in the neighbour's 
garden. If no child climbs over the fence to get it, the game will stop (second- 
worse, or third best outcome for all). If one child gets it, the game can go on 
(second-best outcome for him, best for the rest). But if  all rush to the fence and 
climb over, they will make such a noise that the neighbour will notice and 
confiscate the ball (worst outcome for all). Each child has a motivation to free 
ride and hope another will volunteer, but if  all think this way, the outcome is 
second worst for all. Even if  they are not free riders, they need to decide as a
Hamburger 1979, 89
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group that only one person (and which) will climb the fence, because for all to do 
it would be counterproductive.34
Again, it is better if the collectivity, rather than its individual members, is the 
unit o f agency. Note, however, that we cannot draw the same clear cut 
implications in terms o f enforceability as in the previous two sections. If a 
collective decision has been made, the individual whose “turn" it is to sacrifice 
(or who, through some method such as a lottery, has been picked as the sacrifice) 
faces, on the surface o f it, a choice between complying, and getting her own 
second best outcome, and not complying, which, given that others will not be 
sacrificing, results in the worst outcome. Thus, it seems to be irrational to cheat 
(although that is no guarantee that certain individuals will not do so, on the 
chance that someone else will sacrifice themself at the last minute rather than see 
the collective project go under).
VI. Rational Altruist Argument A: Parfit’s classic case
The next four sections will be devoted to the two Rational Altruist Arguments. In 
one scenario (Sections VI and VII), while it is rational for individual altruists to 
contribute, it is far from certain that they will do the calculations needed to work 
this out. In other words, individuals, qua individuals, may well not be motivated 
by what is rational. In the other scenario, it is by no means certain that it is 
rational for individuals to contribute.
Assume all members o f the collectivity are genuinely committed to its 
common goals. The basic Rational Altruist Dilemma, which is most often cited 
as an objection to act-utilitarianism, goes as follows. Even if individuals are 
committed to the common good, circumstances arise where the collectivity is 
sufficiently large that the difference made by an individual, qua individual, is 
either none, or so small as to be imperceptible. Why, then, should any given 
individual, however committed she is to the goal, contribute to its pursuit? Surely 
she could decide rationally that, because the difference she makes is negligible 
(or none at all), her efforts would be better spent elsewhere. But, o f course,
4 A similar argument can be m ade in situations where the top-left and bottom -right outcom es are 
switched, so that the result o f  no-one sacrificing h im se lf is w orse than all doing so, for exam ple  
Hamburger's case o f  "several people standing on a dock as som eone is about to drown' (1979 ,
89)
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everyone could reason the same way, resulting in a sub-optimal outcome (failure 
to reach the goal). Many environmental efforts are vulnerable to this kind o f 
motivational difficulty.
Parfit and Michael Otsuka discuss the Rational Altruist Dilemma using the 
example of a large number o f wounded men lying in the desert. Call this number 
a thousand, but it could be made arbitrarily big until the example convinced. 
There are an equal number o f altruists. Each has a pint o f water. If all these pints 
are put into a water cart and divided between the men, each will have his 
suffering significantly reduced. (We assume that there is no benefit besides this 
alleviation.) However, the addition o f each pint to the cart, increasing each m an's 
share by a thousandth o f a pint, does not reduce his suffering perceptibly. W hy 
should each individual rational altruist add his pint?
There is an important difference here between cases o f very small benefits, 
and those where benefits genuinely are imperceptible. If the benefit o f each 
altruist's extra pint in the cart to each wounded man was tiny, but just noticeable, 
he could appeal, on consequentialist reasoning, to the fact that, while his benefit 
to each man was small, added up across the thousand men, it is much larger, and 
justifies his effort.
Assuming, however, that there is no perceptible reduction o f suffering to each 
man from the extra thousandth o f a pint, to justify the choice o f the rational 
altruist to contribute without appealing to the collectivity as the unit o f  agency, 
one of two paths must be taken. It is necessary either to argue that there is a 
benefit, even if  it is an imperceptible one, or to find a way o f justifying 
participation without it. Parfit attempts the latter, although he does believe there 
can be imperceptible benefits in the sense that pain can be reduced by 
imperceptible amounts.
Otsuka attacks his argument, defends the possibility o f imperceptible benefits 
and so finds, he thinks, a rational motivation for the altruist. I agree (this section) 
with Otsuka's rejection o f Parfit, but draw a distinction in the next section 
between benefits and what I will call benefit ingredients. This means that while, 
ultimately, the rational agent should be motivated to contribute, this is not for the 
reasons Otsuka offers. It requires, moreover, a degree o f rational calculation o f
‘1 believe that som eone's pain can becom e less painful, or less bad. by an amount too sm all to 
be noticed.' (Partlt 1984. 79)
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expected utilities by individuals that is probably unrealistic and certainly 
uncomfortably unreliable.
Parfit argues that the rational altruist can appeal to a variant on 
consequentialism:
(CIO) When (1) the best outcom e would be the one in which people are benefited m ost, 
and (2) each o f  the m em bers o f  som e group could act in a certain way, and (3) they  
would benefit these other people if  enough  o f  them acted in this way, and (4) they  
would benefit these people m ost i f  they a ll  acted in this way, and (5) each o f  them  
both knows these facts and believes that enough o f  them will act in this way, then 
(6) each o f  them ought to act in this way. ’6
(Note that while this appeals to what everyone in the collectivity can do together, 
it retains the individual as the unit o f agency.)
The problem, Otsuka argues, is that this has two unsatisfactory implications. 
Firstly, he invites us to suppose that, as well as the thousand men, there are 
another thousand, less wounded and less thirsty (although still thirsty). Each 
altruist, as he decides whether to add his pint to the water cart for the benefit o f 
the thousand very thirsty men, knows he also has the option o f giving his pint to 
one o f the less thirsty ones, and giving him the significant benefit o f a whole pint 
o f water. If all do this, then the overall benefit will be less (we assume that there 
will be greater benefit from reducing the suffering o f the worst-off men).
Suppose we appeal to Parfit's CIO. It turns out that it is not possible to specify 
a set o f actions that will most benefit people. The outcome in which all give to a 
slightly thirsty person is worse than the one where all give to the water cart but, 
because the benefit to the very thirsty of each extra pint in the cart is 
imperceptible, it can be said o f any outcome involving some contribution to the 
water cart, that it would be better if one person took their contribution away and 
gave it to a moderately thirsty person. Thus, Otsuka argues, the Parfitian has to 
commit h im se lf‘to the belief either (1) that each outcome is less beneficial than 
itself, or (2) that “ less beneficial than" is not transitive'.37 This is O tsuka's 
Paradox of Group Beneficence.
*  Parfit 1984, 77  
Otsuka 1991, 141
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Parfit might (indeed, he later does), reject CIO and appeal instead to C7:3S
(C 7) Even if  an act harms no-one, this act may be wrong because it is one o f  a se t  o f  acts 
that together  harm other people. Sim ilarly, even if  som e act benefits no-one, it can 
be what som eone ought to do, because it is one o f  a set o f  acts that together benefit 
other people. 9
This might allow him to avoid this objection, but it fails to avoid O tsuka's 
second implication. Consider the case o f overdetermination. Suppose, that is, that 
there are one thousand altruists already and the water cart is full. On CIO or C7, 
an additional altruist would still have a motivation to add his pint, to become part 
o f the group benefiting the wounded. To avoid this, Parfit adds:
( C l3) Suppose that there is som e group who, by acting in a certain way. will together  
benefit other people. If som eone believes that this group either is, or would be i f  he
joined, too large , he has no moral reason to join this group. A group is too la rge  i f
it is true that, i f  one or more o f  its m embers had not acted, this would not have  
reduced the benefit that this group g ives to other peop le .40
But, as Otsuka points out, this does not allow the rational altruist to reach a 
conclusion unless we assume that there can be imperceptible benefits. If they 
can't, then if the group with 1001 altruists is too large, then so must be the group
with 1000, because the benefits it gives are no smaller, and so on.
VII. Rational Altruist Argument A: imperceptible benefits
Let us return, then, to the possibility that there are such things as imperceptible 
benefits and harms, which can be “counted" in calculation o f options by rational 
agents. They could, therefore, be summed in the same way as very small 
benefits/harms (although this is not the line that Otsuka takes; rather he rejects
s Ibid., 143 (H e cites Parfit: "Comments". E thics  96, 1986)
Parfit 1984, 70
40 Ibid., 83
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group beneficence in favour o f his restricted principle).41 Otsuka affirms what he 
calls the Whole Is No Greater proposition:
W: I f / /  people contribute toward the realisation o f  som e benefit, and nothing other than 
the contributions o f  these people affects the amount o f  benefits secured, then the 
difference in benefits, i f  //-l rather than n contributed, added to the difference i f  n-2  
rather than n -1 contribute, added to the difference i f  n -3 rather than n-2  contribute, 
and so forth until we reach //-//, must equal the quantity o f  the benefit secured i f  n 
people contribute.4'
This, he argues, can be formalised as:
F: (B„-B(„_,j) + (B(w.2)-B(w.3)) +•••+ (Br B0) = Bn
He points to Regan's argument that this is a mathematical truism, since all but Bn 
and B0 are cancelled out, and B0 (the benefit o f no people contributing) is, by 
hypothesis, zero.43 I am not going to argue with this obvious maths, but I do not 
think that it can be used in the way Otsuka wants. By sketching an argument for 
the notion that imperceptible benefits must be benefits, it is possible to bring out 
the confusion behind the debate.
Such an argument might go as follows: “The claim is that by giving an extra 
drop o f water to a very thirsty man, one is not benefiting him. However, there 
seems to be a clear sense in which this is benefiting him: the same sense as that 
in which adding a gram o f flour to a cake is increasing the amount o f flour, albeit 
by an amount so small as to be imperceptible in terms o f the overall cake.
"We are not dealing with pre-set units: units are imposed on the scale o f 
increasing benefit (most importantly, perhaps, the pivotal point at which a man is 
aware o f being less thirsty) so that we can measure it, in exactly the same way 
that measurements o f weight are divided into tonnes and kilograms, and grams, 
and if necessary into decimal divisions o f grams. Our weighing scales may give 
us readings no closer together than 5g. If we add lg, it will not show up. But that
41 ' [I] t is m o ra lly  best f o r  an in d iv id u a l to m a x im ise  w h en ever su ch  m a x im isin g  n e ith er  v io la tes  
d eo n to lo g ica l p ro h ib itio n s  a n d  o b lig a tio n s n o r  sig n ific a n tly  w orsens th e  d is tribu tion  o f  b enefits .' 
(Otsuka 1991, 133; em phasis in original)
4; Otsuka 1991, 135 
4 Ibid., 146 (He refers to Regan 1980)
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does not mean that nothing has been added. If another four people were to add 
another gram each, the scales would flip up to the next 5g point when the fourth 
one did so, but that would not mean that nothing had been added up to that point. 
It is the same with drops o f water. A certain number may have to be added 
before the person notices a change, but that does not mean that nothing has been 
added (that there has been no benefit) up to that point."
The problem with this argument (and with O tsuka's reliance on W) is that it 
confuses the notion of a benefit with what I will call a benefit ingredient -  that is, 
something which contributes towards a benefit.
To clarify, consider occasions on which a goal or benefit is '"all-or-nothing". 
Suppose, borrowing from Parfit, four men need to stand on a platform in order to 
operate a winch that will save the lives o f a number o f trapped miners.44 There is 
no benefit unless n rather than /?-l (four rather than three) contribute. Thus:
B(„-i) = B(„-2) = ... B, = 0
But B„ = x
where x is the total benefit, i.e. the saving o f the lives, and n=4
F is satisfied. But that does not mean that each o f the four have not 
contributed to the overall result. One might say that each has contributed one 
quarter o f the benefit ingredients (in this case the weight on the platform), but 
there is no benefit (to the miners) until all have contributed. Thus:
BI, = 74(BI4)
BI2= 72(BI4)
BI3 = 3/4(BI4)
Where BI4 is necessary and sufficient to bring about B4
And so:
BI2 -  BIi = BI3 -  BI2 = Bfi -  BI3 = 74(BL4)
And so:
(BI4 -  BI3) + (BI3 -  BI2) + (BI2 -  BI,) = Bfi
44 See Parfit 1984, 67-70
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Next, consider an intermediate case. Our thousand altruists are building a 
construction in the garden o f a disabled man, to improve his view across the 
countryside. However, they only have children's Duplo bricks, one each. Each 
layer o f this construction requires 50 bricks, and the m an's wheelchair cannot 
rest on it safely unless a layer is complete. Let us say that the m an's view 
improves by x  amount with the completion o f each layer. The following is then 
the case.
B, = B2= ... = B49 = 0 
B50 = B 51 = B99 = x
Bioo= Bioi = ..- = B149 = 2x 
And so on until 
B 1000 = 20x
But if we consider the benefit ingredients (in this case the bricks).
BIi = y/50 
BI2 = y/25 
And so on until
BIiooo= 20y
Where y  amount o f benefit ingredient is necessary and sufficient to bring 
about x amount o f benefit
Finally, return to the original case o f the wounded men. It seems that there must 
be some point at which a wounded man feels the benefit o f the extra water. (He 
notices, at the first such point, that he has had some water.) The extra 
contributions up to the point at which he noticed this were additional benefit 
ingredients (thousandths o f a pint), but it w asn't until enough of them had been 
added that the extra benefit clocked in.
The obvious objection is that it doesn't work like that: there are no markings 
on the individual “pain measure"' as there are on weighing scales. I have 
sympathy with this view. However, imposing calibrations on a continuum is 
something that is done all the time. It is something we have to do in order to 
make much o f scientific progress and day-to-day life possible at all. Perhaps the
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same is true o f this kind o f moral philosophy. Moreover, the impossibility o f 
identifying the exact point at which something changes is a common one in 
metaphysics. (When does a human body decay to the point o f ceasing to exist? 
How many planks are replaced in Theseus' ship before it becomes a different 
ship?4:>) Practicality may require a certain degree o f arbitrariness.46
A second, related, objection is as follows: suppose we have identified the 
crucial thousandth o f a pint which tips the balance and moves the wounded man 
up to the next level o f pain relief. Then, surely, we could change the example so 
that that drop could not be identified? If we changed the numbers so that there 
were two thousand altruists, two thousand wounded men, then one altruist's 
contribution would only go halfway to filling the gap. If we focus instead on the 
next drop, then we just have to increase the numbers again, and so on, ad  
infinitum. To this I respond as follows: in theory, yes, but in practice we are 
limited, ultimately, by facts: for one, by the number o f people in the world. (We 
can only keep on adding altruists up to a certain limit.)
Where, then, does this leave our rational altruist? His extra drop to each 
individual might make no difference, but it might trigger the next stage o f thirst 
reduction (acting in the manner o f a 50th, 100th, or so on, brick in the intermediate 
case). He knows:
a) i f  he is the pivotal provider o f a drop triggering the next level o f benefit, 
his contributing will have made a difference to each wounded man; and
b) i f  all thousand rational altruists all contribute, the wounded men will all 
have their thirst reduced significantly by being able to drink a pint each.
In this case, a truly rational individual should be motivated to contribute. This 
can be demonstrated by appeal to another argument from Parfit. Ignoring small 
chances is one o f what Parfit dubs mistakes in moral mathematics.47 As he points 
out, in calculating the expected benefit o f an act, the agent has to consider not
4:1 See W iggins 2001, 161-71
Consider, for exam ple, the claim  that it is m istaken to im pose an age lim it on driving because  
one driver o f  16 might be better than another o f  18: the point is that learning to drive at ten would  
be unsafe, and at 25 should be safer. O f course there is a degree o f  arbitrariness in exactly  where  
in between the line is drawn, but that does not mean it should not be drawn at all. 
r  Parfit 1984, 73-5
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only the chance o f its making a difference and the costs o f acting, but also the 
size of the difference.
To use Parfit's example, suppose his vote has a one-in-a-hundred-million 
chance o f affecting the result o f an election between Superior and Inferior, the 
two US presidential candidates. Then, he argues, the expected benefit o f  voting 
is: (A/B -  C) where A is the average net benefit to Americans o f Superior's 
rather than Inferior's election multiplied by the number o f  Americans, B is one 
hundred million and C is the cost o f his voting. ‘Given,' says Parfit. 'that there 
are two hundred million Americans, this sum is likely to be positive.'4S He adds:
It may be objected that it is irra tional to consider very tiny chances. When our acts 
cannot affect more than a few people, this may be so. But this is because the stakes are 
com paratively low. Consider the risks o f  causing accidental death. It may be irrational 
to give any thought to a one-in-m illion chance o f  killing one person. But, i f  1 was a 
nuclear engineer, would I be irrational to give any thought to the sam e chance o f  k illing  
a m illion people? This is not what most o f  us believe. 49
The same point can be made here. Suppose that each agent deciding whether 
to add a brick to the platform for the disabled man does not know how the others 
will act. He does not know how many o f the other 999 altruists will contribute. 
He knows that out o f every 50 '"slots'’ he could fill, one will be pivotal (will push 
the benefit to the individual up by x). He assumes, then, that he has a 1/50 chance 
of increasing the benefit to the individual by x, which gives an expected benefit 
o f x/50 less the cost to the individual. Given that we have been assuming 
throughout that the overall project would be considered worth the group's effort, 
that is, that
20.v- 1000c > 0
(where c is the average cost to each individual o f participating)
then we can assume that, so long as the cost to each individual is roughly the 
same, that:
48 Ibid., 74 
«  „ . , _ .
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A-/50 -  L 'i >  0
for each individual /'.r'°
An exactly analogous argument can then be made for the altruists and the 
wounded men, suggesting that rational individuals in the rational altruist case as 
drawn up by Parfit should be motivated to contribute, on consequentialist 
grounds, even in the case o f imperceptible benefits.
However, the discussion does not end there. Firstly, there is a large gap 
between real human beings and perfectly rational agents, which is likely to be 
larger when perfect rationality requires making the kind o f complex calculations 
suggested here. How often do we really calculate expected net benefits in making 
decisions on whether to contribute? Recall Parfifis example. In countries such as 
the UK where voting is not mandatory, many people simply don 't bother to vote, 
and at least a significant proportion o f those decide not to do so on the grounds 
that it w on't make any difference whether or not they do.
It is plausible (and understandable) that each individual would, in the absence 
o f any collectively-led process to reassure her that her action was part o f some 
overall helpful end, decide not to do something which, in itself, appears to make 
no difference. Thus these scenarios fall under what I call the Rational Altruist 
Argument A for collective decision making.
Secondly, the argument stumbles over what might be called the 
overdetermination case. The above calculation o f probabilities worked on the 
basis that, at certain intervals up to the total number o f possible contributors, 
improvements would continue to be made. Suppose, however, that there are 2000 
altruists in the case o f the platform for the disabled man, but his view will not 
improve any more after the 20th layer has been added. Then, assuming once again 
that he can only assume that there is an equal chance o f each o f  any number o f 
altruists from 1-2000 contributing, each altruist reasons that his chance o f being 
pivotal is now 20 in 2000, or 1/100. His expected utility falls to x/100 and there 
is no longer a guarantee that the expected utility o f contributing will be positive.
0 The reasoning goes as follow s: 2 0 x -1000c  > 0 IFF 20x > 1000c IFF x/50 > c  IF F .v/50-c > 0. 
But the assum ption that the cost to each individual is more or less equal amounts to the 
assum ption that c, is approxim ately equal to c  for all i.
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This leaves us with cases where, it seems, there really is a rational motivation 
even for an altruist not to contribute. O f course, my drawing up o f the situation is 
not necessarily intuitively appealing. Perhaps some readers would be prepared to 
bite the bullet on the intransitivity implications, and claim, instead, that an 
imperceptible benefit is no benefit at all. But we have already seen from O tsuka's 
arguments in the previous section that Parfif s attempt to defend the rationality o f 
contributing would then fail, given overdetermination and the (plausible) 
assumption that there is some other worthy cause to which each individual could 
contribute instead.
Can a rational motivation be identified even where an individual knows the 
chances o f making a difference are low, or, given enough other contributions, 
nil? The next section will engage with an argument by G A Cohen which 
suggests that individuals should be motivated to contribute even then. However, 
it will agree only partially, leaving it uncertain whether there will be such 
motivation, thus grounding Rational Altruist Argument B for collective decision 
making.
VIII. Rational Altruist Argument B: only a chance o f benefiting
Cohen argues that individual members o f the proletariat should be motivated to 
participate in a socialist revolution, even though the difference each o f them will 
make is nil. Before considering this argument in detail, it is important to stress its 
differences from most altruist cases. On the Cohen-Marx account, because 
workers know that the revolution is inevitable, they must know that there will be 
enough proletariat revolutionaries to make it happen. Thus, says Cohen, an 
individual worker cannot justify participating in case it turns out that he is 
pivotal. However, as we shall see, Cohen's argument remains useful even in 
cases without this assumed inevitability.
Cohen argues that each revolutionary participates so that 'he can thereby 
reduce the burden on other revolutionaries in the task o f  achieving what they all 
seek' / 1 It is important to distinguish this reason from the more general one o f 
reducing the burden on other people in general: this remains specific to the
1 G A Cohen 1988, 63
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revolutionary goal. He uses the analogy o f a broken-down car with a driver and 
two passengers. All want the car to be moved. All know this. “Then.' says 
Cohen, “each can consistently believe both that it is inevitable that the car will 
move and that it is rational for him to join in pushing it: each appropriately 
motivated person is pivotal here.02
But now suppose there are four people, each resolved that they will push if 
two others do. W hat reason does each individual have to push when he knows 
that there are three others, and only three are needed? Cohen argues:
If an individual pushes, then although, ex hypothesi, he does not raise the probability that 
the car w ill m ove, he reduces the burden on each o f  the other pushers. This suggests a 
good reason for pushing it, nam ely, that each p u sh e r  w ants to red u ce  the  b u rd en  on the  
o thers in a ch iev in g  w hat they  a ll seek, b y  a ssu m in g  so m e  o f  it h i m s e l f '1’
He draws a distinction, moreover, between the fourth man in this case and the 
passer-by who stops to help, motivated entirely by an altruistic desire to reduce 
the burden on the pushers.
Although I am not certain that Cohen's argument convinces in the 
revolutionary case, he touches on some points important for the rational altruist 
dilemma.54 Firstly, if  one is part o f a group and aware o f that and aware o f shared 
goals, it is not entirely implausible that one would care enough about the others 
(or have a sufficient sense o f what was right) not to want them to carry too much 
of the burden. Naturally, this will not transfer to all possible situations, in 
particular to those where having more people than necessary actively 
participating in bringing about a goal would not reduce the burden on the others 
already participating, perhaps because what is needed is a particular, irreducible 
action. Suppose, for example, that instead o f pushing the car, the three people 
had to stand on a platform which acted as a counterweight and lifted it out o f  a 
ditch. The fourth person's contribution makes no difference at all.
52 Ibid., 61
53 I b i d . ,  6 2
4 It is unclear that the second car case is  an adequate analogy for the revolutionary case. If all 
four know the situation that they are in, they know  that each w ill be m otivated to free ride. Under 
those circum stances, can Cohen claim  that the m oving o f  the car is in ev ita b le ? I don't think he 
can. G iven that, individuals might be m otivated to act for a number o f  related reasons: to break 
the deadlock; to increase the chance that the car w ill m ove; and to m otivate others.
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Secondly, Cohen brings out the importance o f being a part, oneself, in the 
achievement o f something that matters to one. This comes across to some extent 
in Parfit's appeal to reluctance to free ride as a potential moral/psychological 
solution to the problem of collectively self-defeating theories, as well as in his 
distinction, in discussion o f parents' dilemmas, between good being done for 
one's children and that good being done for them by oneself?* In the same way, 
perhaps it matters to an altruist not just that the wounded men are helped, but that 
he is involved in helping them. This is no guarantee, but it does provide a 
plausible possible motivation. In many cases, participation might be regarded as 
an important way of expressing solidarity.
Thirdly, importantly, it may be an oversimplification to treat my participation 
as adding just one person to the list o f participants. In choosing to participate I 
may motivate others to do so. Again, this will not always be the case, but it may 
sometimes be.
Thus, in the second component o f the Rational Altruist Argument, situations 
have been identified in which, although an individual might have rational 
motivation to contribute, she would not necessarily do so.
IX. Rational Altruist Arguments A&B: changing the unit o f agency
The previous sections left us with grounds for doubting that, so long as 
individuals are the units o f agency, altruist goals requiring the contribution o f 
many will be achieved, even where there is genuine commitment by each 
individual to the goal. On the one hand, if (as in overdetermination cases) the 
achievement o f the goal has, at least sometimes, to depend on what an individual 
only might be rationally motivated to do, then its achievement becomes doubtful. 
On the other, even where there is a rational motivation, if  the reasoning behind 
that is complicated enough, and the intuitive impression o f the situation is that an 
individual contribution will “add nothing", individuals cannot be relied on to act 
entirely rationally. This is especially true if they have no guarantee that others 
will act, and if  their contribution would be wasted if the others didn't.
" See Parfit 1984: 64-5 and 96-8
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These motivation problems could be overcome by a process o f co-operation, 
in which the altruists decided together on the appropriate action and allocated it 
accordingly. Individuals would know that their individual action was part o f a 
primarily collective act. They would no longer have to take chances on being the 
pivotal person, since the collective enterprise would be organised so as to ensure 
that the necessary level o f contribution was reached. The danger could be 
removed that, because individuals, qua individuals might not be motivated to 
contribute, the end desired by all would be undermined.
As Susan Hurley argues, if the outcome would be better (the common goal 
better served) with the collectivity or group as the unit o f agency for certain 
decisions, then it is (collectively) irrational not to treat it as such.56 She claims 
that arguments such as Parfit's, O tsuka's and Cohen's make a mistake: by taking 
the unit o f agency to be fixed (assuming that the decisions must be made, 
independently, by individuals acting qua individuals), they neglect the option o f 
acting collectively in the strong sense o f submitting to some collective decision­
making process.
Rather, individuals genuinely committed to the shared goals should be 
motivated to defer to a collective decision-making process. (In Cohen's car case, 
this would be a very informal process: the four would discuss how best to utilise 
the resources at their disposal -  say, whether all four should push, making it 
easier for each pusher, or one o f them should walk to the nearby pub while the 
others are pushing, and buy them all sandwiches -  and act accordingly.)
To make the point, consider Cohen's rejection o f what looks, at first sight, 
like a parallel claim -  that is, the possibility that ‘what I achieve with others can 
motivate me even where it would make no difference whether I dropped o u t'.57 
He restrains himself to citing objections briefly in a footnote, but these seem to 
assume that the unit o f agency is fixed at the individual level, which is precisely 
what Hurley rejects.
Cohen's first three ‘[cjapsule statements o f objections' are:
56 Hurley 1989, 145-8 
5" G A Cohen 1988, 61
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(I) How should I compare, with a view  to deciding what to do, the good effects o f  
my redundant collaboration with others with the good effects 1 can bring about 
on my own?
(II) Don't I needlessly sacrifice production o f  these latter good effects by joining 
redundantly with others?
(III) How, without reasoning according to the differences 1 can make, should 1 decide  
which good-effects-producing group to join? '
These may hold (as the discussion o f Parfit indicated) but only so long as the unit 
o f agency is assumed to be fixed as the individual. His fourth is:
(IV) W hy should redundantly collaborating with other people make sense when no- 
one would suppose that redundantly collaborating with natural agencies does
so ‘>59
However, this use o f “redundant" in itself assumes an individual unit o f agency. 
Rather, when faced with Cohen's questions, which are pertinent if considered by 
an individual as an individual, the person should bear in mind the wider scenario.
Suppose I am considering petitioning my MP to demand that a local woodland 
be protected, and I know that if (and only if) at least 500 o f her constituents do 
this, she will act to save it from developers. The case I face is not one in which I 
know for sure that 500 other wildlife enthusiasts, separate to me, are already 
committed to achieving our common goal, and so my effort would definitely be 
redundant. Rather (let us suppose) there are m> 500 individuals all o f whom 
know that only 500 are needed. Thus each knows that i f  500 or more others 
write, any further help would be superfluous and energy could be more usefully 
used elsewhere, but if less than 500 contributed the goal would not be achieved.
These other individuals also all have the same information as me. Given (that 
we know there is) a big enough m and a large enough cost o f participating, each 
o f us could well decide not to bother. But we all know this. Each o f us must 
know, therefore, that the way to achieve the best possible outcome is to evaluate 
the situation at the systemic level (in Hurley's terms): treat the collectivity 
(Woodland Supporters) as the unit o f agency and be bound by its decisions as to
58 Ibid., 61
59 Ibid., 61
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how to allocate tasks (in this case probably by something as simple as setting up 
a chat room through which we coordinated our efforts and kept a note o f how 
many letters had been sent).60 To regard an individual's participation as 
redundant assumes that it must be treated as an individual act rather than as a 
constitutive part o f a collective one.61
Hurley, it is worth noting, also contends that it is irrational of the prisoners in 
the Prisoner's Dilemma, if they are able to act collectively, not to ‘act as a pair, 
and thus do better for them selves'.62 The distinction between individual and 
collective rationality also applies here, as was brought out in Section IV. 
However, there is a key distinction in terms o f individual motivation. Because, in 
the Prisoner's Dilemma, there is a clash o f short-term interests, there will always 
be a motivation to cheat. Thus the prisoners will only be motivated to act 
collectively if that collective decision carries with it powers of enforcement.
X. Clarification and reassurance
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that it can be better to act qua 
collectivity in pursuit of common or shared goals, purposes or interests, than for 
individual members to act independently. However, there are some clarificatory 
points to be made. I have made a wider claim than Hurley. She is concerned only 
with those who volunteer to co-operate.
60 This assum es, o f  course, that the effort o f  so doing doesn't exceed the effort o f  writing a letter 
on the o f f  chance.
61 Note, moreover, that there are efficiency  grounds for acting qua  collectivity in such cases. 
Recall Parfit's miners: say there are ten trapped and it requires four altruists to stand on a 
platform to save them. Suppose there are five altruists, but suppose also there is one miner 
trapped som ewhere else, who requires one man to save him. If Altruist 5 knows that the other 
four are already on their way to the platform, it is rational for him to save the extra miner. But if  
all o f  the altruists learn about the situation at the sam e tim e, and are unable to coordinate, each  
has to decide whether to go to the platform, or go  to save the other miner. Because the loss would  
be so much greater if  there were only three or less on the platform, each is likely to go  there. 
H owever, the end result would be that there were more than needed on the platform, and the 
additional miner died. If the five could decide, betw een them, that four (and which four) would  
go  to the platform, then the m axim um  benefit (save all m iners) would be achieved. Leaving it to 
individuals leaves open the possib ility  either that there w ill be more contributions than necessary  
or (w orse) that there will not be enough. Equally, in cases where the burden can  be reduced by 
spreading it across members o f  the collectiv ity , then the collectiv ity , qua  co llectiv ity , could  
ensure that this was done.
62 Hurley 1989, 145. Donald Regan m akes a case for co llective  utilitarianism, which he calls 
'"co-operative utilitarianism"'. (Regan 1980. 124)
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W e sh ou ld ... ask ourselves how w e can eontribute to the realisation o f  the best unit 
possible in the circum stances. This is not the sam e thing either as individually doing  
what is best, given what the others do (or are likely to do), o r  as doing what w ould be 
best were the others to do it (whether or not they w ill); in neither o f  these cases can 
one's act be regarded as part o f  a co llective act. C ollective  action does not calculate  
consequences from a fixed unit o f  agency; rather, it involves first identifying those  
w illing to act co llectively , and then together doing w hat's best, given what the non-co­
operators do (or are likely to do).6'
I am assuming a slightly different starting point; that o f the individuals within a 
collectivity or group on my non-intentionalist account. These can, recall, be 
already assumed to share purposes, goals or ATC interests, in the sense o f 
interests/purposes/goals which can only be realised/reached together. The point is 
that it is as a collectivity (not just as those within it who happen to be motivated 
to make an effort) that decisions need to be made. These collective decisions will 
then be handed down to individual members. This raises one immediate potential 
counterexample, and a more general concern. I will address these in turn before 
leaving the chapter.
The problem case arises if  the process o f collective action, in itself, 
undermines the satisfaction that the individual gains from achieving the goal 
through which she is part o f the collectivity. This might come about because an 
individual has a goal the achievement o f which, under the circumstances, would 
require co-operation with some particular persons, but her feelings towards those 
persons are such that she would rather not achieve the goal at all, than achieve it 
by co-operating with them.
Consider Jane, who lives in a small village and commutes to another town. 
There is no public transport. She wants to cut down her fuel use so it would suit 
her to car share to get to work. Derek is the only other person in the village who 
works in the same town, and has the same goal. Unfortunately, Derek and Jane 
hate each other. Both would rather not satisfy their goal than satisfy it by sharing 
a car with each other. A wider scale example would be if  two nations bordering 
one another would benefit greatly by trading (each has resources the other lacks) 
but their citizens are historically ideologically opposed to one other (say, they
63 Hurley 1989, 146.
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have clashing religious views) and their citizens would rather not have the 
benefit o f the diverse resources, than engage in trade with a hated neighbour.
Such examples illustrate a special case: one where it is better in terms o f the 
achievement o f the goals or purposes through which the set o f individuals appear 
to constitute a collectivity that they co-operate, but not thereby necessarily 
“better” for each individual member. She might, to use language more familiar 
from Chapters Two and Three in relation to interests, have a goal which turns 
out, under the circumstances, not to be an ATC goal.
So long as the mutual dependence is through such non-fundamental goals or 
purposes, the response to such problem cases is straightforward: co-operation is 
no longer “better’ for the individuals and so there is no reason to co-operate (to 
take the collectivity as the unit o f agency). Thus, obviously, and in contrast to the 
cases to be discussed in the next chapter, there is no case for coercion.64 In other 
words, upon further examination, it seems that such cases do not constitute 
politically interesting collectivities.
The situation is rather different with regard to interests. Consider the 
following two cases. Sets o f individuals could, like the Rival Gangs in Chapter 
Two, be mutually dependent through their need to survive even though they hate 
each other to the extent that individual members might rather sacrifice their 
chances o f survival than co-operate. Equally, members o f some collectivities 
could, although tied to the others for the satisfaction o f similarly fundamental 
interests, put some religious difference above such interests. Consider nations 
such as Israel and Palestine, all o f whose citizens have a fundamental interest in 
peaceful cohabitation, but at least some o f whose members are so ideologically 
opposed to the idea o f cohabiting with each other, that they continue to fight.
However, it was specified in Chapter Two that an individual could only 
become a member o f a collectivity through an unacknowledged interest if it was 
an ATC interest, and the individual is not automatically taken to be the final 
arbiter on what is in her ATC interest. Rather, Chapter Three argued that humans 
have such a fundamental interest in enjoying the central capabilities on 
something like Nussbaum's list that it would not be in an individual's ATC 
interest to be without a central capability (or expose it to serious risk), even if
64 Chapter Five, Sections VII and VIII
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that individual herself believed her interest in enjoying the capability to be 
outweighed by her personal feelings or ideological goals.65 Thus, the capabilities 
approach provides scope for overriding individual views and claiming that it 
remains “better” (for the individuals) that certain decisions be made collectively.
On these grounds, a strong case can be made for individual duties to co­
operate in such cases. This will be explored further in the next chapter. However, 
(as will be seen) the argument, especially when it comes to the possibility o f 
coercive enforcement o f such duties, is rendered more plausible by appeal not 
just to the fundamental nature o f the individual’s own interests, but also to the 
fact that the fundamental interests o f others are at stake.66
The more general concern with this chapter's case for collective decision 
making is that any talk o f the “collective” now almost inevitably conjures up a 
spectre o f totalitarianism. I will spell out now why my arguments should not give 
rise to any such fears.
Firstly, specified in Section I, there is a clear sense in which the interests or 
goals of a collectivity derive from the goals or interests o f individuals, and this is 
especially so in the case o f my more controversial collectivities. (That is, those 
characterised by unintentionality or involuntariness by some or all members.) In 
describing an outcome as ' ‘better”, I have clarified that I mean “better” in terms 
of the achievement o f goals or satisfaction o f interests o f the individuals within 
the group.
Secondly, crucially, I have not drawn any conclusions about how collective 
decisions are to be made. I am assuming (perhaps naively) that a fair, reasonable 
way o f making decisions, as a collectivity, can be found. From the discussion o f 
the discursive dilemma, it seems that a conclusion-driven vote will often be sub- 
optimal, if  a vote on independent premises would yield a different outcome, and 
that sometimes the expert, factual knowledge required means that no vote would 
be an ideal decision-making process. Considerations o f fairness may also be 
relevant, in particular in selecting from within a set o f “better” outcomes
65 O f course, this claim  is com plicated by the final objection discussed in Section VI, Chapter 
Four, but 1 will return to this point in the next chapter.
66 Chapter Five, 11-IV and VIII. The argument is stronger when at least som e o f  those others do 
not regard som e other goal (w hich rules out co-operation) as overriding their fundamental 
interests. With the Rival G angs, the case for co-operation is weaker i f  they all genuinely hate 
each other so much that they would rather die than co-operate, than i f  som e would rather 
com prom ise their ideological beliefs and find a way o f  getting along, in order to survive.
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achieved by collective rather than by aggregated individual actions in partial 
conflict cases. This, however, opens up a whole new topic.
Thirdly, many collectivities on my model are voluntary. Individuals can 
move between them, thereby refusing to be committed to goals they reject. 
(Suppose a sub-group of the environmental activists discussed in Section II 
decided it was more important to save local trees than any other wildlife. They 
could always form a rival group to focus on this end.) This brings the cases 
closer to those considered by Hurley, where it is only those prepared to co­
operate, who do so.67 However, objectors might (rightly) point out that it is more 
dangerous that individuals have decisions imposed on them when they do not 
have the “opt out"' clause o f leaving the group than when they do. This makes the 
fourth point all the more crucial.
As I will spell out in Chapter Six, it is only those decisions and actions 
directly related to the pursuit o f the common goals, purposes or interests which 
determine the collectivity that I contend should be made by the collectivity as the 
unit o f agency. (Note, moreover, that such “handing down” o f decisions is no 
more than what is already done by (at least allegedly) liberal governments such 
as that o f the US or the UK.) To borrow Dvvorkin's example, an orchestra should 
not dictate to individual players on their sex lives; the UK government should not 
tell me what colour socks to wear.68 This is all the more essential when it comes 
to involuntary collectivities.
As 1 have already specified, the process o f “handing down” decisions may 
not be a formal one. While at one end o f the scale there are formal rules and 
punishments, or incentives, at the other collective acts are carried out almost 
automatically. Two campers at the end o f a rainy weekend will co-operate to get 
packed up and out of the rain as soon as possible. If one starts at one end taking 
out tent pegs, the other starts at the other. Agreement is unspoken: as with 
Hume's example o f two men rowing a boat, the conventions are taken so 
completely for granted that they barely register.69 In between, there are 
conventions which are closer to rules, because they come with associated
67 N ote that, even with voluntary collectiv ities, there may be short-term situations in w hich they  
cannot "opt out” -  for exam ple the M onte Rosa clim bers h a lf way up a technical bit o f  the ascent 
and roped together.
68 Dworkin 2000, 225-7. Dworkin h im se lf credits the exam ple to Rawls (1971 , 5 2 0 -9 )
69 Hume 1777, 306-7
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"social" punishments for infringement (as anyone who has tried to queue jum p in 
at a country post office, or stand on the wrong side o f a London escalator will 
appreciate).
Again, o f course, we are left with the apparently paradoxical situation that 
those situations where coercive enforcement is needed will be precisely those 
where membership o f the collectivity is involuntary or unintentional. That is, in 
the Game Theory cases or in those collectivities where some members do not 
acknowledge shared interests. I appeal again to the points above, and to the 
arguments o f Section I. Moreover, where enforcement is most crucial, the 
potential costs o f not co-operating are highest -  a point which leads us naturally 
to the next environmental case, and the discussion o f the next chapter.
Conclusion
This chapter has identified six plausible scenarios in which it would be better (in 
terms o f achieving the goals, purposes or interests around which the collectivity 
is constructed) that certain decisions be made by collectivities, qua collectivities. 
The need to take the collectivity as the unit o f agency arises because of: 
inefficiency; ignorance; the conflict between individual and collective rationality 
in game theory cases; partial conflict; and motivational difficulties even facing 
rational altruists.
Having thus built on the model established in Chapter Two, I am in a position 
to take the remaining steps o f this project. Firstly, to defend the claim that at least 
most of humanity constitutes a collectivity on the back o f shared interests in 
environmental preservation. Secondly, to supplement this by identifying another, 
heavily overlapping set, including, again, most o f humanity, which constitutes a 
morally salient potential collectivity on the back o f collective responsibility for 
environmental harm. Thirdly, to make a partial case for coercive enforcement o f 
collective decisions in each case. And, finally, to bring these strands together and 
to defend the claim that certain environmental decisions should (prudentially and 
morally) be made by a global decisionm aking body, without thereby claiming 
that there is any need for a so-called global state.
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Chapter Five 
Environmental Harm and Global Collectivities
Chapter Two defended a non-intentionalist model on which a collectivity is 
constituted by a set o f individuals mutually dependent through some common or 
shared goal, purpose or all-things-considered (ATC) interest. That is, a goal, 
ATC interest or purpose that it only makes sense to consider as being pursued 
together, whether because it is genuinely (acknowledgedly) shared or because it 
can only be achieved, for each, by all. The inclusion among such potentially 
politically relevant collectivities o f those whose members are mutually 
dependent through certain interests was supported by Chapter Three's defence o f 
a capabilities model o f human flourishing.
This model was expanded to allow for morally salient potential collectivities. 
Such sets of individuals are acting collectively in the weak sense identified in 
Chapter Two, Section VI (their actions combine to produce some predictable 
effect). They would become a collectivity were they to espouse some related goal 
(preventing, or at least reducing or mitigating the effect). Moreover, they ought, 
morally speaking, to espouse that goal, because they are collectively responsible 
for harm in the weak but important sense identified in Chapter One.
Chapter Four argued that achievement o f the goal, purpose or interest through 
which a collectivity is constituted will often require collective decision making: 
leaving it to the individual actions o f members is often inefficient and can be 
counterproductive.
The next two chapters will apply these models to the current environmental 
situation. Chapter Six will lay out some institutional implications, and respond to 
various objections. This chapter will do two things. Firstly, it will use the 
theoretical framework to defend collective (and correlative individual) duties to 
address the problem of environmental destruction. These duties have a twofold 
grounding. On the one hand, most humans alive today are part o f a collectivity 
because o f fundamental interests threatened by damage to the environment. 
(Section I) This gives us a prudential incentive to establish and abide by such 
global decision-making institutions as are necessary to tackle the problem of 
climate change. (Section II).
151
On the other hand, we (or at least many o f us) have a moral duty to establish 
and abide by such institutions. There are two stages to this argument. Firstly, at 
least arguably, this duty derives from a combination o f considerations o f fairness, 
and the positive moral duties, or duties o f humanity, that we owe other human 
beings. (Sections III and VI) Less controversially, we have them on the grounds 
o f collective responsibility for harm -  to future generations and to those 
(generally the global poor) already feeling the effects o f climate change. 
(Sections V and VI)
In the terminology of Chapter Two, an overlapping (though not identical) 
collectivity and morally salient potential collectivity contain between them all 
humans. This motivates a collective incentive (or, in the latter case, duty), with 
correlative individual duties, to set up such global-level decision-making 
institutions as are necessary to tackle climate change and other pressing 
environmental problems.
The second step in this chapter is more tentative. Chapter Four not only 
identified the need for collective pursuit o f certain collective goals, but also 
indicated that powers o f enforcement would be necessary in some cases. 
However, it is one thing to establish a prudential or moral case for individuals to 
act in certain ways; it is another to justify coercing them into so acting. Section 
VII will appeal to a bulwark o f liberalism, M ill's Harm Principle, as a first step 
towards defending the coercive imposition o f our negatively grounded 
environmental duties. Section VIII will sketch a line o f argument by which 
coercive enforcement o f the duties defended in Sections II, III and IV might be 
legitimated.
I. Self-interest and the environment
Does the whole of humanity constitute a collectivity through the goal o f 
environmental preservation?1 A preliminary argument that it does would go as 
follows. We all have certain fundamental interests (health, affiliation, life, etc.) 
which are threatened by severe climate change. Preserving the natural world 
around us is not something any o f us can do alone. It can only be achieved, by all
1 Indeed, a case could be made for extending this collectiv ity  to include future generations, 
although the lopsided nature o f  the dependence m akes this problematic.
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of us, for all o f us. Thus we are all mutually dependent though our most 
fundamental interests, and constitute a collectivity.
There are two objections to this line of argument. One can be dismissed (with 
qualifications). The other is more problematic: it could exclude from the 
collectivity some of those whose inclusion, from the point o f view of any real 
hope o f policy change, is most vital.
The first objection concerns the mutual dependence clause: is the co-operation 
of everyone (all individuals, all tiny nations) really required? Surely if  most 
people, across the major nations, implemented emissions cuts, that would be 
enough to limit environmental damage."
The response to this, very much as with the national case, is that there are two 
sides to co-operating: acting positively for change, and not doing something 
dramatically negative to undermine the satisfaction o f common goals or interests. 
Anyone, anywhere, with the ability to develop nuclear weapons, could 
undermine the attempts at preservation o f human, animal and planet life. Anyone 
who decided to tip sufficient quantities o f toxins into the ocean, or to orchestrate 
a programme of mass deforestation, could do irreparable damage.
We are, to use an overused analogy, like the occupants o f a lifeboat. Even if it 
doesn't take every single individual to row to get the boat to the shore, it does 
require that no-one leaps up and down and (deliberately or otherwise) overturns 
the boat, or drills holes in the hull. It follows clearly from the fact that anyone (or 
at least any, even smallish, group o f people) could undermine the project, that its 
success requires at least some level o f co-operation from everyone.3
The second objection concerns the “goal, interest or purpose” clause. An 
opponent would open his case as follows. The whole o f humanity cannot 
constitute a collectivity through a shared goal of, or common interest in, 
environmental preservation, because not all individuals do share the goal or
2 Assum ing that it is not already too late: that we haven't passed som e crucial threshold level. 
(See Gardiner 2004, 562-3)
3 This prompts the potential objection: since anyone could undermine the projects o f  alm ost any 
other group o f  people, doesn't that make all o f  us part o f  all collectiv ities?  The response is: no. 
because o f  the other necessary elem ent o f  the mutual dependence (sharing in the goal or the 
interest). A grumpy householder could undermine the shared goals o f  the collectiv ity  o f  children  
playing cricket on the green outside his house by marching out and taking the ball, but that 
doesn't make him part o f  the collectiv  ity, because there is no sense in which he shares in their 
com m on goal or interest o f  playing cricket together. H owever, som e such cases (as w e w ill see  
with G eorge in the next section) do raise the question o f  m o ra l obligations to co-operate.
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interest. How could I convince a rich Westerner that he belongs to such a 
collectivity -  and thus has a prudential incentive to promote and abide by 
collective attempts to tackle environmental damage -  if this individual does not 
care about the state of the planet or the damage to poorer groups or nations 
through pollution? Suppose, further, that he would derive considerably less 
enjoyment from life if he didn't continue to drive ten metres down the road to the 
shops, use CFCs, and so on.
A first response is that such an individual ought (prudentially) to care, 
because environmental damage is closer to home than he will acknowledge. For 
at least those o f my generation and younger,4 the near-depletion o f energy 
supplies, and the reduction o f usable land through global warming (combined 
with overpopulation), to name but two, are not problems only "for future 
generations"' or "the poor". Rather, we can expect them to hit us later in life / 
They will threaten not only such controversial capabilities on Nussbaum's list as 
Other Species, but also such undeniably central interests as Life, Health, 
Practical Reason, Senses, Imagination and Thought, and Affiliation.6 Doing 
something to curtail the problem now, before it requires still greater sacrifice, is 
in everyone's long-term interest.
4 That is, children o f  the late 1970s and later.
5 The IPCC predicts a number o f  serious consequences over the next century for ‘most land 
areas'. These include: (very  likely) increased incidence o f  heat waves, with reduction in water 
quality and increased water demand, higher heat-related deaths, loss o f  w ildlife and lower quality 
o f  life for those without appropriate housing for warm weather, and (very likely) increase in 
precipitation events, dam aging crops and causing soil erosion, increased risk o f  death, injury, 
respiratory, infectious and skin diseases, disruption o f  com m erce, settlem ents and transport, loss 
o f  property, and pressures on urban and rural infrastructures. (2007 , 53) Within Europe, North 
American and Australia, the report warns o f  extensive glacial loss, hugely decreased biodiversity, 
floods and flash fires, crop challenges and water availability problems. (50-2) The US Global 
Change Research Programme acknow ledges: 'There will be significant clim ate-related changes 
that will affect each one o f  us. W e must begin now  to consider our responses, as the actions taken 
today will affect the quality o f  life /o r  us an d  future generations.' (USGCRP 2000, 1; em phasis 
added) It predicts a 3-5°C average increase in temperature in the US over this century -  a rise 
'very likely to be associated with more extrem e precipitation and faster evaporation o f  water, 
leading to greater frequency o f  both very wet and very dry conditions.' (7) M oreover, as it points 
out: 'The US is linked to other nations in many w ays, and both our vulnerabilities and our 
potential responses w ill likely depend in part on impacts and responses in other nations. For 
exam ple, conflicts or m ass m igrations resulting from resource limits, health, and environmental 
stresses in more vulnerable nations could possibly pose challenges for global security and US  
policy. E ffects o f  clim ate variability and change on US agriculture will depend critically on 
changes in agricultural productivity elsew here, which can shift international patterns o f  food  
supply and dem and.' (9) In the event o f  a nonlinear threshold event, those in rich countries would  
be even more exposed: Gardiner, drawing on Gagosian (2003). notes that 'it is the rich countries 
bordering the North Atlantic that are particularly vulnerable to Conveyor shifts'. (2004 . 563)
6 Nussbaum  2000b, 78-80
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Thus, most members o f current generations, even those not immediately 
impacted, do have an interest in developing an environmentally sustainable way 
o f life. Their general failure to acknowledge this, and to act accordingly, leaves 
them in a situation analogous to the common land case discussed in Chapter 
Four.7
Suppose, however, the egoistic westerner (call him George) is late middle 
aged. He w on 't, he says, be around to be affected by environmental damage, at 
least to any significant extent, so how can it possibly be in his interest to help to 
limit it now? There are three possible responses.
The first cites the emotional investment o f current generations in at least the 
next few generations. Climate change and other environmental problems may not 
affect this particular man, but they will affect his children and grandchildren. Is it 
not one o f his goals, even if  it is not in his (selfish) interest, to ensure them a high 
quality o f life? For many, it is. But perhaps George has no children. He might 
(genuinely) claim to have no concern for future generations, or what happens to 
the planet after he is dead. Having as enjoyable a life as possible, himself, is his 
only goal.
This leaves us with the second and third responses, both o f which assert that 
even George's fundamental interests are put at risk as a result o f environmental 
damage. The second response points out that, even though he will probably be 
dead before the worst effects o f climate change kick in, he is not invulnerable to 
the natural disasters already increasingly likely as a result o f  damage to the 
world's natural stability? We all face growing risk o f  floods, hurricanes or 
tornados. Moreover, following W olff and De-Shalit, awareness o f the increased 
risk (for, say, a resident o f Florida) can itself be considered a disadvantage, even 
to those who never, as it happens, are hit by a hurricane.9 To this extent, it can be 
said to be in everyone's interest to reduce the risk o f such natural disasters.
7 See Chapter Four, Section IV
8 For example: ‘There is observational ev idence o f  an increase in intense tropical cyclone activity 
in the North Atlantic since about 1970, and suggestions o f  increased intense tropical cyclone  
activity in som e other regions where concerns over data quality are greater.' (IPCC 20 0 7 , 20) 
Intense tropical cyclone activity is 'likely' to increase, bringing with it an increased risk o f  death, 
injury and disease, as well as the potential for disruption o f  water and food supplies, and loss o f  
property. (Ibid., 53; em phasis in original)
9 W olff & De-Shalit 2007 , 63-73
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The third response appeals to the increased risk o f man-made disaster as a 
result o f climate change. Recall my defence o f the characterisation o f the nation 
state as a collectivity.10 I argued that all individuals can be assumed to have an 
interest in living in a safe, peaceful society. This draws on the fundamental 
interests identified by the capabilities approach in Chapter Three. The idea is that 
everyone is better off under the protection of a system o f justice backed up by 
constraints, than in an insecure state o f nature. Using the terminology o f the last 
chapter, this puts the “game" at a wider level: no longer the zero-sum one o f how 
much to tax the rich to give the poor, but a partial conflict one in line with at 
least some readings of Hobbes, in which certain ways o f organising the state and 
its institutions might be to the advantage o f some individuals rather than others, 
but overall all will be better off being part o f the state than n o t.11
A similar claim could be made at the global level. As fuel and usable land 
become scarcer, without some acknowledged, authorised international body to 
address the issue, war is increasingly likely. That threatens everyone's security. 
The case here is even more extreme than the Hobbesian state o f nature: as I have
I ^already pointed out, a few nuclear bombs could destroy the whole planet. " If the 
“game” is, as this implies, not zero or negative sum, but one o f partial conflict, 
then surely a collective decision is, again, called for, as ultimately in everyone's 
interest?
This is plausible. However, suppose George fully acknowledges the damage 
being done to the environment and the associated risk to him o f natural or man- 
made disaster. He concedes, therefore, that he has at least some interest, other 
things being equal, in preserving the environment. But other things are not equal, 
and he regards this interest as negligible besides the more important (to him) goal 
o f continuing to enjoy his fiiel-guzzling, high-polluting lifestyle. What is in his 
interest, he points out, is not necessarily in his ATC interest.
This is an important point, and one to which it is difficult to respond. One 
approach would be to claim that George is simply wrong, as with the terrorist in 
Chapter Two, who denied that he was rendered part o f the nation state by virtue 
o f shared interests. He is mistaken about what is in his own interest. The model
10 Chapter Four, Sections IV and V. See also Cripps 2005, 30-1
11 Hampton 1986, 132-50. I will return to this in Chapter Six, Section IV
" Chapter Four, Sections IV and V
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of human flourishing defended in Chapter Three allowed for this possibility. 
However, this is a rather different case from that o f the terrorist, who denies his 
own ATC interest in health, security or continued life, to the extent o f being 
prepared to accept their almost certain loss rather than abandon his ideological 
goals. George does not deny the importance o f such central capabilities. Nor is 
he choosing, with near-certainty, to bring about a global war or natural disaster 
which would seriously threaten them. Rather, he is living a lifestyle which, if  he 
and others continue to live it, puts some o f those capabilities to some degree o f 
risk.
It has already been specified that not just any unacknowledged interest can 
render an individual part o f a collectivity: it has to be an ATC interest.13 Chapter 
Three argued that everyone has such a fundamental interest in enjoying 
(continuing to enjoy) the central human capabilities on something like 
NussbaunTs list that it could not be in their ATC interest permanently to be 
without a central capability, or to take a serious risk o f so being. But it did 
concede that it could be in someone's ATC interest to expose even one o f these 
central capabilities to some degree o f risk, most probably to secure another one.
Some risk is inevitable in a full life.14 People make choices all the time to 
take part in activities which put even life or bodily health at risk. At one end o f 
the scale, walking down the road to the shops, driving to Cornwall on holiday or 
flying to the US for a conference, involves a risk. At the other, people engage in 
risky sports, which become central to their way of life.1 ^  (Pursuit o f which is 
included within another central capability category on N ussbaum 's list: Senses, 
Imagination and Thought.16) Some may be ignorant o f the risks, or ignore them. 
Others, however, decide, rationally, that they are worth taking.
George runs the risk, in the case o f a severe natural disaster, or war, o f losing 
his health, or even his life. However, it is a relatively low risk. George is late 
middle-aged. His environmentally-expensive tastes are well established and may 
form a central part o f the way o f life he values. Given all this, if he, having
1 Chapter Two, Section X
u As was noted in Chapter Three, Section IV 
As a rock climber, I can make this point with conviction, although such sports do perhaps
com plicate the matter as the risk can be an intrinsic part o f  the enjoyment.
16 Nussbaum 2000b, 78-9
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thought it through, believes that it is not in his ATC interest that a collective 
effort be made (including by him) to address climate change, he might be right.
Thus, this section ends only half satisfactorily. Most o f us (and the proportion 
is ever increasing) do constitute a collectivity through a shared fundamental 
interest in preserving the environment, which would render it in our individual 
ATC interest to contribute to a global effort to tackle climate change. However, 
there are some members o f current generations whose central capabilities are not 
at sufficient risk for it to be necessarily in their ATC interest to co-operate in 
addressing the problem o f environmental destruction. This is problematic, 
especially as such individuals tend to be those whose carbon footprint is highest 
(rich, middle-aged Westerners). Accordingly, Sections IV, V and VI will tackle 
the question of why, nonetheless, they should (morally) co-operate with a 
collective (global) attempt to tackle climate change. The next two sections will 
explore the implications o f membership for those who are part o f the collectivity.
II. A prudential “ought”: collective rationality
Most humans alive today constitute a collectivity with respect to the goal o f 
environmental preservation. The arguments o f Chapter Four make clear the need 
for us to act collectively. Thus, I contend, each o f us ought (a prudential “ought”) 
to promote the establishment o f the necessary collective decision-making 
institutions, then fulfil the responsibilities handed down to them.
This point will be made in two stages. Firstly, I will fill out the prudential 
case. Secondly, this will be supplemented by appeal to an already influential idea 
on the moral-political philosophy borderline: Herbert Hart's Principle o f 
Fairness.
Chapter Four identified various scenarios in which it is better (in terms o f  the 
satisfaction o f the goals, purposes or ATC interests holding a collectivity 
together) that the collectivity itself, rather the members qua individuals, should 
be the unit o f agency. All these are relevant to the environmental case.
There are obvious efficiency considerations. For example, at the small scale it 
is more efficient that energy-saving processes such as recycling are coordinated 
than that each individual tries to recycle alone. Moreover, there will be many 
who mistakenly deny their membership o f the collectivity. This brings the
158
Ignorance Argument into play. Consider, for example, a fast-driving, high 
energy-living young man living in Florida. (Call him Young George.) He has not 
ruled out having children. Moreover his own capabilities are exposed to serious 
risk in the long term through climate change. Thus, unlike George, he is a 
member o f the collectivity. Nonetheless, he acts like the Head-in-the-Sand 
Farmers and ignores or denies such considerations.1' A more extreme case is the 
fundamentalist terrorist, who would rather sacrifice his own life and those o f the 
countless others than accept a world characterised by what he sees as "evil" ways 
o f life.
Nor does acknowledging our shared interest, in this sense, give each o f us an 
incentive, qua individual, to cut carbon emissions (etc), unless we can rely on 
others doing so, which we cannot unless this is enforced because even having 
made an agreement, each o f us would be better off cheating. (Game Theory 
Argument.) Even if we did all adopt the goal o f tackling climate change, there 
are various solutions that some individuals would prefer (which benefited them 
more, or which better suited their ideological views) and various (other) solutions 
which would be better for other individuals. This gives rise to Partial Conflict 
problems. Moreover, even without Partial Conflict, each o f us would be faced 
with the motivation problem that our own reduction in carbon footprint would 
make an imperceptible difference. (Rational Altruist Dilemma.)
The Game Theoretic and Rational Altruist Arguments bring out the 
distinction, touched on above, between two ways in which an individual could 
contribute to a collective effort. Individual co-operation could take the passive 
form of not setting off a nuclear bomb, setting fire to the rain forests, or similar, 
or the more active form of cutting our own everyday carbon emissions. W hile all 
o f us (bar the terrorists) would acknowledge a prudentially grounded 
responsibility to co-operate in the first sense, we do not all need to co-operate in 
the second sense (cut down our carbon emissions) for the overall goal to be 
achieved. Moreover, this kind o f action by each o f us individually could be a 
pointless sacrifice if  not enough others act similarly.
This is precisely why our prudentially grounded incentive is to promote a 
collective solution. (This might, albeit awkwardly, be called a "duty to oneself'.)
1 Chapter Four, Section III
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Reasoning parallel to Hobbes, each o f us has a rational incentive (it is a “ law of
reason”) to reduce our carbon emissions so long as we can be confident that
I senough others will do so too. ' Because (a) we are not confident enough about 
our fellow humans to believe that they will do so, and (b) we know that it would 
be more efficient to organise the reduction across the collectivity than risk all 
over sacrificing unnecessarily, the prudential course o f action for each o f us is to 
promote the necessary collective decision-making apparatus.1} This is 
collectively rational, and satisfies the common good as defined by Sen and 
Runciman.20
III. A moral ought: the Principle o f Fairness
This argument can be bolstered by normative considerations. The question o f 
why we should contribute to collective schemes from which we benefit is a 
familiar one in political philosophy. There is already a tool available with which 
to defend the duty o f each and every member o f the collectivity to do their part in 
a collective effort to tackle climate change: the Principle o f Fairness." That is, 
Hart's claim that:
when a number o f  persons conduct any joint enterprise according to rules and thus restrict 
their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions have a right to a sim ilar  
subm ission from those who have benefited by their subm ission .::
18 Hobbes defends his lirst fundam ental Law o f  Nature as 'a preeept. or general rule o f  Reason. 
That every  man, ought to en deavou r P eace, as farre  as he has hope o f  obta in in g  it; and when he 
cannot obtain it, that he m ay seek, a n d  use, a ll helps, an d  advan tages o f  W arre.' (165 1. 91 -2)
19 Note, however, that it also fo llow s from the arguments o f  Chapter Four, Section IV, that for 
many o f  those involved this is not a Rational Altruist dilem m a, but a G am e Theoretic one, 
analogous to the Tragedy o f  the C om m ons, in which case the "necessary" decision-m aking  
apparatus would be one with pow ers o f  coercion. 1 w ill return to this in Section VIII.
_0 Runciman & Sen 1965, 555-6 . See also Chapter Four, Section I
21 This m ove is not a new  one. A s Casal notes: ‘Raw ls' w idely d iscussed p rin c ip le  o ffa irn e ss  is 
often thought to support the provision o f  environm ental public goods.' (1999 . 363) H ow ever. I 
will offer what 1 hope is a new  slant on the discussion, by appealing directly to the idea o f  our 
positive moral duties to preserve the fundamental interests o f  other human beings. (Sections IV 
and VIII)
"  Hart 1955. 185. A version o f  the principle is also fam ously espoused by Rawls: ‘ [A] person is 
required to do his part as defined by the rules o f  an institution when tw o conditions are met: first, 
the institution is just (or fair), that is, it satisfies the tw o principles o f  justice; and second, one has 
voluntarily accepted the benefits o f  the arrangement or taken advantage o f  the opportunities it 
offers to further one's interests.' (1 9 7 1 . 96)
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As it stands, this principle is liable to attack. According to Robert Nozick, it is 
'objectionable*. He appeals to the examples o f a neighbourhood radio station 
('Though you benefit from the arrangement, you may know all along that 364 
days of entertainment supplied by others will not be worth your giving up one 
day.') and a local rota to sweep streets. ( 'I f  each day a different person on your 
street sweeps the entire street, must you do so when your time comes? Even if 
you don't care that much about a clean street? Must you imagine dirt as you 
traverse the street, so as not to benefit as a free rider?') At the very least, he 
argues, the principle would have to incorporate the 'very strong condition' that 
the benefits to each individual o f co-operating outweigh the burdens, but it would 
remain objectionable even then, as individuals might prefer some other scheme 
altogether, or benefit much less from this one than others do.23
In response, George Klosko makes a move similar to that made earlier in this 
thesis, when it was specified that the only ////acknowledged interests through 
which individuals could count as members o f collectivities were ATC interests.24 
He amends the Principle o f Fairness to apply only subject to certain further 
conditions: 'the goods in question must be (i) worth the recipients' effort in 
provide them and (ii) ' ‘presumptively beneficial’" where "presumptively 
beneficial” goods are 'something similar to Rawls’ primary goods... such goods 
must be necessary for an acceptable life for all members o f the community',*^ 
and ‘the costs and benefits o f the [co-operative] schemes in question are fairly 
distributed'.26 Call this the Modified Principle o f Fairness.
Such presumptively beneficial goods need not, to make Klosko's point or that 
o f this chapter, include anything other than central capabilities. Nor need they 
even extend to the more controversial capabilities on N ussbaum 's list (although 
an interest in Other Species would certainly add force to the arguments offered 
here). As Klosko puts it: ‘such things as physical security, protection from a 
hostile environment, and the satisfaction o f basic bodily needs appear obviously 
to fit the bill'.27
23 N ozick 1974, 93-5
24 Chapter Two, Section X
K losko 1987, 246. Casal draws a sim ilar distinction, betw een co n d ition a l public goods, the 
value o f  which 'derives entirely from them satisfy ing indiv iduals' preferences' (1 999 . 3 6 9 ) and 
unconditional goods, which are supposed to have value over and above those preferences.
"6 Klosko 1987, 253. One o f  his exam ples is a society  faced with pollution (1 987 , 250)
27 ibid., 247
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The Modified Principle o f Fairness avoids requiring compliance in N ozick's 
examples, but adds force to the case made by the previous section. There, it was 
argued that members o f the collectivity (including Young George) had a 
prudential incentive to commit to a collective scheme to tackle the problems of 
climate change. Presumably, for that incentive to remain, the individual would 
have to be confident that the collective decision-making process would divide 
duties in such a way that the effort required o f one, as an individual, would not 
outweigh the costs -  that is, that everyone else contributed their share. Given that 
each individual would reason thus, the possibility o f a workable collective 
solution would presumably hinge on its ensuring general compliance.
The Principle o f Fairness reinforces this with a moral consideration: the 
unfairness of a situation in which all benefit, all things considered, but only some 
actively contribute. (This might become relevant, in practice, if in the process o f 
establishing the decision-making institution, those in a superior bargaining 
position, perhaps because less immediately at risk from climate change, played a 
tactical game and refused to co-operate unless they bore a smaller share o f the 
burdens.)
Thus far, then, it has been argued that most o f those currently alive, including 
Young George, constitute a collectivity with respect to the goal o f  environmental 
preservation, and that this gives members a prudential reason to promote and 
comply with an appropriate collective effort to tackle the problem. We have 
supplemented this with an appeal to the fairness o f contributing to some 
collective effort which protects a fundamental interest, where the cost o f 
contributing is less than the benefit.28
George, however, represents a more problematic case. If it is not in his ATC 
interest that a collective effort be made (including effort by him) to tackle
A further objection might be raised here: how can the costs not outw eigh the benefits for som e  
members i f  the cost to som e people is their life? K losko acknow ledges that it might be necessary  
in a military campaign to sacrifice som e soldiers, ’ for the good o f  the larger unit' but cla im s that 
those soldiers would nonetheless be obliged to fulfil that duty, so long as ‘the im m ediate benefit 
o f  this unfortunate group's m ission is sufficiently large, and the m em bers o f  the group are chosen  
fairly". (1987 , 251) How could this be defended? K losko appeals to the good for the group as a 
whole. However, it might be possib le to render even the military case com patible with an 
individual balance o f  benefits and burdens, by applying condition (i) ex ante. I f  each individual 
w ould be prepared to put her life at a certain degree o f  risk to secure a certain benefit (not being  
invaded, say), then it could be argued that a "fair" sy stem (say lottery) to pick who g oes on a 
particular m ission would be enough to satisfy the condition.
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climate change, why should he be required to contribute to such an effort? The 
next section will consider this question.
IV. Motivating George: duties of humanity
Why should George promote and contribute to collective efforts to tackle climate 
change? Given that he benefits from environmental preservation (the world is 
safer for him, as well as for everyone else) one option would be to appeal again 
to the Principle of Fairness.
However, this prompts Nozickian worries: George would rather that there 
were no scheme (and no benefit) than that there were one and he had to 
contribute. Why, then, should he do so? Section III showed how N ozick’s 
counterexamples could be avoided by restricting the principle to cases where (i) 
the benefits o f co-operation outweighed the burdens and (ii) the good was 
“presumptively beneficial’'. Such a restriction, however, seems to exclude 
George, at least so long as we read (i) (as I was implicitly doing in Section III) as 
requiring that the benefits outweigh the burdens fo r  each participant.
George benefits from the scheme, in that a risk to his central capabilities is 
reduced. In that sense, he shares in a presumptively beneficial good. However, it 
has already been acknowledged that the removal o f all risk to such capabilities is 
not necessarily in his ATC interest. The reduction o f an already small risk, at the 
cost o f curtailing his ability to pursue his own plan o f life, will, for him, not be 
worth it.
Klosko avoids this objection by specifying a weak reading o f his condition (i): 
‘[T]he benefits and burdens under consideration are those o f  the relevant 
community as a whole, rather than o f each particular member.’" (Call this the 
Weak Modified Principle o f Fairness.) This is a significant shift. It also requires 
further defence, both for the cases with which Klosko is concerned, and for the 
global environmental case.
On the non-intentionalist model, there is no understanding o f the community 
or collective interest which does not derive directly from the interests o f the 
individual members. In a full blown collectivity, each individual has a
Ibid., 250 [emphasis added]
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fundamental interest (or acknowledged goal) and is mutually dependent with the 
other members for its satisfaction. Here, however, the situation is asymmetric. 
Not everyone has an ATC interest in collective efforts to achieve environmental 
change although they do benefit to some degree. Thus, the supposed community 
"good” (or balance o f benefit over burden) would have to be understood as that 
which is in the ATC interest o f most but not all, and which requires the co­
operation o f all for its satisfaction. Given that, Nozick's objection retains its 
intuitive pull: if participating in some overall scheme will cost me more than it 
gives me, why should /  comply with it?
Klosko does not provide an entirely satisfactory response to this. He glosses 
over the distinction between the two cases (overall and individual balance o f 
benefit and burden) by referring to the typical individual: '[F]or condition (i) to 
be satisfied, the benefits must obviously outweigh the burdens (for the 
community as a whole, and so for the typical individual).'30 The problem, 
however, is justifying duties to co-operate for an actual individual who does not 
benefit.
Hart, defending his Principle o f Fairness, appeals to 'the [natural] equal right 
o f all men to be free'.31 This, he claims, underlies all moral rights, including 
special rights. Thus, when someone makes a promise, or confers some right on 
someone else, 'this claim to interfere with another's freedom is justified because 
he has, in exercise o f his equal right to be free, freely chosen to create this 
claim '.32 However, his attempt to derive the kind o f ‘'mutual restriction” rights 
covered by the Principle o f Fairness from our equal right to be free is less 
straightforward.
[I]n the case o f  mutual restrictions we are in fact saying that this claim  to interfere with  
another's freedom is justified because it is fair; and it is fair because only so w ill there be 
an equal distribution o f  restrictions and so o f  freedom  am ong this group o f  men. 3 '
This involves a step from the ''natural” right to freedom, which we all hold 
equally, to the idea that, when a system is set up which restricts freedom, those
30 K losko 1987, 252
;| Hart 1955, 175
”  Ibid., 190 
” Ibid., 190-1
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restrictions should be evenly spread: that is, from an equal right (to be free) to a 
right to equal freedoms. Accordingly, as Klosko notes, modem scholarship has 
acknowledged the reliance o f the Principle o f Fairness on another general moral 
principle: fair divisions o f benefits and burdens.34 Plausible as this when 
everyone does benefit, here it only brings us back to Nozick's point. If, for me, 
the benefits o f taking part in a system of co-operation are less than the costs to 
me of a “fair” distribution o f burdens between me and others, within such a 
system, then surely it is imfair to assign me an obligation to participate, at all? 
This is precisely George's complaint.
Further argument is needed to explain why George should contribute. This, I 
suggest, can be done by taking a different slant on K losko's appeal to the good as 
presumptively beneficial to the community as a whole, or by elaborating on the 
following point from Casal.
[Ejnvironm entalists are primarily concerned with what one may call unconditional rather 
than conditional  public goods. They think that the value o f  the unconditional goods they  
try to secure extends beyond the satisfaction o f  their ow n personal preferences. It may 
derive from the intrinsic value o f  ecosystem s or from the value o f  individual animal lives.
O r it m a y  depen d  upon the critica l in terests o f  human bein gs o th er than those who secu re  
the environm ental g o o d  a t s ta k e ...  [OJne does not need to love the forests in order to have  
a reason not to bum them.3'
Crucially, the central capabilities o f the other individuals involved are at 
stake. If, without the co-operative system, their most fundamental interests would 
be exposed to serious risk, we can appeal to G eorge's positive moral duty (to 
prevent serious harm to others) to defend his duty to co-operate. Note that 
exactly the same argument can be used to supplement the claim that Young 
George, or the terrorist, ought to contribute even if  they deny the shared interests. 
This is important for Section VIII.
A smaller-scale analogy brings out the intuitively important, and morally 
relevant distinctions in play here. Compare the following situations (which are 
not dissimilar to the Monte Rosa examples in Chapter Two).
4 K losko 1987, 242, citing David Lyons: F orm s a n d  L im its o f  U tilitarianism  (Oxford University  
Press, 1965)
45 Casal 1999, 369 [emphasis added]
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(a) Anne, Beth and Costas have a shared goal. They want to climb a 
mountain by a particular route. David does not share their goal. They can 
pursue it perfectly well without him.
(b) Anne, Beth and Costas share the goal o f doing the climb. David does not, 
but David is the only one who is a technically good enough climber to 
lead the expedition: they can 't do it without him.
Consider also the further distinction between the following:
(bi) The situation is as in (b) but Anne, Beth, Costas and David are all in a 
cafe in Edinburgh. Anne, Beth and Costas might be annoyed at not being 
able to do the climb, but it will not do them any serious harm.
(bii) The situation is such as in (b) but the four o f them are stranded 
somewhere remote in the Highlands, where a night in the open would be 
extremely dangerous, and only David has sufficient experience and gear 
to be likely to survive it. The climb is the only way out.
Intuitively, it seems that David ought to participate in (bii), but the others can 
make no such claim on him in (a) or (bi). This can be explained by the 
combination o f two factors: the goal or interests o f the others cannot be satisfied 
without him (as they can in (a)); and (unlike in (bi)) the stakes, for those others, 
are very high. If David (at relatively low cost to himself) can prevent their 
deaths, he ought to do it. He has, it might be said, a positive duty, or duty o f 
beneficence, to help them, and on these grounds ought to adopt the relevant goal 
and become part o f the collectivity.
Put more generally, there is an important difference between saying 
individuals ought to act as if they were part o f a collectivity because o f  mutual 
dependence for the satisfaction o f interests which they do not acknowledge, and 
which may not be in their ATC interest: (i) when it is possible for the collectivity 
to exist and to pursue those goals/interests successfully without them, and when 
it is not, and (ii) when the failure to achieve the goals constitutes a threat to a 
fundamental interest (or central capability) o f the individual members, and when 
it does not.
With this in mind, reconsider the case o f the whole o f humanity in relation to 
environmental preservation. Given that the interests o f the relevant others 
(including younger generations in the west, as well as those in poorer areas 
already negatively impacted by climate change) are so fundamental, and given
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that the co-operation o f the Georges o f the world is necessary to achieve the goal, 
the case seems comparable to (biv). Refusal to co-operate would thus constitute a 
moral failure: a failure to protect the fundamental interests o f others.
However, the analogy is not so straightforward. It is true that everyone's co­
operation is required in the sense outlined in Section I: that they refrain from 
setting off nuclear bombs, emptying tankers o f toxins into the sea, and so forth. 
(Moreover, their responsibility to co-operate at least thus far can be grounded, 
less controversially, in the negative moral duty not to harm others.) However, 
when it comes to the more focused attempts to cut carbon emissions, George can 
point out that his continuing to drive everywhere, overheat his house, and so on, 
would not prevent the achievement o f the overall goal, so long as everyone else 
co-operated. His individual refusal would not undermine the whole project, so 
how can we appeal to his positive moral duties (to prevent harm to others) to 
require that he contribute?
We can do so, I suggest, by appeal to the concept o f collective responsibility. 
While his individual co-operation (in this more positive sense) may not be 
necessary, the co-operation o f people like him (“the Georges o f the world", as I 
said above) is necessary. If all middle-aged westerners reasoned as he does, the 
efforts o f the rest o f the world would be inadequate. Thus, while George him self 
is not directly analogous to David from the climbing example, he and those like 
him are collectively so.
Chapter One made the case for taking collective moral responsibility 
seriously. Now, however, it is not even necessary to rest on the extension o f 
M ay's theory defended there, as May him self provides a model o f collective 
responsibility for collective inaction. As discussed in Chapter One, Section II, 
this refers to ‘the failure to act o f a collection o f people that did not choose as a 
group to remain inactive but that could have acted as a g roup '.36 Thus, May 
argues, the holidaymakers on a beach who could have organised in time to save a 
drowning child, but have not done so, are collectively responsible for failing to 
prevent the death o f the child.
Similarly, if George and those like him do not, between them, do something to 
reduce their carbon emissions significantly, they will be failing to prevent serious
?6 May 1992, 107
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harm. As with David, it seems that they, collectively, have a positive 
responsibility to co-operate, and George, in parallel with the arguments o f 
Section V, Chapter One, has an individual duty to promote the fulfilment o f this 
collective duty.
This can be tied back into the discussion o f Murphy in Chapter One, Section 
V, the point being that it would be morally suboptimal if each o f “the Georges o f 
the world” did not contribute, as the sacrifice required o f those who did would be 
correspondingly unfairly greater. Indeed, according to M urphy's Compliance 
Condition, each could only be morally required to do what would be his share
37under full compliance.
This section has attempted, by supplementing the prudential with a moral 
argument, to show that even George ought to espouse the collective goal of 
tackling climate change. However, any argument resting on positive  duties, or 
duties to aid others, is inevitably open to dispute. Such duties are not only less 
clear cut than their negative counterparts, but are also often taken to be weaker 
and so liable to being “outweighed” either by individual considerations or other, 
negative claims.
Philosophically, it is unclear how much weight should be given to the
3Snegative-positive distinction. 1 (For example, if  I shut the door o f my isolated 
home on a stranger on a snowy night in the Canadian winter, am I failing to help 
or harming him?) Nonetheless, it is deeply embedded in the common sense 
morality guiding our everyday lives.39 Moreover, there is greater controversy 
regarding the legitimacy o f enforcing positive duties than negative ones. 
Comparing the discussion o f the Harm Principle (Section VII) with the return to 
the Principle o f Fairness in Section VIII will bring this out.
It would, therefore, be an advantage if the defence o f environmental duties did 
not rest on positive moral responsibility alone. Happily, thanks to the theoretical 
apparatus already built up in this thesis, it need not. The morally salient potential 
collectivity constituted by most o f us alive today (including George) incurs a 
negatively-grounded collective duty, which comes with correlative individual
' Murphy 1993, 278  
See, for exam ple, LeRoy Smith (1 9 7 8 ) and Foot (1978a) 
Scheffler makes this point (2 001 , 36-8)
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duties, to address the problem o f environmental damage. The next section will 
defend this claim.
V. Environmental harm and moral excuses
Chapter One defended a notion o f weak collective responsibility for the harm 
which results from the predictable aggregation o f individual acts.
One such case is damage to the environment, which occurs through the 
aggregation o f the acts o f individuals (as well as other agents, such as corporates 
and governments). The resulting harm impacts, uncontroversially, on two sets o f 
individuals, to the extent o f undermining their central capabilities: those 
(generally the poor) whose chances o f a flourishing life are already undermined 
by factors such as pollution and global warming;40 and future generations 
(including the current generation o f children).
Accordingly, "we" (the "global elite” constituted by westerners and the rich 
minority in poor countries41) are collectively, morally, responsible for harm. This 
renders us a morally salient potential collectivity: one which ought to count itself 
cis a collectivity, with respect to the goal o f curtailing environmental destruction. 
We have a collective duty to end (or at least reduce or mitigate) the harm .4“ 
Individually, we have correlative duties to promote a collective solution (in this 
case, in the first instance, a collective decision-making body) and possibly 
supplementary duties as well.
However, before drawing this conclusion, along with all its implications in 
terms o f collective and individual duties, it is necessary to consider a potential 
line o f objection. Certain excuses are standardly used to argue that an individual 
who is responsible for some harm, has nonetheless acted permissibly. The harm 
is not morally unacceptable. Is it possible to appeal to collective equivalents o f
40 Shrader-Frechette 2002, 6-13
41 A grouping identified bv Pogge in the global ju stice  debate. The question, he says, 'is  not what 
w e are doing to the develop ing countries? The crucial question is what are w e and the rules and 
elites o f  the develop ing countries to g e th er  doing to their impov erished populations?' (2 0 0 2 . 23)
42 Lomborg has argued that it w ould be more cost e ffective  to adopt a policy o f  adaptation to 
clim ate change rather than to attempt to prevent it. H ow ever, as Gardiner has pointed out, this 
rests on a high discount rate, so that the impact to future generations does not count as a 
significant cost. Even i f  Lom borg were correct, how ever, w e would still have strong 
environm ental duties: duties to enable adaptation to clim ate change. (Lom borg 2 0 01 , 317; 
Gardiner 2004 . 569-73)
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these excuses to deny (or override) any moral duty, collectively, to address the 
problem o f environmental harm?
Consider the following four scenarios, at the individual level, in which the 
individual's causing the harm might be morally "excused":43
1) Unacceptable cost to self: the cost to the individual concerned, o f not 
bringing about the harm, is too high.
2) Worse alternatives: in not causing this harm, the individual would cause 
(or fail to prevent) some other, far greater harm.44
3) Consent: the person (or persons) being harmed has (have) given her 
(their) free informed consent to the harm.
4) Acting within one's rights: although an individual is causing harm to 
some other person or persons, she is acting within her rights in so doing, 
and so they have no claim against her.
The first three can be "collectivised", and considered as potential excuses to 
which "we", the global elite, might appeal. The fourth is different. It has most 
force considered as an excuse, once collective decision-making institutions are in 
place, for an individual not to comply with the corresponding restrictions on 
individual behaviour. It will thus be saved for the next section.
There is also a fifth possible excuse.
5) No evidence: there is insufficient or inconclusive evidence that action by 
the individual is bringing about the harm.
44 I am aware that there is a distinction, in legal philosophy, between "excuse” and "justification”. 
■Justified behaviour." says Robinson, ’is correct behaviour and therefore is not only tolerated but 
encouraged. In determ ining whether g iven  conduct is justified, the focus is upon th e u e /, not the 
a c to r ...  Kxcuse. on the other hand, focuses on the actor, rather than the act. A su ccessfu l defence  
o f  excuse represents a legal conclusion  that although the act was wrong, liability is inappropriate 
because som e characteristic o f  the actor v itiates so c iety 's desire to punish him." (1 9 7 5 . 28 9 . The  
article is reproduced from UCLA Law  R eview  2 66) See also Austin 1956 and Husak 2005 . 
However, with the m oral distinction itse lf  a matter for debate, and nothing hinging on it as far as 
this work is concerned. 1 will understand moral "excuses'" as also including justifications.
44 It might be argued that (1) is a subsidiary o f  (2) - harm to o n e se lf  being a variant o f  harm to 
others. H owever, I see them as importantly different. What you might be expected to bear 
yourself, rather than pass it on to others by harming them, might very well be more than what you  
can legitim ately do to one person, in order not to harm another.
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This bears mentioning, but the collective equivalent in the environmental 
case (though frequently invoked) can safely be dismissed. The scientific 
evidence is overwhelming that human activity is causing, or at least dramatically 
worsening global warming. For example, a summary o f the scientific literature 
by Naomi Oreskes clarifies that, contrary to the claims o f various corporations 
and interest groups, 'there is scientific consensus on the reality o f anthropogenic 
climate change'.46
Consider, then, (1) to (3) in turn. Firstly, unacceptable cost to self. Generally, 
the force o f this excuse depends not on the absolute cost to oneself o f not 
harming, but on the cost compared with the cost o f the harm to the person 
harmed. For example, jum ping out o f the way o f a speeding car to save one 's 
own life, and in the process (knowingly) knocking over a pedestrian, would harm 
the pedestrian to the extent o f a few bruises. However, it would not standardly, or 
intuitively, be considered that one would therefore have a duty not to do it. 
Where the consequences to oneself o f not harming are less bad, harming is less 
acceptable. Thus, it would seem that there is a moral duty not to knock over the 
pedestrian by running along a narrow pavement to avoid being late for work. 
Equally, the worse the harm done to the other person or persons, the less the 
chance that even the avoidance o f a significant cost to oneself renders it 
acceptable. (Pushing another person in front o f the car in order to save one 's own 
life, for example.)
Applying this collectively, recall the example o f teenagers jum ping 
independently into the lake, and between them bringing about the death o f a 
child.46 The teenagers, it was argued, have a collective duty to adapt their 
behaviour so as not to cause the drowning o f the child. It is hard to think o f any 
scenario in which the cost to them could eradicate this duty. However, changing 
the circumstances, if the harm to the child would be mild discomfort rather than
^  Oreskes 2004, 1686. A more plausible variant on (5) might be offered, however: that there is 
insufficient evidence as to what is to be done to rem edy the harm, and even as to whether it is 
possible. Neither renders blam eless our continuing to harm. In the first case, extensive research  
into possib le approaches would be a first step towards fulfilling the co llective  duty. In the second, 
lack o f  certainty that disastrous consequences can be averted is no excu se not to try -  and 
certainly no excuse to carry on harm ing -  g iven  that the stakes are so high. (A lthough, w ere there 
incontrovertible evidence that nothing can be done, then a different set o f  responsib ilities w ould  
arise, relating to bearing the consequences with as little undermining o f  flourishing as possib le .)
U> Chapter One, Section ill
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drowning, and the teenagers were freezing to death outside a (heated) pool, this 
consideration would presumably override the duty.
In the environmental case, any such claim seems wildly implausible, at least 
as regards the global elite.47 Much o f  our greenhouse gas output serves luxury 
purposes.4is There is one scenario in which we might claim to need to harm other 
generations in order to preserve ourselves from at least as bad harm. That is, in 
which the only way to protect ourselves from potentially huge suffering as a 
result o f climate change would be by storing up still greater damage for future 
generations. However, there are two points to be made about this.
Firstly, at the individual level, it is one thing to say that I would be m orally 
permitted not to save your life if the only way I could do so would be by losing 
mine. It is another to claim that, if  it were a choice o f my life or yours, I would 
be morally permitted to kill you to save myself. It is still another to claim that, in 
a situation which is at least in part o f my creation, and not at all o f  yours, where I 
could save m yself by sacrificing you, that I would be morally permitted to do so. 
The parallel is, I hope, obvious.
O f course, the situation is complicated by the fact that current generations are 
not the only ones doing the damage: much was done before we were bom, or at 
least before we were adults.40 Were some future generation (which was not itself 
over-emitting) to face the stark choice between saving itself or saving some 
distant future generation, there could be a genuine moral dilemma. However (the 
second point), that is not the situation now. We are not innocent victims faced, 
though no fault o f our own, with the choice o f harming ourselves or others 
severely. The situation is at least in part o f our making, and we are not yet (at 
least in the west) facing real suffering as a result o f it.
Consider, then, the second get-out clause: worse alternatives. It is difficult to 
see what worse harm to others we could be supposed to be preventing by
4 As Shue points out, in the slightly different context o f  defending redistribution to poorer 
countries to help accom m odate the costs o f  cop in g  with clim ate change, the interests at stake for 
those in poorer countries are "vital interests— survival interests. This m eans, I think, that it is 
unfair to demand that they be sacrificed in order to avoid our sacrificing interests that are not only  
not vital but trivial.' (1992 . 394)
48 Shue em phasises this distinction (1 9 9 3 , 54-8). The term inology is from Agarwal and Narain 
(1991, 5-7). For exam ple, they cite the International Project for Sustainable Energy Paths to argue 
that a 50  per cent per capita reduction in b e e f  consum ption in industrialised countries, which  
would still a llow  a healthy diet, w ould reduce animal methane production by 40  per cent. 
w 1 will com e back to this point in Chapter Six, Section VI
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continuing, collectively, to do environmental harm. One suggestion would be 
that we should focus on today's global poor, rather than future generations. There 
are various responses to this, none o f which deny the urgent need to tackle 
poverty, and the claims (undoubtedly o f humanity, arguably o f justice) that the 
global poor have on the wealthy elite.
The global poor (or at least a significant subset o f them) are already harmed 
by our emissions levels. While it is sometimes plausible that harming someone 
can be in their ATC interest (that is, if  the harm is a side-effect o f some activity 
which gives them a greater benefit), a strong empirical argument would be 
needed to show that the benefits even to this generation o f the global poor are 
higher than the costs. (Rather, it seems, we reap most o f the benefits and they 
bear the bulk o f the costs.) Even if  there were such an argument, refusing to 
tackle climate change would simply shore up greater problems for the poor in 
future generations. So long as climate change gets worse, poverty can be 
expected to do the same.
Moreover, we are not failing to tackle climate change in order to tackle 
global poverty. We fail to cut emissions levels because we choose to continue to 
drive cars to the shops, fly abroad for holidays, leave TVs on standby, turn the 
heating up rather than wear a sweater, and so on.
The third excuse, Consent, has to be evaluated with regard to both harmed 
groups: future generations and those in current generations already suffering the 
effects o f environmental damage. To begin with the former, it seems 
immediately obvious that they not only could not, in practice, but would not, in 
principle, consent to being left with a world damaged, to the extent o f severely 
limiting their health and their ability to flourish.
The point can be made with an analogy. Suppose my neighbour says to me: 
“ I want to have a huge party, with a giant bonfire, as a result o f  which your 
garden will be damaged by smoke, and rubbish will be piled up in it. This puts 
yours and your family's health at risk. You are not invited to the party, so you 
will get no enjoyment from it. Do you consent?" Unless I am altruistic to the
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point o f masochism, I will not. There is no reason to suppose that future 
generations are this altru istic/0
This also undermines the suggestion that future generations can be 
considered to have consented because members o f current generations, acting as 
their representatives, have done so. Kristin Shrader-Frechette points out:
Such second-party consent is at least prima facie plausible because, in a dem ocracy, we  
recognise that all citizens must make som e concessions to one another, to majority rule, to 
operate a constitutional governm ent. At least o n e ...  could be that our representatives can 
make decision s for us and therefore that the representatives o f  future generations could  
make decisions for them .51
However, in a democracy, those on whose behalf decisions are made play a 
role in appointing the representatives. This is not the case with current 
governments deciding for future generations. Moreover, it is not part o f the 
idea(l) o f democracy that those making the decisions make those best for them, 
or for a subset o f the overall set represented, at the expense o f other members. 
Rather, the decision is supposed to represent the interests o f the whole set -  to be 
the decision that they, with the proper information, would have made. This is 
clearly not the case here.
This leaves us with the second element o f the consent excuse: (alleged) 
consent by current generations. This excuse is familiar from cases where there is 
harm to a specific individual or group o f  individuals: the African worker, it is 
suggested, consents to take a job with enormous health risks; the Native 
American or poor African American community chooses to allow waste to be 
dumped on its land, in return for payment; poor countries consent to take waste 
from the West. Such cases have been extensively discussed by Shrader- 
Frechette.
There are three responses to this. The first is to note that such cases generally 
refer to specific acts o f environmental damage, usually where there is at least
■° I refer the reader unconvinced by my brief treatment here to Shrader-Frechette's detailed  
discussion o f  the topic in relation to harm to future generations through (a lleged ly) permanent 
geological disposal o f  nuclear waste. (2002 , 105-13) She also  d ism isses a consent excu se in the 
case o f  a waste incinerator im posed on an African Am erican com m unity. (77-84)
M Shrader-Frechette 2002 , 106 
~ Ibid., 71-93 and 124-9
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some notional payment to those (or alleged representatives o f those) accepting 
the harm. It is (even) less plausible to claim that those harmed have consented (or 
would consent) when it comes to the harm done to those (generally the global 
poor) feeling the impact o f pollution and climate change on the planet as a 
whole.
Returning, however, to the narrower cases, the second response is that the 
claim that there has been free informed consent often falls apart upon 
investigation. The third is that cases where individuals do consent to being 
exploited only serve to show that consent, whether or not it is necessary, is 
certainly not sufficient for moral permissibility.
Often, it is not those actually harmed who consent. For example, Shrader- 
Frechette points out that when the Mescalero Apache accepted a m onitored 
retrieval storage facility for spent nuclear fuel, it was in fact the tribal leaders 
who agreed and that ‘people who opposed the facility... became victims o f 
retaliation who were likely to lose their housing and their jobs on the 
reservation"/3 It is, as has already been stressed, one thing for consent to be 
given by representatives o f those concerned; quite another when those alleged 
representatives are not democratically elected, and are coercing those they are 
meant to represent. At the wider level o f third world governments, often there is 
no democratic election process, and/or corruption is rife, rendering it extremely 
implausible to claim that the individual citizens themselves have consented or 
even that the consent has been given by their representatives, with their interests 
at heart.
Even assuming the set o f individuals harmed do “consent”, this is rarely free 
informed consent. Consider the four requirements for such consent, which 
Shrader-Frechette takes from ‘current... consensus in medical ethics': risk 
imposers must disclose full information about the threat; potential victims must 
be competent to evaluate it; they must understand the danger; and they must 
voluntarily accept it. Full information is not always disclosed; nor are those 
affected sufficiently educated to evaluate the risk and understand the danger, if  it 
were.
5'' Ibid., 128 
■4 Ibid., 77
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Acceptance could sometimes be taken as "voluntary", in the sense that even 
someone whose only alternative to taking a dangerous job is starvation could be 
said to be negatively free in deciding whether or not to take that job. (They do 
not have a gun to their head, or someone literally forcing their hand to sign the 
contract.) However, cases (which no doubt there are) where those accepting 
exploitative, dangerous employment or hazardous living conditions are fully 
aware o f what they are doing and consent voluntarily merely serv e to bring out 
the third response.
There is something wrong with a situation in which a person accepts a severe 
threat to some fundamental interest (such as health) in order to protect some 
other such interest (for example, nutrition). In such an exploitative situation, an 
individual human being is having to accept something detrimental to nourishing. 
The fact that they do, in practice, accept it (they consent) does not protect the 
person who imposes that harm upon them from negative moral judgem ent/ 7'
1 have now addressed three o f the potential moral "excuses". The next section 
will consider the fourth. However, before leaving this section, I wish briefly to 
acknowledge one problem facing any argument which hinges on harm to (or 
consent by) future generations. That is, Parfit's non-identity problem (N IP )/6 
Applied to this case, the problem is as follows. Because a child conceived at one 
time will have a different identity from a child conceived at another time, future 
generations if we tackle climate change will not be composed o f the same 
individuals as if we don't. By maintaining our polluting lifestyles, we cause 
individuals in future generations to have a life. Given that, unless they have so 
low a quality o f life that it would be better for them not to have lived, how can 
we have been said to have harmed them? Moreover, presumably they would 
have consented to the action.
Parfit, although he does not provide it, believes that a solution can be found 
to the N IP/ I share his optimism, but it is beyond the scope o f this project to
Shue makes a sim ilar point, with his exam ple o fp lan tin g  landm ines along the Fingerlakes Trail 
that would explode in several generations' time: 'The point is that it does not matter whether  
som e Scouts could be found in 2098 w ho would agree to walk the Trail for a large enough  
package o f  com pensation. A society  that still acknow ledged a right to physical security w ould not 
permit such a transaction then, just as w e would not permit it n o w ...  [V o lu n tary  agreem ent is 
immaterial because such agreem ents are ruled out by our fundamental attitude to the human 
body.' (1999 . 41)
56 Parfit 1984, 358-9
57 Ibid., 445
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offer such a so lu tio n .In s te a d , I will appeal to its far-reaching, and intuitively 
repugnant, consequences. To take the NIP seriously would render morally 
permissible almost any policy which changes the circumstances o f only the as- 
yet-unbom, so long as it at the same time affected who those future generations 
were. Similarly, its implications in the consent case indicate, not that this 
philosophical loophole can be used to justify any environmentally destructive 
policy so long as its impact is only felt after all those alive today are dead, but 
rather that consent is not necessarily an appropriate consideration when it comes 
to actions which affect future persons.
Suppose a malicious scientist were to inject the water supply o f a country 
with a hormone which caused women to miscarry all foetuses save those who 
were blind. Because the children bom (blind) are not the same children who 
would have been bom (not blind) otherwise, it is difficult to say that an 
individual has been harmed. Moreover, assuming their lives to be worth living, it 
is at least plausible that the children actually bom would consent to this act.
Does this mean that he has done nothing wrong? Surely not. Not only is his 
action obviously morally wrong but its wrongness can, at least in significant part, 
be traced to the fact that he has caused a situation to come about in which 
individual human beings ( those individual human beings) are limited in their 
capacity to flourish. He has done something for which the world is a worse 
place, even if  the actual individuals in future generations have not been harmed 
in comparison with not living at all.
Alternatively, consider an individual bom in a concentration camp during the 
Holocaust who nonetheless went on to live a worthwhile life. Is what the Nazis 
did any less bad because this one individual was not harmed in the narrow sense 
o f being “better o ff than if H itler's policies had not been implemented, because 
otherwise he would not have been born at all"? All our instincts say otherwise. 
The wrongness o f H itler's actions consists in part in the conditions that this
38 W einberg, for exam ple, attempts a solution -  one, how ever, w hich is specific  to a Rawlsian  
contractualist m odel. (2002 , 406 -7 )
39 "In significant part" rather than "entireh" because a part o f  the w rongness derives directly 
from his im posing on the w om en the suffering and health difficu lties o f  miscarriages. There is 
also the indirect effect on the parents -  the psychological pain o f  seein g  their ch ild 's life so 
limited -  but there is a parallel here in the environm ental case: new  parents, at present, have to 
deal with the grow ing awareness that the world in which their children will be adults is likely to 
be one where capacity to flourish is curtailed by environm ental damage.
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individual, as a small child, had to endure. We object to the conditions imposed 
by the Nazis to this (as well as countless other) individuals.
Given this, I will skirt the NIP by specifying that when I refer to “harming 
future generations" I mean: limiting the life prospects o f individuals within those 
generations (whoever they turn out to be) by leaving them with circumstances 
within which their scope to flourish is limited in comparison with ours.
VI. Rights and duties
Having rejected three objections to a collective moral duty to address the 
problem of environmental destruction, there remains Excuse (4), above. This 
excuse would be used by an individual in the face o f duties imposed on her by a 
collective decision-making authority on environmental issues. Such duties, an 
individual might say, don 't apply to me because they conflict with my rights.
It is not necessary, here, to dwell in any detail on what such “rights" might be 
supposed to be. I will return to the question in a later section. The point to be 
made in response to the objection is simply that it is possible to have a right to do 
something which is nonetheless morally wrong.60 If I am your landlord and have 
given you the requisite notice, I am entitled to throw you out o f my property, 
even if is mid-winter and you and your children will end up freezing on the 
streets. In such a situation, I have a legal right to do something which is, at the 
very least, morally dubious.
Similar cases can arise even with moral rights. For example, if you make me 
a promise, I have a right to exact the performance o f it from you no matter how 
small a contribution that makes to my interests and how much damage it does to 
yours. Suppose the promise is to help me move house on a particular day. W ere a 
close relative o f yours to fall very ill on that day, I would have a right to insist 
that you help me, even if this deprives you o f a last visit to your relative, and so 
does you both significant harm.
Thus, it seems perfectly plausible that I might at the same time have a moral 
right to do something, and a moral duty not to. A moral right is merely a 
safeguard against others interfering with my performing a certain act; it is not a
60 For a discussion o f  this, see W aldron 1981 or Steiner's d iscussion o f  duty-free zones (1996).
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guarantee that, in performing it, I will not be behaving wrongly. Even if we did 
(although I believe that we do not) have rights which clashed with the individual 
duties corresponding to a collective endeavour to end environmental harm, it 
would nonetheless remain the case that we ought to fulfil those duties.
VII. Towards legitimate coercion I: collectivising the Harm Principle
Considerable ground has already been covered in this chapter. A two-pronged 
defence (prudential and moral) has been offered of a collective duty to set up 
those institutions necessary to decide on co-ordinated global action to tackle 
climate change, which decisions would then be handed down to individuals (and 
state level actors) as duties binding on them.
However, in practice , to have any real chance o f success, such an institution is 
likely to need the power to back up its decisions with coercive authority.61 A 
preliminary discussion o f how such coercion might be justified will be offered in 
the following sections, beginning with the morally salient potential collectivity 
constituted by those collectively responsible, in the weak sense, for 
environmental harm, then returning to the more difficult cases discussed in 
Sections I to IV.
The potential coercive enforcement o f individual duties correlative to our 
collective responsibility for environmental harm can be defended using an idea 
not only appealing and generally accepted, but also acknowledged implicitly by a 
core tenet o f liberalism. The generally accepted idea is that individual freedom 
can sometimes legitimately be limited (that individuals can legitimately be 
expected to submit to coercively enforced collective authority) to prevent their 
doing harm to others. The “core tenet” is the Harm Principle, which claims
that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or co llectively , in 
interfering with the liberty o f  action o f  any o f  their number, is self-protection . That the 
only purpose for which pow er can rightfully be exercised  over any m em ber o f  a 
civ ilised  com m unity, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. 6~
61 It is likely that this power, in the global institution, w ould amount to the ability to im pose  
certain sanctions on violating states, leaving the penalising o f  individuals to those states.
62 Mill 1859, 14
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This principle can be split into two parts:
(Implicit) The positive claim : that it is sometimes permissible to limit the 
liberty o f action o f an individual human being in order to prevent his harming 
others.
(Explicit) The negative claim : that this is the only circumstance in which such 
interference is permissible.
The focus here is on the positive side. As later sections will demonstrate, it is not 
my intention to defend the negative claim (which, in any case, is not generally 
adhered to in so-called liberal societies).
The Harm Principle is standardly couched in individual terms, but can be 
expanded to the collective level. Here, we can borrow from Andrew Kemohan, 
who defends an Accumulative Harm Principle:
The state may adopt po licies that otherw ise would violate neutrality only i f  individual 
activity either is, by itself, causing harm to others or is part o f  an accum ulative activity  
which brings about harm to others.6.
He defends this principle by responding to three worries, two o f which are 
relevant here.64 Firstly, that ' [t]he individual's own actions may be harmless and 
would not be liable to regulation if  others were not taking similarly individually 
harmless actions. It appears that the individual is being penalised for what other 
people do.' This, Kernohan argues, misapplies our intuitions. Individuals are 
penalised for their own actions, albeit in the context o f  others doing the same. ‘If 
they had been doing something else instead, no penalty would have been 
assigned/6'"'
The other concern is that individuals could become subject to ‘overly onerous 
duties'.66 However, Kemohan points out that similar worries could be raised 
even with respect to the Individual Harm Principle, without requiring us to reject 
it altogether.
6' Kernohan 1998, 76. Again, what is relevant here is im plicit rather than explicit in the principle: 
the idea that it is som etim es perm issible to violate neutrality when such harm is being done.
64 Kernohan's other worry focuses on the cases o f  pornography and cultural oppression, with  
which he is particularly concerned. It is that an individual w ill be subject to constraints 'on the 
basis o f  his vaguely defined part in a co llective  activity which brings about harm'. (1 998 . 83)
65 K em ohan 1 9 9 8 /8 3
66 Ibid., 83
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Suppose a man is wildlv flailing about with his fists ... [He is | liable to the im position o f  
a duty which will prevent him from harming bystanders. But what duty? Many duties 
would succeed in preventing harm: Thou shalt not hit others. Thou shalt not flail about 
with thy fists. Thou shalt im m ediately com m it suicide. Thou shalt present th y se lf to the 
nearest servant o f  the state for summary ex ecu tio n ... Only the first o f  these, how ever, is 
a contender, for though the [Individual Harm Principle] licenses the im position o f  
duties to prevent harm, it must be supplem ented with considerations o f  justice  and 
efficiency to determine what particular duties to im pose.6
Similarly with the Accumulative Harm Principle, the point 'is  to indicate when it 
is permissible to impose maximally equitable, minimally onerous harm- 
preventing obligations".68
Expanding the Harm Principle in this way could legitimate coercive 
enforcement o f collective decisions designed to prevent collective harm. 
However, unlike Kemohan, who is concerned specifically with the state, I am not 
restricting discussion to imposable duties within existing political institutions. 
Rather, I am defending a collective duty to motivate the setting up, if  necessary, 
o f an institution with coercive authority. The idea to be borrowed from the Harm 
Principle is a general one: that individual freedom can sometimes legitimately be 
curtailed, by some legitimate collective authority, when the individuals are part 
o f a set which is collectively harming, in the strong or weak sense.69
Hardly anyone would claim that coercion is always appropriate in such cases. 
Rather, the Harm Principle seems to shift the burden o f proof, so that it is those 
harming who have to provide a legitimate reason as to why they should not be 
coerced out o f it.
Thus, within the heart o f liberal thought lies a basis for the legitimate 
coercive enforcement o f environmental duties. However, there is an objection to 
this line o f reasoning. Recall the fourth excuse identified at the start o f Section V, 
Acting within one's rights. An individual might cite such rights in the face o f 
duties handed down to her by a global environmental decision-making body. The
67 Ibid., 85
68 Ibid., 85
f’9 I use the word “legitimate" v ery loosely  here, intending to include such co llective  institutions 
as we have a co llective duty to establish, but to make space for the need for those institutions to 
be established in certain acceptable w ays, involving political input from many different states, 
who in turn are genuinely representing their members.
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excuse could then take two forms. Firstly, as already addressed in Section VI, the 
individual could claim that even if there is an individual duty to act in 
compliance with the institution, this clashes with individual rights and so is 
overridden. Secondly, she could claim that any attempt by the institution 
coercively to enforce the individual duty would clash with her individual right 
not to be interfered with in certain ways.
As was pointed out in Section VI, an individual's rights set limits on how 
others may interfere with her. They do not necessarily render her invulnerable to 
moral claims. However, by exactly that token, the argument o f that section is no 
defence against the second version o f the excuse. If I have a right to do 
something (which is a right against others, to the extent that they are forbidden 
from interfering with me), then surely I cannot be coerced into not doing it even 
if it causes harm.
This has long been acknowledged by proponents o f the Harm Principle. As 
already stressed, M ill's principle does not render the causing o f harm to others a 
sufficient condition for legitimate interference. Rather, he argues: 'A s soon as 
any part o f a person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests o f others, society 
has jurisdiction over it, and the question o f  whether the general welfare will or 
will not he promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to discussion.' 0 
Corresponding to this "general welfare’' is a system o f social rights, 1 and it is 
only when harm to others falls outside the sphere o f what these give the harming 
individual a right to do, that the state can interfere with individual freedom.72
This thesis, however, does not offer a purely utilitarian argument. Thus, 
rather than remain within M ill's framework o f social rights grounded in overall 
welfare, the question here is more general: what rights might individuals in this 
generation have such that, while it is unfortunate that what they are doing results
0 Mill 1859, 83-4 [em phasis added]
1 That is, those established by the constitution o f  a political society  and designed to bring about 
the greatest good to the greatest number. Mill eschew s so-called natural or human rights: ‘1 forgo 
any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the idea o f  an abstract right, as a 
thing independent o f  utility.' (1 8 5 9 . 15; em phasis added)
~ For exam ple: 'W hoever succeeds in an overcrow ded profession, or in a com petitive  
exam ination; w hoever is preferred to another in any contest for an object which both desire, reaps 
benefit from the loss o f  others, from their wasted exertion and their disappointm ent. But it is, by 
com m on adm ission, better for the general interest o f  mankind, that persons should pursue their 
objects undeterred by this sort o f  consequence.' (M ill 1859. 105)
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in harm to others, they have a perfect right to do it, the others have no right that 
they not do it, and they cannot legitimately be coerced into not doing it?
An unrestricted right to negative freedom is clearly implausible. Not only 
would it undermine the whole idea o f the Harm Principle, but it would not be 
able to carry the argument. There are negative freedoms at stake on both sides o f 
the debate. The negative liberty o f the woman, in Cohen's example, who wants a 
Selfridges sweater but lacks the money to pay for it and so will be prevented 
from walking out o f the shop with it, is as violated as that o f the rich American 
who is prevented from putting leaded petrol into his car unless he pays tax on 
it.?J The liberty o f a resident o f a Mexico City shanty town is restricted if  he 
attempts to take his asthmatic child into a private health spa, but is forcibly 
stopped.
Nor will self-ownership, alone, do the necessary work. For this generation to 
have an all-trumping right to continue to pollute, what are required are not only 
strong self-ownership rights, but also some very stringent ownership rights over 
natural resources -  rights strong enough to justify not only the using up o f such 
resources by current generations, but also the devastating impact this use has on 
potentially unlimited resources such as water and air. It is unclear that there 
could be a plausible derivation o f such rights and, given the severity o f the harm 
in question, surely the onus is upon opponents o f this line o f argument to come 
up with such an account.
In its absence, and because full discussion o f this point would require a 
detailed analysis o f property rights, which is beyond the scope o f this project, I 
will simply acknowledge it as a key assumption that we do not have any property 
rights over natural resources which are strong enough to excuse collective 
environmental harm -  or absolve us from the individual responsibilities which 
come with it. This leaves us with one significant argument the less against the 
legitimacy o f coercive enforcement o f those duties.74
Cohen 1995, 58
4 Again, it is worth stressing that I do not claim  this rem oval o f  one significant counterargument 
as a com plete defence o f  the legitim ate coercive authority o f  such institutions.
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VIII. Towards legitimate coercion 2: the Principle o f Fairness revisited
Coercive enforcement o f our negatively-grounded duties (subject, o f course, to 
certain conditions about who does the coercing) is relatively uncontroversial, 
accommodated as it is within the central tenants o f liberalism. Not so coercive 
enforcement o f our prudentially-grounded incentives, or our positively-grounded 
moral responsibilities. Chapter Four indicated that enforcement o f  collective 
decision making could be as necessary as the collective decision making itself for 
the achievement o f the common interests, goals or purpose holding many 
collectivities together. But this in itself does not justify  collective coercion.
Hardin, discussing the population problem as a game theoretic case (the 
Tragedy o f the Commons) recommends ‘mutual coercion, mutually agreed  
upon ,7> Building on Section II, a similar solution might be proposed in the 
general environmental case: we all have a prudential, rational incentive to 
consent to a coercive institution to address climate change (including 
overpopulation). This is because we are in a situation analogous to Hobbes' state 
o f nature. We all know it is rational to act to address climate change as part o f a 
collective effort to do so, but we all also know that there is an individual 
incentive to cheat on an agreement to act collectively, unless that agreement can 
be coercively enforced. Thus the “necessary collective decision-making 
apparatus”, to which I referred in Section II, would in practice be one with 
coercive authority to enforce its decisions.
The Hardinian solution, then, is that we establish such an institution. Its 
coercive authority would be legitimised by precisely that universal informed 
consent (an uncontroversial contractualist line o f reasoning). Thus, we turn our 
prudential incentive into obligations which that institution can legitimately 
coercively enforce.
Leaving aside the question, familiar to Hobbes theorists, o f  how the step to 
acceptance o f a particular coercive institution is supposed to take place, even if 
all are motivated to consent to some form o f coercive authority, 6 there are 
significant difficulties with applying this model to the actual global
' Hardin 1968, 1247 [em phasis added] Sim ilarly, recall that Runcim an & Sen call for an 
'enforceable contract" (1965 , 556) betw een the parties in their analysis o f  the Prisoner's D ilem m a  
as giving a substantive content to the idea o f  the "general will".
6 I return to this in Chapter Six, Footnote 38
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environmental predicament: not least, the many who would not consent to any 
such scheme.
Firstly, some members o f  the collectivity would deny their ATC interest in a 
collective effort to address climate change and withhold their consent. These 
were the kind o f cases discussed in Chapter Four, Section III, under the 
Ignorance Argument, and recalled in Sections II and III o f this chapter with the 
example o f Young George. Secondly, as Sections I and IV made clear, there are 
some members o f current generations who genuinely area 7 part o f the 
collectivity with respect to the goal o f environmental preservation, as it is neither 
their goal nor in their ATC interest.
Turning to the small print, Hardin, no doubt well aware o f such cases, does 
not actually require unanimity. Rather, he proposes coercion 'm utually agreed
77upon by a majority o f the people affected ' .' This, however, is a much more 
controversial proposal, and lacks the justificatory force o f informed consent by 
all. Essentially, a coercively-enforced collective decision-making institution 
would be imposed on these individuals who did not consent. Can this ever be 
justified?
Consider the two problem cases again, starting with Young George. Again, 
we might appeal to the Modified Principle o f Fairness. Central capabilities are at 
stake, rendering the good a presumptively beneficial one as specified by 
Klosko's first condition. Moreover, his second condition (that the benefits o f co­
operation outweigh the burdens) is satisfied not only in his weak sense (for the 
community overall) but in the strong sense (for that individual).
However, we should be wary o f too quick a step from the defence o f a moral 
obligation to the claim that coercive enforcement o f that obligation is legitimate. 
According to Hart's original paper, legitimate enforceability o f the duty to co­
operate in a scheme from which one benefits goes hand in hand with the duty 
itself. Klosko similarly slides the two together. But Nozick has objected that the 
right o f enforceability would not automatically follow from the obligation to 
contribute, even if there were such an obligation (which he, as we have seen, 
denies).78
”7 Hardin 1968, 1247 
8 N ozick  1974, 91-2
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Certainly, it is not always obvious that an obligation should carry a right o f 
enforceability. Consider the special obligations that we acquire on a day to day 
basis. If I promise to post your letter for you, I have an obligation (to you) to do 
so. However, if  you happen to notice me about to pass the letter box without 
posting it, are you entitled to grab hold o f me and force me to put your letter in 
the box, or imprison me if I fail to do so? Is society entitled to do so? It seems 
not.
The question, then, is whether a special case can be made for the 
enforceability o f obligations incurred under the Principle o f Fairness -  or at least 
under the Modified Principle discussed in Section III.
The dilemma is as follows. Prudence and fairness both dictate that Young 
George should co-operate. However, he is motivated to refuse to co-operate, not 
simply because he wants to free ride on others' efforts but because he believes he 
would be better off without the overall scheme than co-operating within it. On 
what grounds can the rest o f the collectivity legitimately coerce him?
They might do so by appeal to his own fundamental interests. Environmental 
damage constitutes such a serious threat to his being able to live a full, 
flourishing life at a later stage that perhaps he can legitimately be coerced into 
contributing to a collective effort to tackle climate change.
There is an obvious objection to this line o f argument: it seems paternalistic. 
If all we can say to Young George to justify interfering in his choice o f lifestyle 
is that it will be better for him although he doesn't know it, we are on 
controversial ground. Certainly, we cannot appeal to the forefather o f  liberalism 
to help us, as we could in the previous section. M ill’s own example makes this 
clear.
If either a public officer or any one e lse  saw a person attem pting to cross a bridge w hich  
had been ascertained to be unsafe, and there were no tim e to warn him o f  his danger, they  
might se ize  him and turn him back, without any real infringem ent o f  his liberty; for liberty 
consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river. 
Nevertheless, when there is not a certainty, but only a danger o f  m ischief, no one but the 
person h im self can judge o f  the su ffic ien cy  o f  the m otive w hich may prompt him to incur 
the risk; in this case, therefore (unless he is a child, or delirious, or in som e state o f  
excitem ent or absorption incom patible with the full use o f  the reflecting faculty), he ought.
186
I conceive, to be only warned o f  the danger; not forcibly prevented from exposing h im se lf  
to it.
The message is clear: vve warn the man if we can, and let him choose his own 
level o f risk exposure: forcible intervention is only legitimate when it isn 't 
possible to warn him in time.
This thesis has already tackled the paternalism objection: Chapter Three 
defended the capabilities approach, as an attempt to get at what is involved in a 
fully flourishing human life, against the charge o f unacceptable paternalism. It 
did so on the twofold grounds that the thick conception o f the good inherent in 
something like Nussbaum's list was a vague one, and that capacity to develop 
and live by one's own conception o f the good and rational plan o f life was central 
to the approach, rendering it more likely to leave individuals able to make long- 
and short-term autonomous choices than a “thin" liberal account which focused 
exclusively on negative freedom.
Such considerations go some way towards softening the accusation o f 
paternalism here. We might question whether Young George is really making an 
autonomous decision, against a background of all the capabilities. Perhaps he has 
been bought up to be dependent on a certain kind o f lifestyle. Equally, one might 
argue that his choice does not constitute a rational decision at all: he is not so 
much weighing all the options and choosing between them, as flatly refusing to 
acknowledge the reality o f the implications. (As with the Head-in-the-Sand 
Farmers.80)
In either case, the arguments o f Section V, Chapter Three, constitute a strong 
case against the claim that it would be unacceptably paternalistic to maintain a 
political structure which prevents his acting on his decision.
However, if we could not criticise his decision on either o f the two grounds 
above, Young George could constitute a particularly tricky case for the 
capabilities approach. Suppose he has grown up with all the capabilities. As part 
o f this, he has had opportunities to enjoy the natural world and access to non-
79 Mill 1859, 107. Interestingly, vve could appeal to Mill for help in certain cases; he condones the 
overruling o f  an indiv idual's decisions to depriv e him self, with certainty o f  future liberty -  i.e. to 
sell h im se lf as a slave -  on the grounds that such a decision defeats the very purpose for w hich he 
is allow ed authority in all cases relating only to h im se lf (the preservation o f  liberty). (1859 , 1 13-
4). At least arguably, the sam e reasoning could be used to veto suicide. 
x0 Chapter Four, Section 111
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high-energy pursuits. Moreover, he does accept the serious risk to his own 
central capabilities posed by climate change. However, he decides that living a 
certain lifestyle in his youth is worth that sacrifice. This recalls the problem case 
addressed in Section VI o f Chapter Three: an individual who had hitherto had all 
the capabilities, and so satisfied the Razian conditions for autonomous choice, 
but decided permanently to give one o f them up.
(I would, however, reiterate the point made then as to the rareness o f such 
cases. It is far more likely that he simply refuses to acknowledge the reality o f his 
decision -  he ignores the facts, or, as Papineau suggests, he needs to reconcile his 
desires and factual information and it is easier for him on this occasion to adjust 
his factual beliefs.81)
In Chapter Three, I identified two versions of the capabilities approach, both 
plausible: the Permissive Version, according to which such a person would be 
said still to have a fully flourishing life; and the Non-Permissive Version, 
according to which it would remain in his ATC interest not to expose the central 
capability to serious risk. In this latter case, I appealed to the vague, open-ended 
nature o f the central capabilities (and their being capabilities rather than 
functionings) to save the account from unacceptable paternalism.
Now, however, it becomes apparent that this distinction has serious 
implications. On the Permissive Version, the capabilities approach would no 
longer give us grounds for saying it was in Young George's ATC interest to co­
operate. He would then count as a George-like case, not actually in the 
collectivity. On the Non-Permissive version, while it would not be unacceptably 
paternalistic to criticise his choice, given that he made it autonomously, it is 
harder to defend forcing  him to retain the capability, at cost to himself, purely on 
the grounds that it is in his interest to do so. There is a difference between 
judging an autonomous person's quality o f life according to a conception o f  the 
good which they do not share, and directly coercively imposing that conception 
on them, in the sense o f restricting their freedom in certain ways in order to 
ensure that they have opportunities which they do not want.
' 1 Papineau 1978, 168. See also Chapter Four, Section 111
At the very least, examination o f this case indicates that something more than 
Young G eorge's own (denied) ATC interest might be needed to justify coercing 
him into participating in the collective effort.
Now consider George. Given that we cannot demonstrate that it is in his ATC 
interest to co-operate, we need more than a paternalistic case for coercing him 
into doing so. Section IV suggested that he had a positive moral obligation to 
submit, grounded in the duty to prevent harm to the others. This also 
supplemented the case for Young G eorge's obligation.
My claim is as follows: once again, what makes the difference between this 
case and examples such as N ozick's public address system is the fundamental 
nature o f the interests at stake -  as interests o f the others involved. It is the harm 
that would be prevented by co-operating which lends plausibility to an 
enforceable Principle o f Fairness on the Modified and even the Weak Modified 
Version.
To make this point, N ozick's own argument can be turned on its head. 
According to Nozick, it is especially repellent to claim that others could enforce 
my supposed duty to contribute to something which benefits me, if those others 
benefit as well.82 This often has an intuitive appeal. For example, we might find 
it morally questionable that I force my friend to go to the gym, for the benefit o f 
her health. If the gym is mine and she incurs a heavy membership charge, we 
find it even more so.
However, our intuitions are reversed if the "‘benefit" to those others is not 
something they could easily do without, but prevention o f some grave harm. 
Consider the following variant on M ill's bridge case: Mill and I are both on a 
rope bridge when it collapses, leaving us hanging. We could, by careful 
concerted effort, climb up to safety. However, Mill, a risk-lover, prefers to run 
the (much higher) risk o f  dropping into the canyon below. If he doesn't move, I 
can't, so I will have to take the risk as well. It is at least arguable that I would be 
entitled to force him up against his will simply on the grounds o f saving his own 
life, but it is much more obviously (intuitively) legitimate for me to oblige him to 
co-operate if  otherwise it is extremely likely that we would both die. Even if  the
'On the face o f  it. enforcing the [Principle o f  Fairness] is objectionable. Y ou  may not decide to 
give me som ething, for exam ple a book, and then grab m oney from me to pay for it, even i f  1 
have nothing better to spend the m oney on. Y ou have, i f  anything, even less reason to demand 
payment i f  vour activ ity that g ives m e the book also benefits you." (N ozick  1974. 95)
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situation is changed so that the risk to him is less (we would fall into a river and 
he can swim fairly well, but 1 can 't) and the costs o f co-operating are higher, 1 
am inclined to think that I am entitled to force him to co-operate (depending, o f 
course, on just how high the costs o f co-operation are).
Similarly, given the cost to the rest o f us if the Young Georges o f the world do 
not contribute to a collective effort to tackle climate change, and given that it is 
in their own ATC interest that the effort take place, there is a moral case to be 
made, in line with the Modified Principle o f Fairness, for our coercing them into 
doing so. With George, the moral case must rest more heavily on the costs to us 
if he does not co-operate, but the fact that there is a benefit to him, in rendering 
his fundamental interests more secure, does at least add some weight to the 
argument.
This is very much an outline argument, and does not pretend to be as strong 
even as that o f the previous section, which is in itself only a first step towards the 
justification o f some specific coercive collective environmental institutions. 
Positive duties are controversial enough; rights o f enforceability even more so. 
However, the cases in which I have attempted to fill out the intuitive appeal o f an 
enforceable Principle o f Fairness draw attention to the fine line between harming 
and not helping. Our intuition, insofar as it does legitimise coercion in such 
cases, does so by bringing them close to those covered by the Harm Principle. 
Moreover, there is also some gain, in such cases, to the relevant individual. All I 
have done here is suggest, somewhat tentatively, how these points might come 
together to defend the coercive enforcement o f the Modified and even the Weak 
Modified Principle o f Fairness.
Conclusion
This chapter has defended the collectivityhood o f most o f humanity with respect 
to an interest in environmental preservation, and used this to give a prudential 
incentive for the promotion o f (and compliance with) a collective decision­
making body. This was supplemented with a moral incentive grounded in the 
Principle o f Fairness.
However, it has acknowledged that some members o f the global elite, above a 
certain age, may genuinely not be part o f this collectivity. A case was made,
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appealing to positive moral duties, for their duty to co-operate. More strongly, a 
negatively-grounded moral obligation to address climate change was offered: 
many o f us (including those who can exclude themselves from the actual 
collectivity), through our contribution to environmental damage, constitute a 
morally salient potential collectivity.
This claim was defended against various moral "excuses'', which might be 
used to claim that we are nonetheless acting morally permissibly. In the course o f 
this, a step was made towards defending the legitimacy o f coercive enforcement 
of decisions by a global environmental decision-making body, and one important 
counterargument was rejected. The question o f legitimate coercion o f the 
prudential or positively grounded duties was also considered, and an argument 
was outlined by which a modified Principle o f Fairness might be supplemented 
to justify coercion in certain cases, including the environmental one.
The next chapter will complete the application o f the model developed in the 
first half o f this project, to the environmental case. It will outline the institutional 
implications o f my account, and address some o f the most likely objections.
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Chapter Six 
Implications and Objections
Hitherto, I have defended a model o f a collectivity which is broader than the 
conventional, intentionalist account o f a social group. A set o f individuals 
constitute a collectivity if they are mutually dependent through some shared or 
common goal or ATC interest, in the sense that that goal or interest requires 
shared or common action for its achievement.
I have also defended the notion o f morally salient potential collectivities. 
These meet two conditions. Firstly, they are sets o f individuals who, were they to 
adopt a certain goal, would become a collectivity. (The goal is a common one in 
the sense above.) Secondly, they ought (morally) to adopt the goal. Filling out 
this ought, I have identified at least one way in which a potential collectivity can 
be morally required to adopt the goal: if its members are collectively responsible 
(including in a weak sense o f collective responsibility, through the predictable 
aggregation of individual acts) for unacceptable harm to others; and if the goal is 
the prevention or mitigation o f that harm.
Political philosophy, I have suggested, should be concerned not only with the 
wider set o f collectivities (rather than the narrower one o f social groups), but also 
with morally salient potential collectivities. For the purposes o f assignment o f 
duties, they should be treated as actual collectivities, because they have a 
collective moral responsibility to adopt the goal that would make them so. 
Moreover, I have argued that, for many collectivities, it is “better'' (better for 
achieving the shared goal or interest) that the collectivity itself be the unit o f 
agency for decisions relating to that goal or interest, than that it be left to the 
combination of individual decisions and actions.
The previous chapter defended the claim that the whole o f this generation o f 
humanity is included in one or other (usually both) o f an actual collectivity and a 
morally salient potential collectivity, by virtue o f environmental concerns. It then 
made a prudential case for the promotion o f and adherence to collective decision­
making institutions, and supplemented this with a moral argument (based in part 
on considerations o f fairness, backed up by positive moral duties, and in part on 
negative moral duties). An outline was offered o f an argument for the coercive 
enforcement o f environmental duties.
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This chapter brings together all these strands. Its basic suggestion, elaborated 
in Section I as the Decision-Making Claim, is that each collectivity in which 
humans find themselves should make precisely those decisions qua collectivity 
which both: are directly related to achieving or satisfying the common purposes, 
interests or goals o f the collectivity, and need to be made collectively to achieve 
better those goals, purposes or interests. I am advocating neither a global 
government which takes over all the current responsibilities o f the state, nor that 
those states (as collectivities) should dictate to citizens in all aspects o f their 
private lives. However, I do not claim to offer a conclusive argument for this 
limitation. My primary objective is to defend the conclusion that state 
sovereignty should be weakened, in that control over certain fields should be 
ceded to a global decision-making body.
Accordingly, Section II will borrow from Simon Caney, in the global justice 
debate, to show how the institutional framework defended here would weaken 
state supremacy. The rest o f the chapter will address various potential objections, 
to this framework and to the overall thesis. A full rebuttal o f some o f these lies 
beyond the scope o f the project, and I can only point the way for future 
discussion. I will respond to others in more detail. The objections are as follows.
Objections to the Decision-Making Claim:
• Communitarian objection (Section III)
• Cosmopolitan objection (Section III)
• Statist objections (Sections III to V):
Liberty-based argument (Section III)
Society o f states argument (Section III)
Same benefits argument (Section IV)
Moral burdens argument (Section V)
General objections:
• Moral burdens argument (Section V)
• Past polluters objection (to the collective harm defence o f environmental 
duties) (Section VI)
• Too inclusive objection (Section VII)
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I. The Decision-Making Claim
Each of us, as an individual human being, belongs to many different collectivities 
-  voluntary, involuntary, intentional, unintentional, small, large, and so on. Some 
o f these collectivities intersect; some are subsets o f others. We are members o f 
families, friendship groups, local communities, businesses, academic institutions, 
nations, states (often nation states), federal groupings o f states such as the EU, 
global economic networks and, crucially, the whole o f humanity.
The space left for freedom o f decision making at each sub level will be 
affected by decisions made at the level o f the bigger collectivities o f which they 
are a part. This raises the question o f what, exactly, should be decided at the 
global level, thereby limiting the potential courses o f action available to 
individual states. Further down the line, to what extent should states be able to 
dictate to their citizens? This chapter will apply the arguments o f previous 
chapters to these questions. As with Chapter Five's appeal to the Principle o f  
Fairness and the Harm Principle, I will draw on a key liberal thinker (in this case 
Dworkin) to support my case.
Chapter Four identified six scenarios in which it would be better in terms o f 
satisfying the goals, interests or purposes through which a collectivity is made 
up, to make certain decisions with the collectivity, rather than individual 
members, as the unit o f agency -  i.e. to make those decisions collectively and 
hand them down as restrictions on individual action. This prompts the following 
claim:
Dec is ion-Making C lai m
Each collectivity in which humans find (or put) themselves should make, 
qua collectivity, precisely those decisions which:
• are directly related to achieving or satisfying the common 
purposes, interests or goals o f the collectivity; and which
• need to be made collectively in order better to achieve those goals, 
purposes or interests.
These decisions should then be handed down as restrictions on individual 
(or subset collectivity) behaviour.
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Note, however, the following points. Firstly, the claim does not mandate 
collective decision making in cases where, although individuals depend on each 
other for achievement o f some end, that end will in fact come about 
automatically from the individual pursuit o f individual ends. Convergence Cases 
in game theory provide one exam ple.1 Alternatively, consider a number o f people 
with the shared goal o f preserving the local bat population, when in practice the 
best way to bring this about is for each household, separately, to encourage the 
nesting o f bats. However, the range o f arguments in Chapter Four suggests that 
such cases are likely to be relatively rare, especially as collectivities increase in 
size, while Chapter Five demonstrated that the environmental case does not fall 
into such a category.
Secondly, this claim is two-sided and only one side (what might be called the 
positive side) has been sufficiently defended in this thesis. I have argued that it is 
better in terms o f the goals, purposes or interests through which the individuals 
are bound together into the collectivity if at least these decisions be made qua 
collectivity, whether formally or informally. A full defence o f the other side o f 
the claim -  that only such decisions should be made at such a level -  is beyond 
the scope o f this project, although I will touch on some o f the theoretical ideas on 
which it draws.
The Decision-Making Claim is not a new idea, far from it. It is an expansion 
o f an idea defended by Dworkin, albeit one which goes well beyond what 
Dworkin himself would allow. This idea is that the areas on which a community 
should dictate to its members should be limited to those within the ‘communal
1 'The interests of the two p la \ers eonverge but they do not coincide. They do not coincide since  
each player harms the other by pursuing his own interest. Their interests converge, how ever, in 
that if  each picks his dominant strategy, they both do better than i f  both did not. The harm each  
can do is small enough that it m akes sense to a llow  it to occur. Altruism  here would be 
m isguided.' (Hamburger 1979. 8 2 -3 ) N ote, further, that in som e, generally sm all, a d  hoc  
collectivities, the required co-operative action takes place without any conscious co llective  
decision making. Recall Sh eehy's escap ing prisoners (Chapter T w o, Section 1), adapted so  that 
each believes h im self to be row ing alone. It is by chance that the prisoners are rowing in tim e and 
succeed in achieving the group goal, and they do so without being aware that theirs is a co llective  
endeavour. Alternatively co-operation might be so autom atic as barely to register at a conscious  
level. Recall H um e's rowers (1 777. 30 6 -7 ) or the cam pers taking dow n their tent in Chapter Four, 
Section X. Such cases would not require acknow ledged or formal co llective  decision  m aking  
unless the alm ost unthinking nature o f  the co-operation meant that an individual could easily  be 
distracted, undermining the co llective  effort. Consider R ousseau's exam ple o f  savages hunting a 
stag: each individual would be inclined to run o f f  at the sight o f  a hare. (1755 , 86 -7 ) The w ay to 
motivate him w ould be by appeal to his long-term  interest in being fed reliably, which is best met 
by submitting h im se lf to the co llective  unit o f  agency in hunting.
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life' o f that community, the success or failure o f which ‘is part o f  what 
determines whether its members' lives are good or b ad '2.
While I agree with Dworkin in rejecting the metaphysical claim ‘that
communities are fundamental entities in the universe and that individual human 
beings are only abstractions or illusions '.' this thesis has defended a broader idea 
o f what can count as the common, or collective, “ life" o f a community than 
Dworkin's own practice view. For Dworkin, for a community to have a 
communal life, not only must that com m unity's composition centre around some 
collective act or acts, but individuals' attitudes must reflect this: individual acts 
are ‘performed self-consciously, as contributing to the collective a c t'4 This thesis 
has rejected such a limitation, defending a broader, non-intentional
understanding o f the “common life" o f some group o f  individuals as integral to 
how well individuals' lives go.
The Decision-Making Claim can also be seen as a variant on the principle o f 
subsidiarity, familiar from early debate on the European Union. This ‘regulates 
authority within a political order, directing that powers or tasks should rest with 
the lower-level sub-units o f that order unless allocating them to a higher-level 
central unit would ensure higher comparative efficiency or effectiveness in 
achieving them '.5
According to this account, decisions relating to the protection o f the
environment should be made globally, through the establishment and
maintenance o f some global environmental decision-making body. (So, relatedly, 
should some decisions regarding international security, for example concerning 
the development o f nuclear power.)
Legitimate states would make the decisions related to the common interests or 
goals which render them collectivities, subject to the constraints laid down by 
that body. These would be so-called “political" decisions, by which I mean, with 
Dworkin, executive, judicial and legislative decisions relating to national 
distributive justice and the corresponding tax regime, to the criminal justice 
system, and to national security.6 With federal groups such as the EU, decisions
' Dworkin 2000 , 223
- Ibid., 225
4 Ibid., 227 [em phasis added]
5 Follesdal 1998. 190
6 Dworkin 2000, 228
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relating to the common interests or goals o f  members o f that collectivity would 
be made at the collective level, with the individual states' policy making 
constrained again by any such decisions.
Sub-state communities, such as religious groups, would make decisions 
relating to their common interests or goals but, again, within the boundaries set 
by the wider-level decisions. The state would not dictate a person's sex life, or 
whether she observed a certain religion, or whether she ate Frosties or Coco Pops 
for breakfast, although membership o f some community within the state might 
come with further restrictions on action. Being either a Muslim or a member o f 
The Vegetarian Society, for example, the individual might be restricted in her 
choice o f breakfast to the extent o f not eating bacon.
Sub-state collectivities, on the structure I envisage, are restricted in enforcing 
their collective decisions. Such collectivities can, collectively, impose sanctions 
(ultimately exclusion from the collectivity) but they cannot legitimately interfere 
with an individual's freedom, property, or person, or back up their penalties with 
such a threat. Importantly, individuals have the option o f leaving such sub-state 
collectivities. If Stella is a member o f the Vegetarian Society and she decides to 
start eating fish, she may only be able to do so on condition o f quitting the 
society, but it (the collectivity) cannot force her to stay and comply with the no­
fish requirements.
This gives the state (or arguably some federal organisations) the role o f 
protecting members o f sub-state collectivities against attempts, by those 
collectivities, coercively to enforce collective decisions, rather than allow 
members to opt out. But this role -  o f protecting, ultimately, the security o f the 
person -  already falls into the realm o f the common interests (security, peace, 
etc) which bind us as members o f the state. Moreover, precisely because it is in 
such involuntary collectivities as the state, where there is generally no opt-out 
clause, that coercive authority to back up collective decisions can be necessary, 
there is a strong incentive not to expand the state's sphere o f  influence any 
further than is absolutely necessary. That is, for fear o f imposing some precise, 
comprehensive conception o f the good on individuals in a collectivity from 
which they can not opt out, political philosophers would be wise to err on the side 
o f caution.
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Having thus expanded on the Decision-Making Claim, the next section will 
indicate the kind o f institutional change it is likely to require.
II. Weakening state supremacy
I draw in this section on Caney's proposal for global institutions to administer 
distributive justice. I do so both because o f the clear framework he provides for 
debate, and because the institutional structure envisaged on my account has 
considerable similarities to that he advocates.
Caney lays out four defining features o f state sovereignty: legality, or 
authority to coerce, supremacy, or absolute authority (the absence o f  final 
authority elsewhere), territoriality, or a territorially defined group o f people over 
whom its supreme authority is exercised, and comprehensiveness, or ultimate 
authority over all policy areas/
The model defended here, like his, denies states comprehensiveness (and, 
accordingly, denies them supremacy in the sense o f being the final authority for 
all the decisions within their remit). However, the powers assigned to global 
institutions differ: 1 would allocate them (or it) power over environmental 
decision making without, for the purposes o f this work at least, drawing any 
conclusions regarding distributive justice. Caney is concerned to establish 
international institutions to apply principles o f international distributive justice.
Moreover, Caney, defending the weakening o f comprehensiveness on 
cosmopolitan grounds, appeals to both rights-based and instrumental 
considerations.
Fake... the claim that people have a dem ocratic right to exercise control over the Factors 
that affect their rights. Som e o f  these factors are likely to be global in nature... w hereas 
other factors (say, people in their vicinity im pacting on their right not to be assaulted) are 
more local. G iven this, there is a case for different institutions operating at different leve ls  
and addressing different p o lie \ issu es ... W hereas, som e matters like cultural issues are 
best dealt with by local -  i.e. "sub-state" -  authorities, others w hich cover a w ider range o f
7 Caney 2007, 149-50
8 The exception would be redistribution as called for as a result o f  past environm ental harms 
(duties o f  reparation)
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issues (like protecting the environm ent or adm inistering cosm opolitan principles o f  fair 
trade) may be more effectively  dealt with by "supra-state” a u th o r itie s ../
He adds, o f supremacy, that 'since it is in practice impossible to keep policy 
areas utterly separate, a system in which no institution has comprehensiveness 
also lacks supremacy. There may be no one political institution that has final 
authority.'10
Quite apart from the fact that I would count as global such factors as 
environmental protection, rather than (necessarily) 'the global economy 
impacting on [individuals'] right to subsidence'.11 there are some important 
distinctions to be made here. Firstly, my argument is not "rights-based". Like 
Judith Lichtenberg, 1 suggest that appeal to rights is 'e m p ty '12 without the 
grounding o f those rights in precisely the sort o f considerations discussed above 
-  that is, o f fundamental interests according to some kind o f a model o f human 
flourishing.13 Given that, I prefer to refer directly to those interests. However, the 
capabilities approach does incorporate as a functional capability control over 
one's environment, including one's political environm ent.14
Secondly, I would quibble with the suggestion that there is no ultimate 
authority. Rather, ultimate authority lies in different institutions for different 
decisions. Global institutions would be the supreme authority on environmental 
decision-making, in that they would establish targets and so forth, and have the 
authority to enforce their decision through various sanctions on noncompliers. 
This leaves a sphere o f influence for individual states, regarding political 
decisions, which in turns leaves much to individuals and sub-state collectivities.
It remains an open question at this stage exactly how much detail will have to 
be gone into at the global level, and how much of the detail o f implementation 
can be left to sub-global collectivities. However, it would be a strong claim -  and 
one requiring more argument than offered in the quote above -  that, because the 
state is subject to the authority o f global institutions on environmental issues,
9 Ibid., 163
10 Ibid., 163
" Ibid., 163
12 Lichtenberg 1981, 82
1 In fact. Caney h im self also favours broadly "w ell-being based" justifications o f  civil and 
political human rights'. (2007 . 72)
14 Nussbaum  2000b, 80
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there are no issues on which it is the court o f last appeal. If supremacy is to be 
understood as a separate consideration from comprehensiveness (and originally 
this is how Caney lays out his model) it is surely at least prima facie possible that 
different political institutions can have supremacy in different policy areas.
III. Objections to the Decision-M aking Claim
Having completed the model upheld by this thesis, by drawing out its 
implications in terms o f the kind o f institutional framework we are understood to 
have a duty to bring about, I will end by acknowledging various objections. I will 
attempt to answer some here; others have already been answered, at least in part; 
others still I raise only to acknowledge that a full response is beyond the scope of 
the current project. However, I will at least suggest how a response might be 
framed. This section begins with objections to the Decision-Making Claim and 
the corresponding curtailment o f state authority.
The communitarian objection
It might be argued that, rather than be limited to the common interests or goals o f 
the collectivity in a relatively narrow, political, sense, the state should be able to 
impose some ethical “code” on individuals, for their own good, or for the good o f 
others in that state community. Thus homosexuality or abortion might be banned. 
Others would argue that, while state powers should be limited to the “common 
life” o f  the state, this common life is much broader than a restriction o f state 
authority to the realm o f the “political” would imply. This is what Dworkin dubs 
the illiberal argument from integration.1^
As already stressed, I do not claim to offer a comprehensive defence o f both 
sides o f the Decision-Making Claim. It is beyond the scope o f this project to 
respond in detail to the communitarian arguments. However, I would note that
15 Dworkin 2000 , 222-30. Dworkin criticises four "illiberal" argum ents for the expansion o f  state 
authority to cover sexual orientation: an argument (based on the harm principle) from dem ocratic  
theory; an argument (based on prom oting w ell-being) from paternalism; an argument from self- 
interest, which suggests that liberal tolerance renders political com m unities unable to meet 
mem bers' material or intellectual needs; and the argument from integration, his response to 
which w as touched on in Section II. S ee Dworkin 2000, 2 1 2 -230 . The article. "Liberal 
Com m unity", originally appeared in the C alifornia Law  R eview  11  (1989) and was a response to 
the now infam ous decision in B ow ers  v. H ardw ick  (1986), in w hich the US Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality o f  a G eorgia sodom y law.
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the limitation o f authority at each level follows naturally from the model built up 
in previous chapters: one on which individuals are the units o f moral concern. 
Collective authority has been advocated only in situations where: this is the best 
way to achieve the goals (selfish or otherwise) through which all members o f the 
collectivity are mutually dependent, it is necessary for the protection o f some 
fundamental interest (central capability) o f all those individuals, or there is 
collective responsibility for serious and morally unacceptable harm to others.
The onus would thus be on the communitarian either to appeal to one o f these 
arguments to justify (say) a ban on hom osexuality,16 or to defend more extensive 
powers o f collective decision making, without threatening the centrality o f the 
individual, flourishing life (which flourishing, recall, involves a core element o f 
autonomy, or planning one's own life against a background o f reasonable 
options).
The cosmopolitan criticism
Just as communitarians and (we shall see below) statists would attack me for 
curtailing state sovereignty, those in the cosmopolitan camp in the global justice 
debate might attack me for not limiting it enough. Not only, they would say, 
should environmental (and international security) decisions be made globally, but 
so should other decisions, notably those relating to distributive justice. Some 
might even go further, to defend a global state to replace the current system of 
nation states.
I have deliberately left open the question o f whether duties o f distributive 
justice extend beyond the nation state. It is possible that global duties o f justice 
could be defended in the same way as globally assigned environmental duties.17 
One point in favour o f such an extension is that, as briefly discussed in Chapter 
Five, Section VII, there is little reason to believe that western states, corporations 
or individuals, or elites in other countries, have anything like the strong and
16 This seem s unlikely. Firstly, it is certainly no part o f  the capabilities approach that it is in an 
individual's fundamental interest not to be hom osexual. Q uite the reverse: freedom  o f  ch o ice  in 
such matters is central. Secondly, preventing hom osexual activity is not a genuinely  shared goal: 
it is not a goal to which all adhere. Thirdly, even  i f  (w hich I w ould query) liv ing in a state in 
which there are also hom osexuals were to constitute harm to som e religious types, there is no 
question that the harm done to the hom osexuals by repressing them  w ould outw eigh this (recall 
the moral excuses o f  Chapter Five, Section V ) and undermine any attempt to ground interference 
in co llective harm arguments.
1 1 will com e back to this in Section VII.
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extensive property rights in natural resources which they currently claim. 
However, that need not mean that global duties o f distributive justice would be as 
extensive as those within each state (although they could plausibly -  and would 
on a parallel account to that advocated above -  take priority over such duties). 
More generally, a very strong case would have to be made before all, or even 
many, o f the powers currently exercised by state governments would have to be 
ceded to a global equivalent.
Statist objections
Like Caney, I am advocating a system in which states lack both supremacy and 
comprehensiveness.18 This raises objections from the statist camp. This, for the 
purposes o f this project, can be taken as designating those who condemn any 
weakening o f state sovereignty. These are the same type o f  arguments made 
against a cosmopolitan model which includes international institutions for the 
application o f international distributive justice. Following lines taken by Caney
1 9and Darrel Moellendorf, there seem to be four key objections:
• Same benefits argument: there is no need to make decisions at the wider 
collective level, as the optimal result will be achieved by the actions and 
co-operation o f states.
• Moral burdens argument: this model, in obliging individuals to consider 
interests geographically or temporally distant, places too heavy a burden 
on individuals.
• Liberty-based argument: global political institutions, in centralising 
power, are detrimental to individual freedom.
• Society o f  states argument: for individual human beings to flourish, it is 
necessary that they be members o f a state within a “society o f states’'.
The first two arguments will be debated in the next two sections. W ith regard to 
the last two, the liberty-based argument, as Caney points out, is 
undiscriminating: it seems to allow for no possible global political institutions 
but a world state, against which it would have most force. Moreover, as he also
18 Caney 2007, 163
l') Ibid., 148-82. M oellendorf 2002 , 30-67
2 0 2
notes, the current system frequently oppresses individuals to the detriment of 
their freedom.
To this we might add that, according to the view defended in Chapter Three, 
what is valuable is not negative freedom per se but its contribution to individual 
flourishing, in particular insofar as it is a component o f an autonomous life. The 
collective decision making advocated on my model restricts individual freedom 
o f action only when that action, understood as contributing to a collective act, 
would contribute to the undermining o f individual flourishing, either for the 
whole collectivity, including that individual, or for some other person(s) to such 
a level as to constitute morally unacceptable harm.
With regard to the latter, note that libertarians themselves have been
remarkably inadequate on the question o f restricting harm, and have had even 
less to say regarding the serious harms which result from the aggregation o f 
individual acts. Nozick does accord a couple o f pages to the question of 
pollution, including that o f when ‘individuals have widespread and individually
miniscule effects' .“ He regards the problem as redressable within the legal
system, by means o f group law suits. However, this assumes an institutional 
framework within which such suits can be made. It is precisely the lack o f such a 
framework (say, according to which Bangladeshi farmers can sue US polluters) 
which is the problem in the global environmental case.
The Hegel-inspired “society o f states” argument involves, as Caney notes, two 
claims: that the state is valuable because it is necessary to combat atomism and 
provide recognition and political unity (otherwise, people feel alienated), and that 
this instrumental value o f the state is upheld only if  that state is respected by 
other states, i.e. if  it is a member in a society o f independent, sovereign states.21
Borrowing Caney's argument, we can reject this line o f reasoning. Whilst it is 
plausible that humans require membership in a political regime to live
flourishing lives (on Nussbaum 's approach, control over one's political 
environment is a component o f a central functioning"”), that does not imply that 
those political regimes must be sovereign states with unlimited authority over all 
issues (that is, with comprehensiveness and supremacy). Rather, Caney argues:
■° N ozick  1974, 80 [his em phasis]
-l Caney 2007, 170-1, citing M ervyn Frost, Ethics in In ternational R elations  (Cambridge  
University Press, 1996)
Nussbaum 2000b, 80
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Surely what is needed is m em bership o f  political units with considerable autonom y which  
are recognised by other units to have worth and autonom y. And such institutions are quite 
com patible with the cosm opolitan framework defended early (i.e. one in which supra-state 
political institutions regulate and monitor the conduct o f  political com m unities)."'
The other two statist arguments require more detailed consideration, and will 
form the subject o f the next two sections.
IV. Same benefits argument: is state co-operation enough?
The same benefits argument denies the need for any global decision-making 
institution, and accordingly for the weakening o f state supremacy outlined in 
Section II. The optimal result, it claims, will be achieved by the actions and co­
operation o f states.
This could be read two ways: either as the claim that states, acting 
independently, will behave in ways which, in combination, solve the problem of 
climate change, or as the more sophisticated objection that, by co-operating 
voluntarily with one another, states could retain all the current aspects o f  state 
sovereignty and still tackle climate change. This latter, again, could be read in 
two ways: as claiming that the combination o f various agreements between 
different states (bilateral, trilateral or multilateral) would be sufficient to tackle 
climate change, or as asserting that a voluntarily upheld agreement, between all 
states, to co-operate in the aim o f tackling climate change, would be adequate. In 
this last case, the challenge is not so much to the idea that we need to decide 
what to do at a global level (and so that individuals, albeit via states, should be 
promoting such collective action), as to the idea that such collective action must 
be implemented by a decision-making institution with coercive authority.
As an objection, this final version is the most plausible. Accordingly, I will 
focus on undermining it. However, in doing so, I will also respond to the weaker 
versions.
A preliminary point against the same benefits argument is that agreements 
between states will not be enough unless they have force over international
Caney 2007. 171
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corporations, who are significant players in the industries most impacting climate 
change.24 That aside, however, there are two main reasons why such agreements 
might be insufficient. These are analogous to the arguments offered, with regard 
to individual motivation, in the last chapter.
Recall George: the middle-aged, rich, childless American. There is no 
prudential motivation for him to contribute to an effort to tackle climate change, 
although the collective responsibility for environmental harm of the global elite, 
including him, gives him a moral duty to do so. Moreover, as that duty is 
grounded negatively (in weak collective responsibility for harm) I suggested that 
it might be legitimately coercively imposed.
Is there a state counterpart to George? Given the increasing proportion o f 
members o f all states who are young enough to have an all things considered 
(ATC) interest in tackling climate change, as well as the emotional stake most 
members have in future generations o f citizens, I do not think there is any state 
that can plausibly make the case that it does not have a prudential incentive to 
co-operate with efforts to tackle climate change."
Note that this is not the same as claiming that the state itself has an ATC 
interest in tackling climate change: as discussed in Chapter Four, the state is 
assumed not to have interests over and above those o f individual members. 
Rather, given the way the state is structured, and the interest most individual 
members have in environmental preservation, it should (although, as I will 
discuss below, does not necessarily) follow that the state would espouse the goal 
of limiting climate change, if only in the strictly limited sense o f acknowledging 
that it would prefer there to be less environmental damage. (This preference can 
be understood in much the same way that each individual in the Prisoner's 
Dilemma would prefer to spend less time in prison.)26
24 Caney draws attention to the various entities which could potentially be held responsib le for
pollution: individuals, corporations, states and international regim es or institutions. (2005 , 7 52-6 ) 
' 5 This point could be made more straightforwardly by extending the account o f  Chapter Tw o to 
include future generations as m em bers o f  the collectivity. H ow ever, that is beyond the scope  o f  
this argument.
~6 This is a com plicated point, as the state includes som e who are not in the actual co llectiv ity  
with respect to environmental protection. Thus, the claim  is not that this is a com m on goal or 
interest o f  the state in the sense that it is one o f  the interests through which individuals are 
members o f  the state. Rather, the point is that, if, in p ra c tic e , states are required to take a v iew  on 
this, it would make sense for them to espouse the goal o f  cutting clim ate change.
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Why, then, cannot we rely on co-operation by states to tackle climate change? 
We need to return to the arguments o f Chapter Four and their application, in 
Chapter Five, to the environmental case. All the arguments (Inefficiency 
Argument, Ignorance Argument, Game Theoretic Arguments, Partial Conflict 
Arguments, and Rational Altruist Arguments) were seen to be relevant when it
O'?
comes to the position o f individuals with respect to tackling climate change."' 1 
suggest that they also apply when we assume the parties to be states rather than 
individuals. Given the objection under consideration, I will focus in particular on 
those which bring out the need for not only collective but also enforceable 
decision making.
The Ignorance Argument appeals to the possibility o f  individual denial, either 
o f an ATC interest or o f mutual dependence with certain others for satisfaction o f 
that interest. In practice, there are two common versions o f the ignorance case 
with respect to the environment. Firstly, those who deny the fact o f climate 
change, deny that it is the result o f human behaviour, or produce an inadequately 
supported assertion that some technological solution will be forthcoming (at the 
most extreme, that we will simply find another planet to move to). This, as I have 
already suggested, may be the result o f  adjustment o f factual beliefs to avoid a 
clash in the set o f beliefs and desires."l Secondly, those who do know the facts 
but, given that the clash between beliefs and desires is not brought home to them 
on a regular basis, succeed in ignoring them rather than facing up to the need for 
lifestyle adjustments.
Can this argument be evaded by considering states rather than individuals? It 
might seem that state governments, with access to the most up-to-date scientific 
information and knowledge that they are responsible for (and answerable to) the 
younger as well as the older generations o f citizens, could not be this ignorant. 
However, states are made up o f individual citizens, some o f whom may either 
deny the facts or ignore them, voting accordingly. Many governments are also 
influenced by dominant interest groups, including international corporations with 
heavy carbon footprints. This renders it all too plausible that whatever view they 
ought, prudentially, to espouse, states could in practice act like Chapter Four's 
Head-in-the-Sand farmers.
~ I made this point in Chapter Five, Section 11.
Papineau 1978, 168. See also Chapter Four, Section 111.
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Moreover, even if most states do acknowledge the situation, there remains a 
Game Theoretic motivation problem which explains not only the need for a 
collective decision-making body, but also powers o f enforceability. Recall the 
Prisoner's Dilemma. The combined result o f each individual doing what she is 
rationally motivated to do, qua individual agent, is that things are worse o ff for 
all individuals than if they had co-operated. However, a unenforceable agreement 
to co-operate doesn't work because, unless the payoffs have actually been 
changed, each individual has an incentive to cheat.
States are in this situation with respect to cutting carbon emissions to tackle 
climate change. As regards the larger states at least, this is a multi-player 
Prisoner's Dilemma (albeit one in which, unlike with the Common Land Case, 
there isn 't the additional complication o f an incentive to free ride-9).
Multi-player Prisoner's Dilemma
Other states Other states
Cut emissions D on't cut emissions
State A Cut emissions S,S W,B
State A Don't cut emissions B,W T,T
Thus, it seems, an unenforceable agreement between states, to co-operate, would 
not be enough.
However, there is a counterargument to this line o f reasoning, brought out by 
the analogy with the Hobbesian state o f nature.30 M odem Hobbes theorists have 
made sense o f an apparent clash between two “reason-based" lines o f action in 
the state o f nature (fight or seek peace), by modelling the situation as a Prisoner's 
Dilemma, with its clash between individual and collective rationality. However,
Chapter Four, Section IV. Each in d iv idu a l has a rational incentive to free ride on the 
environmental efforts o f  others, but this is not the case with all states. As with individuals (but 
more obviously), there are som e things all states must not do i f  the planet is to be preserved. 
Recall the distinction brought out in the last chapter betw een co-operating by om ission and in a 
more positive sense, in this case by cutting dow n carbon em issions. With regard to the latter, it is 
possible that a smaller states could free ride on the environm ental p o lic ies o f  big states and other 
small ones. H owever, in com bination, even sm aller states failing to co-operate would undermine 
the project. M oreover, bigger states are necessary for the su ccess o f  the project, and so the free 
riding incentive does not apply to them.
30 Chapter Five, Section IV. N ote that H obbes h im se lf describes the international situation as a 
state o f  nature, although he, living in a generation where the impact o f  hum ans on the 
environment was relatively lim ited, does not see  this as threatening our fundamental interests. 
(1 6 5 1 ,9 0 )
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as Jean Hampton points out, the incentive structure is changed in a repeated 
game.31
[I]n this case the parties to the bargain in the natural state know that they w ill have 
occasion to contract with each other in the future, and although they know that the action  
o f  breach is rational in the short run (i.e., in the first gam e), they know that in the long run 
the breach will deprive them o f  benefits from future bargains by creating distrust betw een  
them and putting the action o f  breach in equilibrium  H ence, the argument is that because  
contractual activity between people  in the state o f  nature is likely to be frequent and open- 
ended, the keeping o f  a contract is alw ays rational, because in addition to supplying each  
with the benefits o f  a particular bargain, it acts as a signal to each party that the other party 
will keep contracts in the future and thus enables both to read the long-term  profits o f  
constant contractual a c tiv ity .'
In other words, the payoffs change in a repeated game. Given that the 
environmental “game" is not a one-off Prisoner's Dilemma, but an ongoing issue 
where there are likely to be repeat attempts at agreements, the corresponding 
argument would be that it would be rational for each individual state to sign up 
to, and stick to, emissions quotas.
That this has not been the case in practice hardly needs pointing out.33 
Moreover, drawing further on Hampton, it is possible to understand why.34 She 
argues that conflict arises in the Hobbesian state o f nature, despite the rationality 
o f making and sticking to contracts, because o f the parties' short-sighted pursuit 
o f self-preservation.
Many people fail to appreciate the long-term  benefits o f  cooperation and opt instead for 
the short-term benefits o f  noncooperation, and the rest are legitim ately fearful enough o f  
this short-sightedness afflicting their partners to doubt that cooperation w ould have any 
educative effects. This worry could then force even a farsighted person to take a s in g le­
play orientation, with the result that the uncooperative action would dominate.'"
1 Hampton 1986, 74-9
: Ibid., 75
See Gardiner 2004, 589-95 for a d iscussion  o f  the failure o f  the Kyoto Protocol.
4 Hampton 1986, 80-88
' Ibid. ,  81
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There are, Hampton suggests, two reasons for short-sightedness. Firstly, some 
‘less intellectually talented inhabitants'36 will fail to understand the iterated 
Prisoner's Dilemma situation. Either they do not grasp that they are in a multi­
play situation, or they fail to appreciate the advantages o f long-term co­
operation. This is precisely the point raised above, in the Ignorance Argument. 
Certain states, with some voters in the situation o f George, some others thinking 
like Young George, and big business holding huge political influence, might be 
constrained not to acknowledge the need for long-term co-operation. M odem 
democratic politics, by its nature, is a short-term business: governments have an 
interest in prioritising policies which have their payback before the next election, 
and future generations don 't have a vote.
Hampton's second explanation o f short-sightedness in the Hobbesian state o f 
nature is that 'the prospect o f future contractual interactions w ith ... present 
partners is too remote to warrant [co-operating in the present gam e]'. This, 
however, is rendered plausible in the state o f nature only because individuals are
37supposed to be 'independent o f all society'. It is less so with individuals in the 
actual world, and considerably less so again when it comes to states, who are 
limited in number, and have existing channels o f communication.
However, the first point remains convincing. Moreover, it is not necessary for 
the argument to work that all states would actually be short-sighted, only that it is 
sufficiently likely enough that some would be short-sighted (as they have proved 
to be in practice) for fear o f being cheated on to motivate the others not to 
comply with any non-enforceable agreement.
Thus, any interstate agreement to tackle climate change (say, by setting 
emissions levels for each state) would require enforceability by the other states -  
effectively, by the overall collectivity. This would, in all but name, be the kind o f
38global institution defended here.
36 Ibid., 82
37 Ibid., 82
~'8 This raises the related question o f  how, if  w e are in a situation analogous to the H obbesian state 
o f  nature, agreement could ever be reached (and stuck to) to establish such a global institution. 
Again, it is helpful to borrow from Hampton. She suggests that the process o f  accepting a 
sovereign can be a Co-ordination Problem rather than a Prisoner’s D ilem m a, because once there 
is a potential sovereign on the table, each player w ould be w orse o f f  refusing to co-operate i f  
others did, as the balance o f  pow er would be against them. (H am pton 1986, 138-50) Sim ilarly, i f  
the majority o f  states (those that have shown them selves to be farsighted) were to establish an 
environmental collective decision-m aking body, g ive  other states the chance to com ply (and be
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However, even if the same result could be achieved by various bi- and 
multilateral agreements, there is another reason for requiring a formal, global 
institution with the power to oversee the allocation o f targets. This borrows from 
argument given by Rawls, in the domestic case, against the libertarian, and draws 
attention to a weakness in Rawls' own international account.
On the libertarian account, the only just outcome is that resulting from just 
(free) transfers from an initially just acquisition. There is no need for more than a 
minimal state (one limited to 'the narrow functions o f protection against force, 
theft, fraud, enforcement o f contracts, and so o n '40). Rawls, in defending his 
principles o f justice for the basic structure o f society, appeals to the possibility o f 
an overall unjust outcome, resulting from a combination o f individually just 
transactions.
lS]uppose we begin with the initially attractive idea that social circum stances and p eop le 's  
relationships to one another should develop over tim e in accordance with free agreem ents 
fairly arrived at and fully honoured. Straightaway we need an account o f  when agreem ents 
are free and the social circum stances under which they are reaching are fair. In addition, 
w hile these conditions may be fair at an earlier time, the accum ulated results o f  m any  
separate and ostensibly fair agreem ents, together with social trends and historical 
contingencies, are likely in the course o f  time to alter citizens' relationships and 
opportunities so that the conditions for free and fair agreem ents no longer hold.41
The idea is that the basic structure establishes a framework within which 
individuals can interact voluntarily, without thereby undermining the justice o f 
the overall process.
Exactly the same point can be made at the global level, although Rawls does 
not acknowledge this. “ Given that the world is, environmentally speaking, as
represented on the body), but threaten sanctions if  they do not, this could be a way to change the 
payoffs so that all states com plied.
49 Rawls 1993, 262-9
40 Ibid., 262
41 Ibid., 265-6
42 At the international level, Rawls leaves everything to transactions betw een supposedly free and 
equal liberal (or at least decent) peoples. His failure to consider the possib ility  o f  the kind o f  
structure advocated in Section II can be attributed, I suggest, to tw o w ays in which he appears to 
underestimate the com plexity o f  the debate. Firstly, he offers a vehem ent rebuttal o f  the idea o f  a 
world state (1999, 36) but, like the proponent o f  the liberty-based argument, above, appears to 
neglect the possibility o f  som e institutional set-up which is neither a world state nor a "society o f  
peoples". (1999. 3) Secondly, in dism issing the suggestion  that natural resources should be 
redistributed between countries on the grounds that the crucial elem ent in how a country fares is
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closed as Rawls' paradigm society, the outcome o f  “free and equal" treaties and 
transactions between states may undermine the capacity o f other states (for 
example, low lying, vulnerable countries such as Bangladesh) to endure as a 
liberal or decent state. Exactly as Rawls notes o f the domestic case, so we can 
say o f the international one:
[T]he conditions necessary for background justice can be underm ined, even though  
nobody acts unfairly or is aware o f  how the overall result o f  many separate exchanges  
affects the opportunities o f  others. There are no feasible rules that it is practicable to 
require econom ic agents to fo llow  in their day-to-day transactions that can prevent these  
undesirable consequences. These consequences are often so far in the future, or so  
indirect, that the attempt to forestall them by restrictive rules that apply to individuals 
would be an excessive  if  not an im possib le burden.4'
The argument here is limited to the need for global environmental decision­
making institutions, although it is plausible that the Rawlsian argument could be 
used against him with respect to distributive justice as well.
V. Moral burdens argument
This section will consider the second statist objection to the model in Sections I 
and II: the moral burdens argument. This claims that the model, in obliging 
individuals to consider the interests o f those geographically or temporally distant, 
places too heavy a burden on them. As I will argue, as a statist objection, it can 
be rejected. However, it raises questions which impact not just on the claims o f 
this chapter, but on the theoretical framework on which they were based. I will 
also address such points, although a full discussion will have to be reserved for 
later projects.
The appeal to burdensomeness can be read in three ways: as requiring too 
much o f the individual in terms o f knowledge o f the far-reaching impact o f her 
actions, as requiring an individual to make unreasonable sacrifices o f her own
its political culture, not the level o f  resources, Rawls appears com pletely to ignore the num erous 
negative externalities attached to the use  o f  those natural resources.
Rawls 1999, 266
goals and interests, or as requiring an individual to prioritise distantly-grounded 
duties over the local moral claims of, for example, family or community.
The first of these is quickly addressed: establishing an institutional structure, 
within which common interests are met and collective harms mitigated, should 
actually make life easier for individuals. The framework established by 
collective decision making at each appropriate level would leave individuals free 
to carry out their own lives within the sphere o f the restrictions handed down to 
them, knowing that so long as they complied with those restrictions they would 
not have to worry about their collectively acquired responsibilities. This is 
analogous to the Rawlsian basic structure, as discussed in the last section, which 
is intended to leave individuals free to exercise their freedom and partiality, 
within a set o f constraints which ensure that justice is satisfied.
The rest o f this section will focus on the second two readings o f the objection. 
These could be put against both main lines of argument in this thesis. That is, to 
the defence o f collective and correlative individual duties by appeal via the non- 
intentionalist account o f collectivities, to prudential considerations backed by 
considerations o f fairness, their defence on the basis o f negative moral 
responsibility for harm.
Let us begin with the former. The problem is that an individual's 
environmental responsibilities, acquired through membership o f the global 
collectivity, could clash with pursuit o f her own individual goals or interests, or 
with duties she acquires through membership in other collectivities. For example, 
Young George's own goals involve living a high carbon lifestyle, which clashes 
with environmental duties. Alternatively, someone o f my generation might also 
be an executive in an oil company, rendering her part o f the global collectivity 
with respect to environmental protection, but also part o f a smaller collectivity 
with rather different shared goals.
In general, the possibility o f clashing duties as a result o f  membership o f 
different collectivities, or a clash between individual goals and duties acquired 
through membership o f a collectivity, need not pose insuperable problems. As 
Chapter Four, Section X pointed out, consideration o f other interests or goals 
may mean that the individual, all things considered, would rather not be a 
member o f some collectivity. She is not then generally bound to act as though 
she were. Recall Jane, the potential car sharer. Alternatively, consider an
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individual who is a member o f both the local mountain biking club and a local 
wildlife preservation society. Suppose the preservation o f a rare bird required the 
closing o f a particular trail to mountain bikes. The goals would clash. However, 
it would be up to the individual which she prioritised: she would not be bound to 
remain in the mountain biking society, with its goal o f fighting to keep the trail 
open, if she regarded the preservation o f the birds as more important.
Such opt-out clauses have been ruled out only in the case o f certain 
collectivities: those where individuals are mutually dependent for the satisfaction 
o f their ATC interests. This chapter has assigned priority to decisions made in 
those collectivities and, within the set o f such collectivities, to those decisions 
made at the wider collective level: that is, those where the co-operation o f  most 
people is required. The two most obvious cases are global environmental 
decisions, and those relating to political questions at state level.
This can be defended against the burdensomeness complaint as follows. 
Firstly, if individuals are, as a matter o f fact, in a situation such that satisfaction 
o f their fundamental interests depends on co-operation at the global level, it is 
not very helpful to argue that having to take account o f this, and prioritise 
decisions made there, renders their lives more difficult. General failure to do so 
will make their lives worse. This is so even if  fundamental interests are also at 
stake in the smaller collectivity, as with the state, or if  our oil company 
executive's job depended on the industry's continuing to expand. If the problem 
of climate change is not addressed -  and I have argued that it can only 
successfully be tacked at global level -  then, no matter what is done at the level 
o f smaller collectivities, each individual's fundamental interests will be at risk. It 
therefore makes sense for state (and ultimately individual) decisions to be made 
within the boundaries drawn at the global level.
Lest this seem paternalistic in terms o f practical application (given that not all 
individuals do accept the prudential reasoning), it can be supplemented with a 
second point. There is a distinction between this environmental case and that in 
which an individual risks only his own central capabilities in pursuit o f  some 
other goal. While it could be said to be paternalistic to interfere, purely on the 
ground o f his own long-term interests, with someone who risks a central
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capability to pursue some ideological goal or to keep a job,44 in this instance the 
fundamental interests o f all the others in the collectivity (near and far) are also at 
stake. This, as has been argued at length in the previous chapter, makes a morally 
significant difference.4:'
Consider now the morally salient potential collectivity constituted by those 
individuals collectively responsible for environmental harm. Here, I have 
contended, there is a negatively grounded collective duty (and corresponding 
individual duties) to establish and abide by the global decision-making body. 
Given this, the moral burdens objection is already weakened: it is harder to slip 
out o f a responsibility not to harm someone else, just because that person is 
further away, than to evade the more controversial responsibility to help them.
Moreover, this way o f tackling the issue should make things less rather than 
more burdensome for individuals. Chapter One made the point that the 
responsibility in this case is collective. Once the institutional structure envisaged 
in Section II is in place, no individual is required to negate the collective harm 
alone: each has only to play her part in a collective attempt to do so.
Nothing has been said about how collective institutions would allocate duties 
to individuals. However, recalling the moral '‘‘excuses'' o f  the last chapter, it 
should be clear that excessive burdensomeness could exclude an individual from 
having to comply. This is something the environmental body would have to take 
into account in allocating duties. Thus, for example, the owner o f a small but 
polluting factory in a developing country, whose own livelihood or that o f  his 
family depended on the business, would not be required to cut emissions in the 
same way as a major US player would.46
A full discussion o f this topic is beyond the scope o f this project.47 My point, 
for now, is that the imposition o f certain restrictions at global level, to remedy
44 Although we can certainly criticise the state framework in w hich he is obliged to make such a 
choice, and, as Chapter Three made clear, we can say he is underm ining his own flourishing by 
so acting.
43 Chapter Five, Sections 111, IV and V 111
46 As Shue puts it, at the interstate level: ‘ [WJhatever justice may positively  require, it does not 
permit that poor nations be told to sell their  blankets in order that rich nations may keep th e ir  
jew ellery .' (1992 , 397)
47 The question o f  further conditions on the legitim acy o f  a global environm ental decision­
making body w ill be part o f  my post doctoral research. These conditions would include the 
fairness o f  allocation o f  duties.
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collective environmental harm, need not mean depriving individuals o f scope to 
pursue individual projects, and to satisfy their moral duties closer to home.
This should be enough to respond to the moral burdens argument, as a statist 
objection to the institutional framework laid out in Section II. However, a related 
question does arise. I have defended individual duties, derived from collective 
responsibility for harm, to promote institutions (where they do not already exist) 
to address the harm. Moreover, I suggested supplementary individual duties, to 
mimic such duties as would be assigned by a collective decision-making process, 
or to attempt to mitigate the harm directly.48
These also give rise to concerns about burdensomeness. Promotional and 
supplementary duties could clash with individuals' pursuit o f  their own goals, 
with individuals' moral obligations closer to home (for example, their duties to 
their families), or even with each other.
Further discussion is needed o f how far individual duties to promote collective 
institutions should go (when, for example, an individual might instead 
legitimately opt out o f the harming group) and under exactly which 
circumstances supplementary duties come into play. This would naturally take 
account of moral excuses parallel to those discussed in Chapter Five. These 
include cost to the individual, or cost in terms o f preventing worse alternatives, 
o f fulfilling the duties.
Some preliminary remarks were made in Chapter One and I plan to return to it 
in later work, but a thorough discussion o f this issue is beyond the scope o f  the 
current project.49 The potential for conflicting moral duties, including the 
potential for tragic moral clashes, where an individual is stuck between two 
morally bad options, is not unique to my model. I will, accordingly, limit m yself 
to making a few points in defence o f this thesis, and in particular to eliminating 
an especially worrying potential charge: that I have been self-contradictory.
This latter attack arises as follows. Recall that, in Chapter One, I motivated 
my expansion o f collective responsibility in part by appeal to Scheffler, who 
highlighted the difficulty o f addressing some o f the most pressing current global 
problems with only the concept o f individual responsibility. Rather than abandon 
the intuitive pull o f a common sense morality at the individual level, which
4S Chapter One. Section IV
4' This forms part o f  my post doctoral research proposal
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prioritised negative over positive duties and duties to those closer to us over 
those further away, it was suggested that the most constructive approach would 
be to focus on collective responsibility. Now, given that I have argued that an 
individual, as a result o f being part o f a group collectively responsible in a weak 
sense for harm, can acquire certain duties, it might seem that I am back where I 
started: with counterintuitive results.
This is not so. Firstly, it is important to be clear about the line o f argument. As 
specified in Chapter One, the point was never to deny individual responsibilit/es 
with regard to such far-reaching or combined effects altogether, but rather to 
channel them in an appropriate way. The idea was to expand the options for an 
individual, faced with the reality o f the situation, beyond the following, one o f 
which has practically disastrous consequences, and the other o f which is too 
restrictive: do a certain action on the basis that a) you can 't be expected to see 
how that exact act will affect others within the far-reaching global network, and 
b) your act alone won't make any difference anyway; or refrain from the action 
altogether because if everyone acts in the same way, it will bring about harm.
Rather, I have argued that both collectively caused harm, and the possibility 
of collective action to remedy that harm, should be taken into account in 
determining how the group (collectively), and each individual within it, should 
behave. Thus, while individuals may well be expected to behave in certain ways 
because o f collective responsibility for harm, the duties they acquire are derived 
on a different level to those acquired through their individual acts, taken in 
isolation. (That is not to say, however, that one or the other must always take 
priority.)
With this in mind, the following defence can be made against the charge that 
individual promotional and supplementary duties, acquired through collective 
responsibility for harm, impose too heavy a burden. Firstly, it is less burdensome 
if an individual is expected to take into account the fact that the predictable 
combination of acts, including hers, will have a negative impact, than if  she is 
expected to understand the exact impact o f her individual act within the ‘various 
large-scale causal processes and patterns o f activity"*0 within which it is 
subsumed.
,0 Scheffler 2001, 43
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Secondly, with regard to the potential for clash between promotional and 
supplementary duties, Chapter One stated that the former are the primary duties 
incurred by individuals in cases o f weak collective responsibility for harm. 
Supplementary duties come into force if  there is little chance o f the promotional 
efforts succeeding or, if  compatible, alongside th e m /1
Thirdly, relatedly, my discussion o f weak collective responsibility indicated 
that individual mimicking duties would not be morally required if fulfilling them 
would make no difference/2 Thus, the model can (as is practically essential) 
accommodate the far reaching combined impact o f our actions, without requiring 
us, as individuals, to make pointless moral sacrifices.
VI. Past harmers objection
Having tackled the statist objections and acknowledged their wider implications, 
I turn now to an argument which focuses on the collective harm aspect o f my 
defence o f environmental duties.
Caney, debating the fairest way to allocate the burdens o f climate change, 
rejects what he calls the Polluter Pays Principal, in part by appeal to the 
significant proportion o f the harm done by previous generations.53 M ight a 
parallel objection be raised to my reliance on collective responsibility o f current 
generations for environmental harm in deriving collective (and correlative 
individual) duties to tackle climate change?
My response is as follows. Firstly, we arc currently harming, collectively. 
Thus, at the very least, we have a collective responsibility to end that harm. This 
in itself would be enough to make the case for the global decision-making body, 
and for individual duties to promote such an institution.
A second possible reply would go as follows. Recall the discussion o f Chapter 
One, Section IV. There, it was suggested that, however plausible M urphy's claim 
that ‘a principle o f beneficence should not increase its demands on agents as 
expected compliance with the principle by other agents decreases',54 a parallel
31 Chapter One, Section IV
32 Chapter One, Section IV
53 Caney 2005 , 752-62
54 Murphy 1 9 9 3 ,2 7 8
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claim regarding the individual duties incurred through collective responsibility 
for harm would be less obviously acceptable. If the group o f those collectively 
responsible for environmental harm also includes those who, by virtue o f being 
dead, have defaulted on their duties, then, although a morally non-ideal solution, 
it could be that the others in the group should bear the burdens (especially given 
that they began to contribute against a known background o f harm already done). 
However, this line o f argument would require considerable further work.
Thirdly, there remains the other side o f my account. This objection could be 
used to bring out the importance o f combining both lines o f  argument: 
prudentially grounded duties, based on collectivityhood, and negatively morally 
grounded duties, based on membership o f a morally salient potential collectivity. 
It is in most o f our ATC interest not only to stop adding to climate change, but to 
find a way of tackling the harm already done. This supplements the case for a 
global decision-making body, and extends its mandate.
Finally, relatedly, it is the collective body that would then have the 
responsibility for allocating duties to individuals within the collectivity or 
morally salient potential collectivity. The task o f this thesis has been importantly 
different from that o f Caney's book. The question o f how such duties could fairly 
be allocated, which would presumably include considerations o f contribution 
levels, as well o f who benefits, or (as Caney advocates) who can bear the costs, is 
the natural next stage for discussion.
VII. Too inclusive objection
Finally, consider the claim that the account defended in this thesis has not only 
the implications I have defended at the global level, but other, less intuitive 
implications: it is too inclusive. This objection might be levelled at both elements 
o f the case for global environmental decision making, and I will respond by 
considering each in turn.
Begin with the claim that most o f us constitute a collectivity through our ATC 
interest in environmental preservation. The worry is that if  we can derive a global 
(or near global) collectivity and a corresponding prudential incentive to adopt a 
global decision-making body by appeal to some (not necessarily acknowledged) 
interest, we could be opening the door to all sorts o f global authorities. Consider
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a couple of counterintuitive examples. We all have an interest in staying fit and 
healthy. Does this mean we should adopt a global fitness institution, mandated to 
force us to exercise? The preservation o f great art is desired by many, in 
countries all across the world. Should we therefore have a global Department for 
the Arts, with authority to dictate to national and sub national galleries and 
m useum s?55
In both cases, the answer is no. Nor does my model imply otherwise. A 
version o f this objection was already rejected in Chapter Two, Section X. 
Individuals can only become members o f a collectivity through: a genuinely 
(acknowledged) shared goal, selfish goals which require co-operation for their 
achievement (and this is outweighed, as discussed in Chapter Four, Section X, if 
individuals would rather give up the goal than co-operate with the relevant others 
to achieve it), or an ATC interest. The only ATC interest defended in this thesis, 
as applying acknowledged or not, was that each one o f us has in enjoying the 
central human capabilities. Moreover, individuals have to be mutually dependent 
for the satisfaction o f their ATC interest: it has to be something which can only 
be satisfied by all, for all.
These conditions exclude the cases above. While the opportunity for a healthy 
life is a central capability, this does not legitimate forcing individuals to exercise 
the functioning (health or, in this case, fitness, which is only one aspect o f the 
functioning). Even if keeping fit could be said to be in the interest o f each and 
every one o f us, we are not mutually dependent globally for the achievement o f 
this end. It can be pursued individually, or at least through various local, 
voluntary collectivities.
The preservation o f great art is even less obviously in each individual's 
interest, and even if  it were, it does not require pursuit at a global level. The fact 
that many individuals do have an interest in great art, and that they do not share 
the same state, is not enough in itself to require supra-state co-ordination. Unlike 
environmental preservation, it seems to be something that can be left to the art 
industry within each state to sort out. (O f course, a case might be made for 
international co-operation, or even some international court to adjudicate with 
respect to art theft, but that is not quite the same point.)
Thanks to Jonathan W o lff for the exam ples.
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The arguments of the last chapters supplement the response to this objection. 
The case for prudentially-grounded collective decision making has been 
restricted to scenarios where there is a common interest or goal in the sense 
necessary for collectivityhood, and there is a need, according to the kind o f 
argument offered in Chapter Four, for collective action. Chapters Four and Five 
have, moreover, made it clear that further arguments are necessary, even in such 
cases, before the possibility o f legitimate coercive enforcement o f collective 
decisions can be admitted.
Concerns might also be raised about inconclusiveness with regard to the other 
side o f the defence o f global environmental duties: collective responsibility for 
harm. Weak collective responsibility is a very broad notion. I have already had to 
defend it against objections in Chapter One. 56 Now, the question is: if  we can be 
collectively responsible, in a sense giving rise to all these collective and 
correlative individual duties, for environmental damage, how else might we 
acquire such duties? Consider the following cases.
Firstly, suppose a number o f walkers, independently, venture onto an area o f 
apparently solid ground and their combined weight causes a landslide which 
seriously injures other walkers below. Are they collectively morally responsible? 
Secondly, suppose the combined sound o f schoolchildren, chattering in their 
twos and threes as they pass my window for ten minutes or so every morning, 
drives me into a frenzy o f irritation. Does this give them a duty to co-ordinate a 
rota so that only one or two speaks at a time, or some take another route? Finally, 
if a group o f beautiful girls move to a small village and all the young men rush to 
marry them, are they (the beautiful girls and the susceptible men) collectively 
responsible for morally significant harm to the girls already in the village, whom
57the men would otherwise have married? Do they acquire collective and 
correlative individual corrective duties as a result? Are the beautiful girls morally 
required to give up their partners, or at least ship in some other men for the other 
women?
Again, the answer is no. These examples overlook the various restrictions 
imposed by the model, both in terms o f the original conditions for weak
56 Chapter One, Sections IV and V
57 A variant o f  N ozick 's exam ple o f  Z and Z' who are left with no choice but to marry each other, 
repulsive though they find each other, as the more attractive A to Y and A' to Y ’ have already 
paired off. (1974 , 263)
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collective responsibility, and in terms o f the moral “excuses'’ which might be 
allowed to render harm morally permissible.
Recall the two-part sufficient condition for weak collective responsibility, 
introduced in Chapter One, Section III:
• the individuals acted in ways which, in aggregate, caused harm, and 
which they were aware (or could reasonably be expected to have 
foreseen) would, in aggregate, cause harm (although each only 
intentionally performed his own act); and
• they were all aware (or could reasonably be expected to have foreseen) 
that there were enough others similarly placed (and so similarly 
motivated to act) for the combined actions to bring about the harm.
This rules out such one-off, unpredictable cases as that o f the walkers.
Moreover, it has been understood throughout that not all negative impact on 
another person constitutes morally significant harm. While it has not been 
claimed positively that nothing else counts as harm in the relevant sense, the only 
impact on another which it has been asserted should count as morally relevant 
harm is the undermining o f a fundamental interest or capability. This rules out 
the schoolchildren case, although not the marriage one (assuming the village is 
relatively isolated, and this could be the wom en's only chance to form a loving 
relationship and have children).
However, the moral “excuses" outlined in Chapter Five included the cost to 
oneself o f not doing the harming ac tion /8 This applies in the marriage case, 
where the cost to the men and the beautiful women would be being deprived o f 
choice in their life partner. (Appeal to some uncontroversial individual rights, 
notably rights o f self ownership, would also be enough to refute any attempt to 
coercively enforce any demand, even if such a duty could have been 
convincingly defended, for the men to marry the less attractive women.)
Some controversial cases might, however, be included by my model. For 
example, Kemohan highlights cases o f cultural oppression, where (in various 
ways, such as through pornography) a negative impression is perpetuated o f  a
^ S Chapter Five, Section VI
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certain group within society, which leads its members to see themselves as o f 
unequal moral w orth.^ He defends his Accumulative Harm Principle with 
reference to such examples. Discussion o f this kind of cultural oppression is 
beyond the scope o f this thesis but, should it turn out to be a case o f weak 
collective responsibility for harm, on the model defended in Chapter Two, and 
not be ruled out by the excuses o f Chapter Five, I would simply bite the bullet 
and accept the implications in terms o f collective (and correlative individual) 
duties.
I have also left open the possibility that certain global duties o f distributive 
justice could be justified by appeal to the collective harm done, economically, by 
rich westerners (and corporations and governments) to the global poor. Rather 
than ground such duties, as Pogge does, in our upholding an institutional 
framework within which certain individuals' human rights are not met, the 
normative point would be that it is the predictable result o f the combination of 
our individual choices (as consumers, among other things) that many in 
developing countries are restricted to a lifestyle without secure access to central 
capabilities.60 This, as I said in Section III, goes beyond the scope o f my project. 
However, as the cosmopolitan criticism highlighted there makes clear, it is far 
from obvious that such an implication, were it to be demonstrated, would be a 
JAadvantage for my account, or show it to be implausibly inclusive.
Conclusion
This chapter has drawn together the arguments o f the rest o f the thesis, to argue 
that decisions related to environmental protection should (prudentially and 
morally) be made at a global level. These decisions would then be handed down 
as a framework within which nation states (and other supra-state institutions or 
federations) can exercise their political authority. It is further suggested that,
59 Kem ohan 1998, 6-19
60 Pogge 2002, 45-8 . The two questions are already linked by Shue, who argues that a global 
clim ate change policy should not only require richer nations to bear more o f  the costs o f  
prevention, but also to assist poorer nations in coping with such clim ate change as is now  
unpreventable. He argues: 'The rich nations have indisputably so far caused most o f  whatever  
problems there are in the cases o f  ozone depletion and global warming. Consequently, any 
attempt by rich nations to wash their hands o f  any resultant harms that are not prevented w ould  
be doubly unfair.' (1 9 9 2 .3 9 1 )
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those nation states having made their legislative, executive and judicial decisions, 
sub-state communities should be left with space in which to pursue their common 
goals.
To make such environmental decisions globally will require some kind of 
global institution. This is exactly the kind of suggestion designed to raise western 
hackles. However, four statist arguments have been rejected, rebutting a 
challenge to the Decision-M aking Claim and the assignment of authority to 
political and social structures sketched on the back o f it. Objections to the overall 
model have also been acknowledged, and largely rejected.
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Conclusion
This thesis has argued for global institutional change: in particular, it has 
advocated a global environmental decision-making body.
I have defended a collective moral duty to tackle climate change, derived from 
our collective moral responsibility, in a weak but significant sense, for 
environmental harm, both to future generations and to those (primarily the global 
poor) whose central capabilities are already threatened by environmental 
damage. 1 have also defended a collective prudential incentive to do so, by 
appeal to the idea that most humans are members o f a global collectivity. The 
achievement o f this morally required, collectively rational goal requires us, I 
have argued, to make the relevant decisions qua collectivity (i.e. at the global 
level) and hand them down as restrictions on individual (and state) action. In 
other words, a global decision-making structure is required.
I have argued that powers o f enforcement over non-complying individuals (or 
states) will also be necessary. Chapter Five made a significant step towards 
justifying such coercive authority, by appeal to a collectivised version o f M ill's 
Harm Principle. It also offered a more tentative case for legitimate collective 
coercion, based on a modified version o f  H art's Principle o f Fairness, 
supplemented by appeal to positive moral claims.
The proposed changes to the global institutional framework have been 
defended against four statist objections, and the arguments o f the overall thesis 
defended against two further attacks. The fact, brought out by Caney, that much 
environmental harm was done by earlier generations, serves, it was argued, not to 
undermine my collective harm-based argument, but only to reinforce the 
importance o f both sides o f my model. Moreover, I have argued that the account 
defended here is not rendered weak by its inclusivity. It may have some 
controversial implications, but not clearly counterintuitive ones.
However, there are limits to what it has been possible to achieve. Only one side 
o f the Decision-Making Claim o f Chapter Six was defended in any detail. The 
other side gives rise to a familiar communitarian argument: that too much 
authority has been ceded from the state to substate collectivities. Conversely, 
cosmopolitans about global justice would be likely to complain that the transfer
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of power upwards does not go far enough: that the global institution should 
enforce global duties o f distributive justice. Both these points are beyond the 
scope o f this thesis, although they are interesting topics in themselves and it is 
plausible that my model could be extended into the global justice debate.
More importantly, in terms o f the aims o f this specific project, two key points 
call for further debate. Firstly, Chapter One defended an individual duty to 
promote the necessary collective structures to address weak collective harm, and 
suggested two supplementary individual duties: to mimic the duties such an 
institution would assign, or to attempt to mitigate the harm. As Chapter Six 
acknowledged, in the environmental case, these could impose considerable costs 
on individuals. They could be burdensome in terms o f clashes with both 
individual projects and moral duties acquired as individuals or members o f 
smaller collectivities. Thus, questions were raised as to when, and to what extent, 
an individual would be morally obliged to fulfil her collectively-derived duties. 
These questions were left open.
Secondly, more work is needed on whether a conclusive defence o f the 
coercive enforcement o f environmental duties (in general) is available through 
the line o f argument sketched in Chapter Five, Sections VII and VIII. Relatedly, 
questions arise as to what criteria any particular global environmental institution 
would have to meet before it could be said to have legitimate authority. Such 
criteria are likely to include conditions regarding both the representativeness o f 
the decision-making process (or at least, perhaps, its ensuring that all have the 
opportunity to be represented), and the fairness o f the distribution o f burdens.
Two further issues, barely touched on in this project, also naturally suggest 
themselves. I have talked very little about the issue o f population growth, but this 
is a key contributor to climate change and, as such, would presumably need to be 
addressed by any global environmental decision-making structure. However, any 
regulation is likely to provoke emotive objections, and appeal to an individual 
"right to procreate”.1 Moreover, I have done no more than hint that the model 
could be expanded to include (at least) sentient non-human animals, whose 
flourishing can be said to have moral value and who could, using an expansion o f 
the capabilities approach, be said to have certain fundamental interests.
1 See also Chapter One, Footnote 50 for a specific  problem relating to overpopulation and weak  
co llective responsibility.
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I hope, in my next research project, to give all four o f these points the 
attention they merit. This thesis could only ever be a start. However, it has 
covered considerable ground. 1 have outlined a normative framework within 
which to tackle some o f our most pressing global problems, and indicated how it 
might be applied to what is arguably the most pressing o f them all. I hope that 
this, in itself, is both philosophically interesting and practically relevant.
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